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ABSTRACT 
 
ETHAN LECHNER: Composers as Ethnographers: Difference in the Imaginations of 
Colin McPhee, Henry Cowell, and Lou Harrison 
(Under the Direction of Sarah Weiss) 
 
This is a study of the ideas of musical difference held by three twentieth-century 
composers—Colin McPhee, Henry Cowell, and Lou Harrison. Each wrote about culture, 
and was thus in a broad sense an ethnographer, and each was influenced by non-Western 
musics in the development of innovative compositional techniques. I discuss how their 
very different views on non-Western musics were inextricable from other aspects of their 
professional work. I compare their ideas to those of his closest colleagues and contrast 
them with dominant anthropological understandings of culture difference in the twentieth 
century, particularly the attitude of cultural relativism dominant in Ethnomusicology. In 
the introduction I discuss the importance of formulations of differences to American 
modernist composers generally, in particular the lines of differentiation they drew among 
their own music, “conventional” Western music, European music, Romantic music, 
“Oriental music,” and “primitive music.” I argue that modernists very often formulated 
their representations of non-Western musics through the same process of negation of 
conventional ideals and styles by which they developed their own aesthetic programs. 
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PREFACE 
 
My original goal for this dissertation was to come to an understanding of cultural 
difference that could account for hybridity in the compositions of a variety of composers. 
In the end, I do not claim to have come to such an understanding, or to have arrived at an 
analytical approach that can account for music that subsumes difference in the manners 
of works as varied as Colin McPhee’s Tabuh-tabuhan, Henry Cowell’s United Quartet, 
and Lou Harrison’s Double Concerto. My subjects have not cooperated with that aim. 
Each approached the issue of cultural difference uniquely—though certainly not in 
isolation from others grappling with the same issues—so that I have been drawn away 
from my original goal of explicating a single method by which to analyze them all, and 
have been forced to delve more deeply into their particularities. The analyses that I have 
done, then, have necessarily become specific to the terms by which each of these 
composers dealt with the same concerns that were originally my own: namely, the 
bafflement of cultural difference, and how, in the context of music, differences 
sometimes dissolve into sameness. 
I had originally planned to develop a theory of intentional hybridization in 
composition. Through the development of the study, I have been forced to come to terms 
with the insight that meaning (defined broadly to encompass all aspects of musical 
experience) is not inherent to music but is something that arises in the moment, imputed 
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by the listener willingly or unwillingly. This implies that hybridity is also not something 
that can be considered immanent to music and analyzed as such, but is something that 
must be considered in the terms by which it is ascribed. Thus, the central question of the 
project has been transformed from How can the hybrid qualities of the musics of various 
composers be understood? to How did various composers understand their musics as 
hybrid, on what terms did they stake their claims to hybridity, and how did they articulate 
their claims to others? The result is that the word hybrid, which was the central concept 
of the dissertation at its conception, is now practically absent from my discussion. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“Loosely speaking, every one interested in modern music realizes there is some 
resemblance between certain aspects of primitive and of contemporary music.” 
Henry Cowell, 1933 
 
In his introductory overview of “modernism” for the Oxford History of Western 
Music, Richard Taruskin comments on the special relationship the movement had with its 
time: 
To make an ism out of being modern is on the face of it paradoxical, since if 
modern simply means "of or pertaining to present and recent time" (as one 
dictionary defines it), then everyone is modern by default, and always has been, 
since we cannot live at any other time than the present. To be modernist, then, 
is more than to be modern. Modernism is not just a condition but a commitment. 
   It asserts the superiority of the present over the past (and, by implication, of the 
future over the present), with all that that implies in terms of optimism and faith in 
progress."1 
 
Based on my own examination of United States composers of the first half of the 
twentieth century, it appears that Taruskin’s statement can be amplified somewhat. 
Modernism was characterized not only by enthusiasm for the progressive aspects of the 
present, but also by antipathy for the present’s recalcitrant mainstream. Modernism’s 
feelings for the immediate past (specifically the nineteenth century) were largely 
disdainful, while its feelings for the long past were often admiring. With respect to the 
                                                 
1
 Richard Taruskin, The Early Twentieth Century, volume 4 of The Oxford History of Western Music 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 1. 
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rest of the world, modernism in the U.S. was often pointedly dismissive towards Europe, 
while it was concerned with gaining deeper understanding and appreciation of the musics 
of the non-West and its own “folk” and indigenous “primitives.” As will be seen, within 
the minds of modernists all of these issues were inextricably related. 
For modernism, particularly in America, cultural difference was always an immediate 
concern, even when it was not the explicit concern. This fact is reflected in the intensive 
study of non-Western musics in which modernists frequently engaged, and which is 
documented in their writings. It is also reflected in the frequent allusions to non-Western 
musics in their compositions. In this dissertation I examine how in both of these idioms, 
writing and composition, modernists represented both particular non-Western musics and 
the nature of the world’s cultural divisions in general. This introduction explicates the 
most general features of modernist thinking about difference, and the remainder of this 
dissertation analyses the written and musical works of Colin McPhee, Henry Cowell, and 
Lou Harrison.2  
By way of introduction to these issues, consider Stravinsky, who said, 
“Expressiveness has never been an immanent feature of music.”3 By what means did 
Stravinsky ascertain certainty about the “immanent” features of music? By what methods 
of induction or deduction and by what evidence did he arrive at this knowledge? As we 
will see, one cannot get far tracing this notion and others like it without encountering the 
ideas about cultural difference (and non-difference) that were in circulation at the time, 
                                                 
2
 For my purposes here I define modernism circularly. My modernists are those twentieth-century 
composers who formed a discourse community, whose style of thinking about cultural difference it is my 
primary purpose here to explicate.  
 
3
 Stravinsky, An Autobiography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), 53. 
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both within the modernist composers’ own community and beyond it in other fields. 
Knowledge of the “immanent features” of music, whatever they were believed to be, was 
sooner or later connected to ideas about non-Western musics, either developed through 
direct observation or, as frequently, through imaginative imputation.  
Indeed, Stravinsky made his above statement about the nature of music—as a 
universal phenomenon—in the course of describing the Russian folk poetry, in which he 
had observed this essential, elemental quality of non-expression (and upon which he had 
imputed it). It was as if, by simple virtue of being distant from Western European 
bourgeois culture, Russian folk peasants could by negative association be cited as the 
bearers of music’s most elemental, “immanent” properties. It was also as if, by simple 
virtue of being Western, the music of the bourgeois concert hall could be regarded as in a 
strange way disconnected from its truest nature, its own “primitive” essence.  
Stravinsky also stated, “It is in the nature of things—and it is this which determines 
the uninterrupted march of evolution in art quite as much as in other branches of human 
activity—that epochs which immediately precede us are temporarily farther away from us 
than others which are more remote in time.”4 This statement provides a summary of the 
modernist position vis-à-vis its others as I have observed it. It indicates a belief in the 
unified march of culture, and an acknowledgement of the propensity to value that which 
was far removed in time and to regard with antipathy that which came directly before. It 
is the aim of this dissertation to elucidate how this style of thought played out, albeit in 
quite various ways, in the writings and compositions of Colin McPhee, Lou Harrison, and 
Henry Cowell. 
                                                 
4
 Stravisnky, An Autobiography, 91. 
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If there were features of the American modernist preoccupation with difference that 
were historically peculiar, certainly the tendency of these composers to construct an 
identity for themselves—both as individuals and as a movement—in antithesis to a 
constructed other predated them. In very general terms, earlier ideas about cultural 
difference, those dominant among anthropologists in the 19th-century United States, had 
been largely focused upon paradigms that placed “civilized” society as unambiguously 
superior to all others by dint of its supposedly higher evolutionary state. Whether through 
explicit, theorized racism or through a notion of unilinear cultural evolution without 
racial differentiation as its basis, non-Western peoples were understood as crude and 
irrational, and their artistic products were in a significant sense irrelevant to the 
“civilized” person.5 If a great deal of effort was expended in proving this to be the case, it 
was then possible for a person of distinction to expend little effort looking to other 
cultures for artistic and intellectual guidance. Indeed, we can witness many 
representations of non-Western people and their music by 19th-century composers in the 
U.S. and Europe that were fanciful, sensational, and unconcerned with veracity.  
This style of thought has been discussed at length in musicological criticisms of 19th-
century representations of the ethnic other (particularly in opera). It has been frequently 
argued that there was an all-but-total disconnect between such musical representations 
and that which was represented. There was, in other words, a great deal of fantasy. Susan 
McClary, for instance, notes that to consider Bizet’s Carmen as an example of Spanish 
                                                 
5
 Three resources on the history of anthropology that I have found invaluable in this study are George 
W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York: The 
Free Press, 1968); Adam Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1988); and Ronald E. Martin, The Languages of Difference: American 
Writers and Anthropologists Reconfigure the Primitive, 1878-1940 (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 
2005). 
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music “confuses the image of the ethnic other concocted by the Northern European with 
the thing itself…” Bizet did some research into Spanish music by studying arrangements 
of Spanish folk songs, but “any ‘authentic’ Spanish flavor Bizet received from this 
source too was already heavily mediated.” McClary states definitively that, despite “the 
influence of actual Spanish, Spanish-American or gypsy sources…Bizet’s agenda was 
not ethnography.” 6  
The very broad cultural trend that tended to validate styles of representation that were 
fantasies (or all but), has come to be referred to in academic discourse as “Orientalism,” 
and in musicological discourse it is often referred to as either “Orientalism” or 
“exoticism.” In musicological discussions, the term Orientalism refers most often to 
musical representations that were created, as McClary states of Carmen, “not through 
instinct or by virtue of … borrowing from ethnic sources, but rather by means of [a] well 
developed set of signs that … audiences shared…” (p. 54). To describe an opera as truly 
“exoticist” is then to state that the various signs (including musical ones) that it used to 
represent the other had only an arbitrary relationship to any actual person or peoples. 
For this study, what marks the rise of musical modernism is the intellectual shift 
among a few early-twentieth-century composers in which explicitly condescending 
attitudes towards the “pre-civilized” were no longer compelling, and the rights of a 
composer to freely engage in fantasy was severely curtailed. A corresponding shift in 
anthropology was associated with Franz Boas. Beginning roughly with his critique of 
                                                 
6
 Susan McClary, George Bizet: Carmen (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 53-54. On 19th-
century musical exoticism, see also Ralph P. Locke, “Cutthroats and Casbah Dancers, Muezzins and 
Timeless Sands: Musical Images of the Middle East,” in The Exotic in Western Music, Jonathan Bellman, 
ed. (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1998), 104-136. Also in that collection see Richard Taruskin, 
‘Entoiling the Falconet’, Russian Musical Orientalism in Context,” 194-217. 
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anthropological racism in The Mind of Primitive Man, anthropologists began focusing 
their studies of non-Western peoples into critiques both of the cultural biases in 
anthropological theories and of Western societal norms more broadly, rather than 
proceeding with an assumption the West’s unassailable superiority, against which non-
Western cultures were measured and inevitably found to be inferior.  
Corresponding trends in the arts began to make use of non-Western artistic products 
(as observed and as imagined), which had previously been regarded as culturally inferior, 
into critiques of prevailing aesthetics. For instance, as we will see in Chapter 2, where 
contemporary aesthetic norms called for continuous melodiousness, the other was 
invoked as a case for disjunction and percussiveness. When norms called for grand and 
amorphous orchestral sounds, the other was invoked as a case for sparseness and clarity. 
When norms demanded expressiveness, the other was invoked in the case for non-
expression. The other represented a new source of authority, not based upon its 
acquisition of “civilization” but upon its very freedom from it. If faith in the superiority 
of “civilization” had produced absolutist arguments about the nature of music as a 
universal phenomenon, the new primitivist epistemology countered these with 
absolutisms of its own. 
Pierre Boulez, for instance, made such statements in the tersest way, for to him there 
were only a few very distinct things that were of interest about “Oriental music,” and 
those he understood as antitheses to aspects of Western music: “the time structure, the 
conception of time being different; the idea of anonymity; the idea of a work of art not 
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being admired as a masterpiece but as an element of spiritual life.”7 Beyond these points 
there was only “great foolishness” in going to the “the Orient,” for its music “that has 
attained perfection is now frozen, and if there is no modern Oriental music it is because 
those peoples have lost their vigour.” The particular aspects of “Oriental music” that 
interested Boulez differed from those that interested the three composers of this study, 
and his tone was far more arrogant than theirs. Yet, his manner of discovering Oriental 
music,” seeing it purely as a reflection of his own aesthetic concerns will be echoed in 
each chapter of this dissertation.  
With the rise of modernism, constructions of difference were coming to serve a new 
function and assuming a new form. It was not so much that among artists and 
anthropologists discussions of difference were moving past binary paradigms, but that the 
way in which such oppositions were drawn began to shift. Before modernism (and to a 
great extent continuing concurrently with it), discussions of difference had focused upon 
the poverty of value in non-Western culture. This lack was opposed with, and gave shape 
to, the high value of the favored arts of “civilization.” Edward Said has described this 
dualism as structural to Orientalist thought and furthermore as integral to the construction 
of the Western image of itself. He summarizes the 19th-century propensity to categorize 
humanity into groups as based upon a 
rigidly binomial opposition of “ours” and theirs,” with the former always 
encroaching upon the latter (even to the point of making “theirs exclusively a 
function of “ours”)…. “Our” values were (let us say) liberal, humane, correct; 
they were supported by the tradition of belles-lettres, informed scholarship, 
                                                 
7
 Pierre Boulez, “Oriental Music: A Lost Paradise?” in Orientations (London: Faber, 1986): 421. For a 
critique of Boulez’s view of culture see Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the 
Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-garde (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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rational inquiry; as Europeans (and white men) “we” shared in them every time 
their virtues were extolled.8 
 
Now with modernism a double opposition was formulated: first was that between the 
non-West and the West, in which the non-West was interpreted as a newly significant if 
not superior source of influence for artists; second was the opposition between the small 
modernist movement and the mainstream of society. This meant that, with these two 
oppositions, modernism took the innovative step of correlating its own ideas and styles 
with those of non-Western people, rather than with the supposedly superior “West” (with 
which it self-identified, if only for rhetorical purposes).  
As an example, we can observe Debussy commenting upon Sundanese (West 
Javanese) music that he heard in 1889 as, “able to express every shade of meaning, even 
unmentionable shades, and which make our tonic and dominant seem like ghosts.”9 
Though Debussy’s encounter with gamelan was far more casual than that of the three 
American composers I focus upon here, in this structuring of oppositions they were alike. 
In remarking upon the relative merits of Sundanese music over Western music, he was on 
the one hand remarking that “theirs” was better than “ours.” On the other hand, once we 
take a closer look at that which was “ours” we see that Debussy did not in fact 
unequivocally identify with it, but that it was precisely what he aimed to distance himself 
from. By 1895 when he made these comments he had himself developed a compositional 
                                                 
8
 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Said’s analysis of the Orientalist 
tradition has been critiqued by some as reductive. For a critical assessment of Orientalism’s impact on 
academia, see Daniel Martin Varisco, Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid (Seattle and London: 
Univ. of Washington Press, 2007). See also James Clifford, “On Orientalism,” in The Predicament of 
Culture (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988), 255-76. 
 
9
 Debussy to Pierre Louÿs, 1895, quoted in Edward Lockspier, Debussy: His Life and Mind (London: 
Cassell, 1962): 1, 115. For a detailed account of the music presented at the Kampong javanais at the 1889 
Paris World’s Fair see Annegret Fauser, Musical Encounters at the 1889 Paris World’s Fair (Rochester: 
Univ. of Rochester Press, 2005). 
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idiom which had distorted conventional tonic and dominant (for instance in Pelléas et 
Melisande and Prélude à l’après-midi d’un faune), and he did so, if not in direct imitation 
of Javanese music, then with an either/or mentality through which Javanese music and his 
own fell into ideological alignment.10 He made this either/or concept more explicit in a 
1913 statement of how the Javanese were different from “civilized” peoples: 
There were, and there still are, despite the evils of civilization, some delightful 
native peoples for whom music is as natural as breathing. Their conservatoire is 
the eternal rhythm of the sea, the wind among the leaves and the thousand sounds 
of nature which they understand without consulting an arbitrary treatise. Their 
traditions reside in old songs, combined with dances, built up throughout the 
centuries. Yet Javanese music is based on a type of counterpoint by comparison 
with which that of Palestrina is child’s play. And if we listen without European 
prejudice to the charm of their percussion we must confess that our percussion is 
like primitive noises at a country fair.11 
 
We may note that each aspect of Debussy’s representation of these “delightful native 
peoples” was articulated in antithesis from some aspect of Western culture that had 
become tiresome to him. If “their” music was natural, this implied that “ours” was 
contrived. If “theirs” was drawn from the elements of humans and nature, “ours” was 
                                                 
 
10
 For a summary of the literature addressing how Debussy was influenced by gamelan, see Annegret 
Fauser, “French Encounters with the Far East,” chapter 4 in Musical Encounters at the 1889 World’s Fair 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2005). Fauser writes, “In general terms, Debussy’s 
orchestra, especially in Nocturnes (1987-99) and La Mer (1903-5), has been described as a “stylized 
gamelan” because of the often layered instrumentation. The superimposition of different timbral, 
rhythmical, and registral strata is also one of the character traits of works such as Pagodes and has been 
identified as influenced by the gamelan” (p. 199). Of particular relevance to my present discussion of 
modernist ideology is Fauser’s observation that the musicological literature has tended to read Debussy’s 
encounter with the gamelan in terms of a propulsion towards innovation, a peculiarly modernist narrative: 
“The musical innovations of Debussy’s piano music with respect to structure and harmonic language can 
thus be understood through his encounters with a new sound-world. His new sonorities then found their 
basis in complex materials appropriated from a different world, and their presence could thus be attributed 
to a rupture with tradition—a concept dear to the ideology of modernism—rather than to the more 
suspicious notion of late-nineteenth-century French eclecticism within a continuous development of the 
Western tradition” (p. 200). See also Richard Mueller, “Javanese Influence on Debussy’s Fantasie and 
Beyond,” Nineteenth-Century Music 10 (autumn 1986-87): 157-86;.and Mervyn Cooke, “’The East in the 
West’: Evocations of the Gamelan in Western Music,” in The Exotic in Western Music, ed. Jonathan 
Bellman (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1998), 258-80. 
 
11
 Debussy, Revue S.I.M., quoted in Lockspier, Debussy, 115. 
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inscribed in arbitrary treatises. If “their” percussion was sophisticated, our “civilized” 
percussion was, ironically, “primitive.”  
What I am identifying as the modernist style of thinking amounted to a reversal but 
not necessarily a revision of earlier ethnocentricity. Although Debussy used of the word 
“primitive” as a criticism of the percussion of Western culture, he was not actually 
overturning the dominant cultural evolutionist paradigm in which “primitives,” 
conceived of as aboriginal peoples of Africa, America, Asia, and Australia, were 
understood to persist in the same state as Europe’s long past. It was a reversal of the 
system of values that underlay the paradigm, but his statement maintained evolutionist 
logic. Whether it was good or bad to be “civilized,” what remained certain was that some 
people were, and others were not. And what it was to be “not-civilized” could be 
determined simply by imagining the opposite of what it was to be “civilized”: to be 
uncontrived, to draw one’s music from nature, and have sophisticated percussion 
techniques. Even with as limited direct contact as the World’s Fair provided him, 
Debussy could deduce such knowledge of the lives of the Javanese performers, for he 
possessed, as a supplement to his limited contact with the musicians there, a battery of 
preconceptions about the binomial differences between “civilized” and “non-civilized” 
peoples.  
Many parallels will be found among the three composers of this study. Though in his 
publications Cowell often described specific, geographically located musical traditions, 
he also frequently referred to both “primitive” and “Oriental” musics as broad classes, 
without any reference to actual temporally or geographically located persons or peoples,. 
“Primitives,” he noted for instance, did not make distinctions between speech and song, 
 24 
whereas, of course, Westerners did.12 It is most likely that in cases such as this Cowell’s 
“primitives” were functions of his Westerners, derived through imaginative assumption 
about what would be the opposite of them: if Westerners differentiated between speech 
and song, primitives surely did not. “Orientals” then occupied a space along a continuum 
drawn between “moderns” and their “primitive” opposites. This form of thinking, 
apparent in many anthropological accounts of the “primitive”—in other words most 
anthropological writing prior to the rise of Boasian relativism, and many thereafter as 
well—has been described by Adam Kuper: 
For [the anthropologists] modern society was defined above all by the territorial 
state, the monogamous family and private property. Primitive society therefore 
must have been nomadic, ordered by blood ties, sexually promiscuous and 
communist. . . . [Anthropologists] looked back in order to understand the nature 
of the present, on the assumption that modern society had evolved from its 
antithesis.13  
 
Debussy’s representation of the Javanese was more romanticized and less informed 
than were the representations by the three composers of this study, but in its structuring 
of antitheses it was the same. As will be seen, even after years of study in Bali, McPhee 
also constructed his representations of Balinese music so as to conform to certain pre-
formed categories occupying the thinking of his composer colleagues, describing 
Balinese music as in many ways the antithesis of 19th-century European music: as non-
expressive, as socially functional, as rhythmically complex, and as orchestrally lean. As 
mentioned, Cowell made primitivist statements similar to Debussy’s, and developed 
ideas about “primitive” music based simply upon assumptions that it would be the 
                                                 
12
 This statement appears in Cowell’s unpublished manuscript, The Nature of Melody (hereafter cited 
as NOM), Henry Cowell Collection, New York Public Library for the Performing Arts (hereafter cited as 
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opposite of “cultivated” music. Harrison’s views of Java were different from Debussy’s, 
far more informed by careful study of gamelan, but no less determined by what he saw 
Javanese music to not be.  
As early as 1931, Charles Seeger noted the tendency among his modernist colleagues 
to create their own music through negation of conventional styles:  
Most modern composition seems to restrict itself to a comparatively narrow 
variety of moods. In avoiding romantic sentiments, there has been little left except 
excitement, which is not an emotion or sentiment. . . In its abhorrence of the 
pretty, the sentimental, the self-pitying revelry, the exuberant optimism and 
subjectivism of romantic ardor, modern music has run almost entirely to the 
grotesque, the unsentimental, the merely exciting, and the almost inevitable 
pessimism of pure objectivity.14 
 
To a great extent, American modernists not only forged self identity and compositional 
style through negation of “romantic sentiments,” “prettiness,” and so forth, but conceived 
of non-Western musics through a similar process of negation. They defined their bearers 
of “the truth about music” in contrast with European styles and particularly with 
Romanticism, for instance by representing them as rhythmically rather than harmonically 
complex, or as utterly inexpressive, out of contrast with the emotiveness of Romanticism.  
This style of constructing the other through contrast from familiar cultural figurations 
served a double function. On the one hand, it provided the modernists with an image of 
the other from which they could easily draw influence by virtue of its very perfect 
dissimilarity from familiar musical style. The other was created on familiar terms 
through the simple inversion of its aspects. This constituted an enormously rich way of 
developing original material in a heartbeat, and offered a potent opportunity for 
modernists to think their way out of the hegemonic modes (not just musical ones). On the 
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other hand, this method of conceptualizing non-Western musics functioned to create a 
source of authority for the validation of the music modernists had already composed, 
even if it had not in fact been directly inspired by any non-Western image. These two 
tendencies went hand in hand, and their reciprocal relationship propelled some of the 
stylistic shift of the twentieth century. The modernist created the other in his own image, 
while fashioning himself after his imagined other. 
This raises the question, whom did the modernist really imagine to be his other?15 
Was it the non-Western person, or was it the other musician of his own society who was 
stuck in European styles of the 19th century, or in some other sense ignorant of the “truth 
about music” as it was apparent to the modernist himself? If the question is which was 
the object of the American modernist’s antipathy (at least as evidenced in his 
publications), then the answer is clearly the other Western musician. For instance, Boulez 
exhibited this attitude in the above quotation, for although he spoke dismissively about 
“Oriental musics,” his real adversary, the real other that he sought to intellectually 
dominate, was the Western composer who might look for false forms of inspiration in 
“Oriental musics.” The reality of “Oriental music” itself was only represented in order to 
win an argument that was internal to his own community of composers.16  
                                                 
15
 I will occasionally use the pronoun his to refer to a general, non-specific modernist composer. I have 
chosen to do so as an acknowledgement that musical modernism was a largely male (an often masculinist) 
historical movement. Otherwise, in referring to members of mixed-gender populations I write he/she, 
his/her. 
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 Born and Hesmondhalgh have made a similar though not identical argument about the modernist’s 
other being the popular culture of his/her own society: “…mass culture is modernism’s other in music as in 
the other arts, while references to ‘authentic’ folk and ethnic musics, primitive and exotic constructions, 
have remained more enduring and acceptable as forms of appropriation and projection in music” (Western 
Music and Its Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music, ed. Georgina Born and 
David Hesmondhalgh [Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000], 16). They focus more upon “high 
modernism” than upon the “eclectic modernists” of this study. Though antipathy to popular music is 
apparent in the writings of these three composers, I have not found it to be nearly as recurrent a theme as 
antipathy to other styles of art music, particularly European ones.  
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A recurrent tendency of the composers of New Music—which will be seen again and 
again in the three studies that follow—was their taking exception to the prevailing 
musical norms as coercive and tiresome. The non-Western counterexample to these 
norms offered both the opportunity and the compulsion to innovate. As noted, it is not 
necessarily the case that one of these aspects preceded the other. The desire to innovate 
led the modernist to new investigations into the musics of others; meanwhile, 
investigations of the musics of other produced revelations that necessitated innovation. 
In the effort to challenge Western hegemony modernists frequently found it 
imperative to go beyond merely introducing examples of alternative forms of music-
making, and to make absolutist statements about music and humanity staked upon 
representations of such other musics. The other offered not merely another example of 
how music might be made, but was a key to a singular “truth about music” which 
modernists sought to ascertain, in much the same way that Foucault describes 19th-
century scientists having sought the “truth about sex.”17 The tendency to seek the “truth 
about music” among modernists might be regarded as part of a larger intellectual 
holdover from the nineteenth-century. As Martin describes:  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ethnic researchers had gone 
into the field and into the libraries with many varied agendas and subagendas, but 
most usually with the ethnocentric assumption of objective expert authority and 
the propensity, in the standard style of nineteenth-century science, to steer their 
findings into the channels of universal truths about human nature and societies.18  
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 The following quote from Foucault on the notion of “suppressed sexuality” as ripe with parallels in 
the modernist discourse on what might be called “suppressed musicality”: “The notion of repressed sex is 
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grandiloquence of a discourse purporting to reveal the truth about sex, modify its economy within reality, 
subvert the law that governs it, and change its future” (Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 8. If one replaces the word “sex” 
with “music” one comes very close to a summary of the position common among modernist composer. 
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 Martin, The Languages, 12. 
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Though modernists constantly advocated revolt from the cultural molds of the 19th-
century, ironically their means toward their revolutionary ends were in this case 
retentions of the 19th-century scientific positivism. The methods and findings varied 
significantly, and yet the tendency to seek such “truths about music” through totalizing 
schemas was pervasive, and non-Western culture was one of the key objects of study 
toward that aim. This will be seen to be especially clear in the chapters on Cowell and 
Harrison that follow. 
Modernist composers were usually only casual consumers of anthropological ideas. 
For this reason, there is little terminological unity evidenced within modernist 
publications when they refer to issues of cultural difference. I will use terms such as 
“primitive” and “exotic” in reference to particular threads of modernist thought, even 
though they were occasionally used differently by the modernists themselves. The term 
“primitive” is an important case in point, for while I have found relatively few uses of the 
term in modernist publications, and while primitivism is not often thought of as having 
been as significant a movement among early-20th-century composers as among visual 
artists, a great deal of the ideas about difference articulated by modernist composers 
implied evolutionist and primitivist styles of thought.19  
For instance, McPhee was probably equivocal in his regard of the Balinese as 
“primitives,” and yet he often implied that the Balinese were the bearers of elemental 
human traits, which implied primitivism. When Cowell wrote about “Orientals” he was 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19
 On primitivism as a literary movement literature, see Michael Bell, Primitivism (London: Methuen 
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not speaking about the same category of humanity as “primitives,” and yet he was 
referring to an evolutionary schema that implied the existence of “primitives” as a 
category less developed than “Orientals.” Furthermore, Cowell sometimes decried the 
term “primitive” as condescending, while in the same utterance affirming that there were 
categories of humanity ranging from least to most advanced (even at the point when 
Cowell lost his taste for the word “primitive,” he continued to refer to a least advanced 
stage of human cultural development, the notion of which would have popularly been 
called “primitives,” “barbarians,” or “savages”). Harrison did not much refer to 
“primitives,” but he did remark that there were “primitives.” His own interests were in 
“cultivated Oriental” peoples, a category which took definition in contrast from 
“primitive” peoples (Harrison probably was most influenced by Cowell in his 
understanding of differences between “primitive” and “cultivated” peoples). 
The objective of modernists in this regard was most often counter-institutional, in so 
far as their findings about musical “truths” were articulated as challenges to what they 
saw as the hegemonic order. As far as this goes these modernists might be regarded as 
“relativists,” for non-Western musics were important to them in the critique of 
absolutisms in contemporary currency. None of these ethnographer/composers, however, 
were epistemological relativists. They did not maintain that knowledge was ultimately 
relative to culture, and that universals were actually ethnocentrisms. Each of them held 
absolutist views on the “truth about music.” I will discuss the subtlety of this distinction 
at length in regard to Cowell, who in spite of and indeed because of his positivistic style 
of inquiry was a bearer of current relativist ideals of tolerance and pluralism.  
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Both the non-Western other and the mainstream Western other were constructions of 
the modernist imagination. I wish to emphasize that for the purposes of this study what I 
am explicating and critiquing is the non-West only in terms of its existence in the minds 
of modernists. I am not, in the following criticisms of the images of difference held by 
Colin McPhee, Henry Cowell, and Lou Harrison, attempting to clear away their 
“misunderstandings” so that the correct “understandings” may emerge. I reiterate that if 
the identity of the non-Western other, of the mainstream other, and of the modernist 
himself were all constructions, this is not to say any was simply a fantasy. As noted, 
many modernists expended a great deal of effort in their studies of non-Western musical 
practices, the three that I focus on being particularly notable examples, and their 
representations continue to be compelling in many regards. If, for the purposes of this 
study, the other ultimately only existed as images in the mind of these composers, this is 
not to say that these were images uninformed by careful study and even interaction. 
It is also important to emphasize that, though at moments in this study I will describe 
a particular representation of the other having given rise to a particular style, or a 
particular stylistic concern having given shape to the representation of the other, 
ultimately none of these factors should be understood to have preceded the other two. 
The modernist’s conception of his mainstream other was continuously reinvented with 
his shifting conception of the non-Western other. His self-conception was continuously 
reborn in opposition to his shifting conception of his mainstream opponent. His non-
Western person or peoples were continuously re-imagined as correlates to his shifting 
concept of self. This process of reciprocation is discussed in greater concreteness in the 
Chapter on McPhee.  
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Even in cases, such as that described by Kuper above, in which the attributes of 
“primitives” seem to have been invented purely by calculating the antitheses to the 
attributes of “civilization,” there is still the question of how and why certain attributes of 
civilization became problematized in the first place. How did Kuper’s anthropologists 
come to reflect on there being anything peculiar about their territorial states, 
monogamous families, and private properties? It was only by encountering, at some 
historical moment, that which seemed to be startlingly non-territorial, non-monogamous, 
non-private, and hence non-civilized. Similarly, modernist composers’ problematizations 
of Western musical norms were the result of modernist engagements with difference in 
some form. Constructions of difference as a world-wide phenomenon meanwhile fell into 
shape along the ideological fault lines of contemporary Western discourse. Neither came 
prior to the other. 
Similitude as a Key to Hybrid Composition 
If so far I have emphasized the importance of dichotomization in the imagining of 
difference by modernist composers, I have done so to a great extent in order to point to 
the most important compositional technique that modernist composers employed in their 
compositional engagements with difference. This was the flip-side of the construction of 
difference: the construction of sameness, or, as I will call it, “similitude.” The 
construction of similitude was most precisely a strategy of constructing knowledge of 
foreign musics in a manner by which those musics could become sources of influence. 
Similitudes were those features of music that could be said to be both “theirs” and “ours,” 
and were so, demonstrably, because within a binaristic framework they were not a third 
party’s.  
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This strategy can be found in use by the three composers I have studied, in spite of 
their varied compositional styles and ideas about difference. In his 1935 article “The 
‘Absolute’ Music of Bali,”20 McPhee described Balinese music on terms so familiar to 
the members of his milieu that the word “Balinese” might have been substituted with 
“modern” with little resulting incongruence. He generated these similitudes by 
dichotomizing Balinese music with Romanticism. Balinese music was not made of 
amorphous masses of orchestral sound, was not performed in concert halls, was not guilty 
of hyper-emotional oozing, and was not harmonically overloaded. In all these regards, it 
resembled various new ideas of modernist music, and in some of these respects it 
resembled McPhee’s own composition Tabuh-tabuhan, which was a Bali-inspired work. 
(He did not give these similitudes explicit statement; rather I interpret them as 
ethnographic allegory in the sense described by Clifford, see below.) For Tabuh-tabuhan 
this meant that McPhee composed each passage so as to speak in the very same “breath” 
and in the very same “utterances” about Balinese music and about modernist music. This 
unit of similitude, in which two voices speaking two distinct languages were heard within 
a single breath, corresponds to what Bakhtin calls the “intentional hybrid.”21 
Similitude becomes salient in my analysis of Cowell’s United Quartet (1936) at two 
levels. First, Cowell created similitude in the construction of categories of human music-
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 Mikhael Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, 
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), 259-422. “What we are 
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I had originally intended this Bakhtinian sort of similitude to be the organizing concept of this project. I 
have found, however, that I had to conceive of similitude differently with Cowell and with Harrison, and so 
the concept has lost its centrality. 
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making. With these categories he subsumed various musical traditions into units of 
sameness: “primitive,” “Oriental,” “archaic” and “classic” musics, along with other 
categories that together encompassed all of human musicianship (spanning back 
throughout the history of humanity). Second, he created similitude in the “uniting” of the 
features of these various categories of humanity, based upon certain “elemental” bases 
that he viewed as transcending all of these ethnic/historical divisions. The result was a 
work that Cowell not only claimed to be universal, in the sense that it was based upon 
musical features so fundamental as to be shared by every human musician, but 
comprehensively human, in the sense that it represented aspects of every category of 
human music throughout history. 
Harrison’s approach to constructing similitudes was also dependent upon the 
perception of the sameness of various distant traditions—unifying, for instance, the music 
of Indonesia, Ancient Greece, and the modernist composer Harry Partch—by 
understanding them to be in antithesis from others—those employing the tuning system 
of equal temperament. Harrison, however, went much further than McPhee in imagining 
the world, in very many aspects, to be lined up entirely into two forces of opposition, one 
good and one bad. On the one side were the forces of reason, exemplified by Asia, 
Greece, and certain modernists, and on the other hand were those of absurdity, 
exemplified by dominant urban styles of music making and life. He associated reasonable 
phenomena, differentiated them from absurd phenomena, which he then associated with 
each other and differentiated from reasoned ones, and so forth. In the end a tremendous 
amount of knowledge of the world—his “reality”—was coordinated within a single 
dualistic framework: the good half he celebrated and the bad half he deplored. 
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Compositionally, this style of associating and differentiating yielded certain trans-
national conceptions of musical materials, which then permitted their combination as 
simple workings out of what was “really the same” as it in fact existed in the world. I 
discuss the relevance of this compositional method to Harrison’s Double Concerto for 
Violin, Cello, and Javanese Gamelan. 
The three composers that I have examined have turned out to have only limited 
commonalities in terms of their views on difference, and this was in spite of their close 
personal relationships. The more closely I have examined each, the more their 
dissimilarities in their most fundamental terms of thinking about cultural difference have 
become apparent. Certainly not one of them was content merely to work in the mold of 
another. Still, each of them focused heavily upon differences and similitudes, and for 
each this style of thinking was critical to his style of composing. This fact alone offers 
argument for considering these three composers as of a single meaningful cultural 
movement called modernism. I discuss the conception of modernism arrived at through 
this study further in this introduction. 
 
Contemporary Paradigms of Constructing Difference 
Among intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century, it was commonly 
believed that there were “primitives,” peoples who might have existed on various spots 
on the globe, persisting in more-or-less the same state as more “civilized” societies had in 
their own very distant past.22 Such notions as there being an  “primitive” form of society 
based upon certain kinship structures, a “primitive” religion which was animism, closely 
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tied to “primitive” consciousness (mythic consciousness), and other “primitive” cultural 
forms were commonplace and served as the foundation of inquiry in a variety of fields. 
But, as Adam Kuper has pointed out, this long-lasting and pervasive surety about the 
existence of “primitive society” was a delusion: 
The rapid establishment and the endurance of a theory is not particularly 
remarkable if the theory is substantially correct. But hardly any anthropologist 
today would accept that this classic account of primitive society can be sustained. 
On the contrary, the orthodox modern view is that there never was such a thing as 
“primitive society.” Certainly, no such thing can be reconstructed now. There is 
not even a sensible way in which one can specify what a “primitive’ society” is. 
The term implies some historical point of reference. It presumably defines a type 
of society ancestral to more advanced forms, on the analogy of an evolutionary 
history of some natural species. But human societies cannot be traced back to a 
single point of origin, and there is no way of reconstituting prehistoric social 
forms, classifying them, and aligning them in a time series. There are no fossils of 
social organization.23 
 
And he continues:   
The persistence of the model is particularly problematic since various of its basic 
assumptions were quite directly contradicted by ethnographic evidence and by the 
logic of evolutionary theory itself. The difficulties were clearly stated by some of 
the leading scholars in the field (notably Westermarck, Boas, and Malinowski). 
Notwithstanding, social anthropologists busied themselves for over a hundred 
years with the manipulation of a fantasy… (p. 8) 
 
Given the commonness of the belief among highly respected thinkers in the existence 
of various “primitive” cultural forms, it is not surprising that many composers and music 
theorists assumed that there must be some particular sort of music possessed by 
“primitive” peoples all over the world. Even if the notion of “primitive” music was 
untenable in light of the data available (and arguments launched in 1911 by Franz 
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Boas24), all three of the composers of my study, to one extent or another, worked under 
its sway, as did most of their colleagues. 
Primitivism, a reversal of more commonplace styles of evolutionist thinking that 
found value in “primitive” cultural forms (rather than regarding them as inferior to the 
products of “civilization), was common among artists and intellectuals in the early 
twentieth century. Rather than viewing “primitives” as crude and barbaric, primitivists 
saw them as more in touch with the fundamental aspects of human existence. Yet 
primitivism only reversed the assignment of value in the evolutionist view of culture, and 
in other respects maintained the ethnocentrism inherent to it. In the primitivist view, the 
history of all the world’s peoples was still a single march of culture, with Western culture 
having traveled the furthest.  
The only question was whether it was better to be where “we” (as civilized people) 
were, or to be where “we” had come from. In the evolutionist view, culture was not 
something possessed uniquely by each group of people, but was singular and was 
accumulated, with Euro-American society possessing it in the greatest degree. I use the 
term primitivism exclusively in this sense, as an ideology that assumed the existence of 
“primitives” in the contemporary sense grounded in cultural evolutionist theory, and not 
in reference to other ideologies of valuation of long-past peoples living in simpler states. 
Therefore I will not use the word primitivism to describe Harrison’s interest in Chinese, 
Korean, and Javanese musics, because he did not regard these groups as “primitive” nor 
did his conception of their significance have to do with a belief in unilinear evolution. He 
did, however, share with primitivists the idea that non-Western peoples existed in a state 
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that was more fundamentally and “naturally” human, and that it is desirable for moderns 
to “regain” certain of those peoples’ attributes. I do use the term primitivist in connection 
with McPhee and Cowell. 
Sigmund Freud’s ideas on difference provide a useful parallel to the primitivist 
thinking among some composers. Though Freud was not an anthropologist, he was highly 
concerned with anthropology because its concept of the “primitive” represented a key to 
his own endeavors in the field of psychology. The “primitive” was essential man, 
possessing the essential psychology of man (which Freud also found that his hysterical 
patients possessed). He held the evolutionist view that civilization had advanced out of 
“primitive” states, and yet, as Martin describes, Freud did not imagine that in “civilized 
society” the irrational and savage aspects of the psyche had been conquered. “We” had 
never ceased being “primitives”: 
We live in the presence of in the presence of our ultimate ancestors’ urges and 
deeds and we always will. Our understandings and institutions might differ from 
those of primitive peoples, but our psychological and moral makeup is a 
continuing heritage.25 
 
Martin describes how, unlike other evolutionists who imagined that civilization came 
about through the “triumph of knowledge over ignorance, of reason over superstition,” 
for Freud civilization arose to a large extent by “the suppression of instincts” (p. 119). 
This attitude characterizes a great deal of modernist speculation about difference: that 
there were musical instincts possessed and acted upon by non-Western peoples that were 
merely suppressed in “our” own society. The modernist composers that I study do not 
seem to have been greatly influenced by Freud, yet it was not necessary to have been 
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directly influenced by Freud in order to sympathize with his regard of “primitives” as a 
key to understanding human nature and the “truth about music.”26  
Mark Slobin has remarked that, for much of the twentieth century the idea of the 
“primitive” was one of three fundamental categories used in the study of non-Western 
musics, along with “Oriental” and “folk”: 
The study of world musics moved out of what would nowadays be called an 
Orientalist stance only in the 1960s. Till then, few people seriously questioned the 
notion that beyond the Western classical tradition there were three kinds of music 
to be studied: Oriental, folk, and primitive. This triad underlaid many works and 
was implicit in the training of my generation of researchers. “Oriental” of course 
referred to those Asian “high cultures” that had long-term, accessible internal 
histories and that could be “compared” with similar European systems. 
“Primitive” encompassed all the “preliterate” peoples of the world, who had to 
rely on oral tradition for transmission and who had no highly professionalized “art 
musicians” in their midst. The “folk” were the internal primitives of Euro-
America.27 
 
These categories pervading the thinking of early ethnomusicology were held by McPhee, 
Cowell, and Harrison. Cowell, who was perhaps the most informed on theories of 
difference in the social sciences broadly, kept particular stock in these three categories. In 
Chapter 3 I will discuss in detail the use he made of them.  
Not all of the modernist composers who expressed primitivist views would have 
subscribed to cultural evolutionism in full form. Many were not interested in developing 
full fledged and consistent theories of culture, but only in referencing concepts such as 
“the primitive” in a more casual way. None was beholden to any schema of organized 
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understanding of human difference. Though I will describe in each chapter a single 
conception of difference possessed by each composer, in actuality what I point to in each 
case were merely recurring styles of thought, not philosophies which they followed with 
perfect consistency. Like most modernist composers, McPhee, Cowell, and Harrison read 
eclectically and their ideas neither fell squarely along the lines of a particular established 
paradigm nor were perfectly integrated. Like other modernists they were capable of 
valuing “primitive” or “Oriental” culture at one moment, and holding up the value of the 
modern civilized world at the next, as it suited their various agendas and appeared to be 
sensible given the evidence they possessed.  
Though the terms “primitive” and “primitivism” were employed by modernist 
composers, they were not used with great consistency. It was sometimes the case that 
other words, such as “exotic,” were used, even while the ideas expressed were distinctly 
primitivist. I have attempted to use such terms with greater consistency than they 
received in the modernist writings I analyze. The result may be some discrepancy 
between my own use of terms and their use in the quotations of modernist composers I 
provide.  
The composers that I study were either just as interested in the musics of “Orientals” 
as they were of “primitives,” or were all but exclusively interested in “Orientals.” 
Nevertheless, I have given a great deal of attention to primitivist notions, because they 
are a key to understanding how these composers conceived of “Orientals.” John Corbett 
has described the relationship between these two concepts in the minds of experimentalist 
composers: 
Already, right at the outset of the proverbial golden years of American 
experimentalism, a familiar nineteenth-century form of Orientalism helps guide 
 40 
an overriding interest in non-Western music: “Oriental” music is linked, at least 
by persistent proximity, with the “primitive,” and both are looked to for their 
rejuvenative powers in a period of mounting dissatisfaction with conventional 
Western musical civilization.28  
 
Cowell often spoke of “primitives” and “Orientals” together, not because he regarded 
them as the same, but because they were conceptually linked: “primitives” represented 
the stage of human evolution at its origins, while “Orientals” represented a stage of 
evolution that was higher than that of “primitives”—Oriental music, like Western music, 
was “cultivated”—but lower than that of Euro-Americans (actually Cowell objected to 
the words “higher” and “lower” in this context because of their Eurocentric connotation, 
but he nevertheless maintained a unilinear understanding of human societies’ evolution 
that implied higher and lower degrees of evolution). To the extent that Harrison’s 
thinking about non-Western musics was organized within these categories, he was all but 
exclusively interested in “Orientals,” not in “primitives.” 
Although there seems to be an unavoidable degree of arrogance attendant with 
cultural evolutionism, holding as it did that all societies were engaged in a march of 
progress inevitably directed to the state of advancement of Euro-American society (and 
implying, at the very least, that modern people were the only ones qualified to claim the 
wisdom of hindsight upon the history of humanity and foresight into its future), not all 
evolutionist arguments carried an equal degree of condescension. The phenomenon of 
primitivism attests to this variance, for it held that the evolution away from more 
emergent states of humanity had in fact been a decline, and not an achievement.  
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The dominant philosophy of anthropology in the twentieth century has perhaps been 
cultural relativism, which is often described as having supplanted cultural evolutionism. I 
discuss cultural relativism in both the chapter on Cowell and again more fully in the 
chapter on Harrison. The principle as I define it in that latter chapter may, again, not be 
exactly the same as usages of the term found elsewhere. I had originally sought a 
standard meaning of cultural relativism with which to frame the argument of that section, 
but found that the meaning has varied in different corners of the field and has been the 
subject of debate. It is also inevitably the case that explicit articulations of a philosophy 
for the purposes of methodological orientation for a field and the actual ways that 
researchers carry out their inquiries do not match perfectly. I have opted to define the 
term myself in a manner that reflects the intellectual trends that I have observed in 
Ethnomusicology. In regards to the non-unity of cultural relativism as a philosophy of 
difference, see Alison Dundes Renteln.29 Renteln argues that the principle has been 
poorly articulated by both its advocates and opponents, and that the result has been much 
unnecessary argument over the theory’s merits.30 
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Issues in this Project’s Assemblage 
Although I hope for this dissertation to contribute to a general historical picture of 
ideologies of cultural difference held in the modernist composers’ community, I have 
approached the question through detailed and focused studies of only three composers. 
The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that focus upon three composers cannot go 
very far in yielding a broad picture of the movement, and I freely admit that ideas of 
difference and their significance to composition among 20th-century composers were far 
more diverse than that which is represented in this dissertation. It is because of this very 
fact of the intense internal diversity within the modernist movement that I have found it 
necessary to focus upon three composers in such depth. Each of them possessed quite 
idiosyncratic ideas on difference that only have come into full light through detailed 
consideration of a broad selection of their publications. In studying a movement of 
individuals who were eager not to reproduce conventional modes of thought—or even 
those of their closest colleagues—I have found it essential to proceed from a careful 
consideration of individual cases in order to produce worthy historical generalizations. At 
the same time, these individuals were certainly not islands, and in each chapter I offer 
comparisons between the ideas of the focus composer and those of some of his closest 
colleagues.  
The three composers that I picked for focused analysis each gave cultural difference 
(and non-difference) an especially central place in his compositional and theoretical 
endeavors. There were others who did the same, and whom I might also have chosen. I 
hope in a future version of this project to include more modernist voices in my analysis. I 
selected Cowell because he was central to so many of the activities of American 
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modernists, especially as they related to the study of cultural difference. I selected 
McPhee and Harrison because each of them made special study of Indonesian musics 
(Balinese and Javanese respectively) and, as I have myself been conducting fieldwork in 
Indonesia since 2002, I felt well equipped to study them.31 Since we share a field, I have 
found that I have been able to come particularly quickly to a critical perspective upon 
their representations of Balinese and Javanese musical culture. Strictly speaking, 
however, my critical study does not rely upon my first-hand experiences in Indonesia. I 
do not “correct” McPhee or Harrison’s representations of Indonesia based upon my own 
understandings of Indonesian musical culture, but rather critique their arguments based 
on features immanent to them and contrast their representations with others produced by 
scholars working in other milieus, guided by other methods and interests. In the end, the 
only population that this dissertation seeks to represent is that of modernist composers, 
not Indonesians. 
The study on McPhee addresses textual issues of his ethnographic writing and relates 
them to his composition Tabuh-tabuhan; the two studies on Cowell and Harrison are 
meanwhile mostly concerned with epistemological issues. This disunity has arisen 
because of these composers’ different writing styles and research styles—McPhee was 
the only one of the three to engage in extensive field research. McPhee’s publications 
about Bali have limited unity in tone and content, perhaps because they were spread out 
in time (his first came in 1935, while his most significant ethnographic work, Music in 
Bali, was only released posthumously in 1966, long after his fieldwork had been 
concluded). Cowell, meanwhile, wrote more prolifically—and it seems less self-
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consciously—and the result is many texts that together contribute to a big picture of his 
ideas on musical difference. I have therefore focused upon textual issues of discreet 
discursive acts in McPhee’s case, and have developed exegeses of epistemological 
matters as evidenced across texts for Cowell and Harrison. 
My discussion of Colin McPhee is an examination of his ethnographic writing, and of 
how the same issues become relevant to his “ethnographic composition.” By the latter, I 
mean a composition that aims to represent musical materials that are foreign to its 
intended audience. The ethnographic composition, like conventionally conceived musical 
ethnography (a book about foreign music), presents the audience with documentations of 
the foreign music and implies, even when it does not articulate explicitly, interpretations 
of the nature of what it shares with and how it differs from the audience’s own music. 
The represented materials of an ethnographic composition, not being precise 
documentations of foreign sounds as a field recording would be, present a series of 
statements about what the foreign music most essentially “is.” I discuss McPhee’s 
ethnographic composition Tabuh-tabuhan as an encounter with difference in which that 
which was represented was ultimately compelled—for the sake of coherence and 
appeal—to speak on terms familiar to its audience. It was an allegory in the sense that 
although it most explicitly spoke about one thing (Balinese music), it at the same time 
represented something else unstated (modernism). That which was represented, then, far 
from appearing to the audience as a novel object for neutral apprehension, inevitably 
appeared in the forms of the audience’s own familiarity, and spoke to their own particular 
concerns. 
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I draw this concept of ethnographic allegory from James Clifford, who describes how 
in ethnography the constructed image of the other and the other’s manners of making 
meaning are unveiled, “seen” and “heard,” in a continuing structure of metaphors 
between what the reader presumes to be the meanings belonging to the other and the 
meanings that had articulated themselves to the reader prior to his/her opening of the 
book: “What appears descriptively to the senses… seems to be ‘other,’ while what is 
suggested by the coherent series of perceptions is an underlying similitude.”32 Even if the 
ethnographer were to offer no parallel structure by which the other was to by regarded, 
Clifford argues that, in the interest of coherence, an allegorical frame would be 
constructed by the reader. “Even scientific ethnographers cannot fully control the 
meanings—readings—provoked by their accounts” (p. 110).  Such parallels are the terms 
on which the meaningfulness of ethnographic accounts is contingent.  
As noted, the materials available for both Harrison and Cowell were such that in each 
case periods of marked consistency could be observed in their voices as they articulated 
views on cultural difference—even in periods when they composed with a variety of 
voices. For that reason, my analyses of those two composer/ethnographers have been 
concerned with the exegesis of theoretical stances that come into full focus through 
examination of multiple writings. Rather than focusing on the dynamics of a single 
utterance, as I did with McPhee, I focus in the chapters on Harrison and Cowell on the 
tendencies of thought that permitted a variety of statements about the cultural other and 
which provided the means of drawing compositional influence from the cultural other. 
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As I have already mentioned, I argue that an overarching dualism informed Harrison’s 
understanding of cultural difference and can be heard in his compositions—through the 
generation of materials in opposition to certain undesirable forms of musicality, such as 
equal temperament. Meanwhile, Cowell’s views on difference idiosyncratically combined 
three styles of conceiving of difference: scientific positivism, cultural evolutionism, and 
cultural relativism. I have discussed the latter two in the previous subsection of this 
introduction. By positivism, I mean that Cowell understood there to be inherent features 
of music, transcendent of culture. While Cowell respected that the world’s peoples’ 
musics differed in many significant respects, he saw difference as only descending to a 
certain depth, below which was a fundamental level at which any music could be studied 
with the same scientific apparatus. This basic level, music’s “elements,” offered a 
unifying foundation for his inquiry by which Euroecentrism could be dispelled and upon 
which all musics could be championed as equally valid. This was relativistic in spirit, but 
epistemologically speaking was not “cultural relativism” as it is generally defined today. 
My analyses of the compositions of these three modernists are somewhat 
idiosyncratic. In each case, I have prioritized analysis of the composer’s verbally 
articulated views on difference, and then developed musical analyses that expose how 
each made notes accomplish the same thing as words. Beyond this, there has been no 
overarching music analytical method, because, just as I have allowed the writings of each 
composer to determine what was significant to say about them as writers, I have done the 
same for them as composers. I have discussed how McPhee’s orchestral work Tabuh-
tabuhan acted as ethnographic allegory, in the sense described by James Clifford. With 
Cowell and Harrison I have discussed how the same epistemological issues that were 
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structural to their written statements about cultural difference and non-difference were 
present in and structural to their compositions.  
There are certain themes which I have not taken up but might have, and it is worth 
mentioning those now. One is race. This study, though it is concerned with cultural 
difference on a worldwide scale, does not touch upon issues of race because those were 
not explicitly touched upon by these composers in their writings. Racialism was one 
common component of anthropological thinking in the nineteenth century and in the 
twentieth century as well, and in some cases cultural evolutionist theories went hand-in-
hand with racist ones. The composers I have studied, in so far as they subscribed to 
cultural-evolutionist theories, did not suggest that differences in culture were due to 
differences in biology, but rather subscribed to what Martin calls the “civilization 
paradigm”: 
Certainly this [civilization] paradigm, too, was hierarchical, but it did not involve 
marking any peoples as absolutely, hereditarily inferior, but only as to some 
degree and for some reason—climatic or historical, say—slower in their 
development as a society.”33 
 
The composers of this study seem to have believed in the biological unity of 
humanity, to have been anti-racist, or not to have considered race an issue worth 
stressing. The absence of explicit racism is not, however, an indication of pure 
colorblindness. Cowell must have conceived of his “Orientals” as having darker skin than 
he did, and his “primitives”—as they happened to exist in Africa, Australia, and wherever 
else—as being darker still. Yet he articulated no reason why this should necessarily be so. 
If a study of ideas of race among these American modernists were undertaken, it would 
require different methods from the ones I have used. 
                                                 
33
 Martin, The Languages of Difference, 23. 
 
 48 
The relationship of sexuality (particularly homosexuality) and interest in non-Western 
musics among modernist composers is another issue that I might have pursued. Each of 
these three composers had sexual relationships with other men, either partially or 
exclusively, as did many 20th-century American composers that were interested in non-
Western musics. I regret that I cannot offer any explanation for the overwhelming 
gayness of this historical phenomenon. Rather than offer crude interpretations of 
something so complex, I have opted to leave the issue to other scholars, able to offer the 
issue the focused study and finesse that it deserves. As a start, for those interested in this 
line of inquiry, I refer the reader to Nadine Hubbs’s thoughtful The Queer Composition of 
America’s Sound,34 which focuses on the gay community surrounding Virgil Thompson 
and Aaron Copland. 
My aim in this introduction has been to offer the reader a sense of what all three 
studies of the following studies point to about modernist styles of engaging with 
difference. The fact that all three follow address different though related concerns has 
arisen because, after some struggle, I have relented to allow the materials I have accessed 
on each study to give me their forms and themes, rather than the reverse. I have had to 
ignore less than I would had I asked all the materials to speak to the same concerns, and 
so I hope that the result is studies that are both more incisive and less reductive. 
                                                 
34
 The Queer Composition of America's Sound: Gay Modernists, American Music, and National 
Identity (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2004). 
 
  
 
Chapter II: Colin McPhee and “The Absolute Music of Bali” 
 
“From a musician’s viewpoint the island of Bali is the legendary isle joyeuse.” 
Colin McPhee, 1935 
 
 
During the 1920s and ‘30s American composers were becoming increasingly 
interested in foreign musics. Many hoped that the closer examination of such musics and 
their incorporation into a new modern music would lead composers away from the 
influence of Western Europe, and toward a music that was at once more confidently 
American and more deeply human. Toward this aim, both nationalist and universalist, the 
musics of “primitive” peoples from all parts of the earth (not just those indigenous to the 
U.S.) were of interest. “Primitives” were understood to be in touch with those “first 
principles” of music making that had become obscured in the European classical music 
tradition, especially that of the nineteenth century. 
Perhaps no American composer of that era could claim to have made as careful and 
prolonged a study of a foreign music as Colin McPhee. McPhee lived on the island of 
Bali (in modern Indonesia) for much of the decade of the 1930s, and intermittently during 
and his time there wrote articles, compositions, transcriptions, and lectures introducing 
Balinese music to Western audiences. His first profession was composition, but his 
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ethnographic publications, particularly the encyclopedic Music in Bali35 (posthumous, 
1966), ultimately received the greatest recognition. Upon Music in Bali’s publication the 
ethnomusicologist Judith Becker reviewed it as “one of the most carefully written, 
complete and precise descriptions of any musical style outside the Western world.”36 
McPhee’s memoires A House in Bali (1946) gave a rich, non-technical description of 
Balinese life, and as such may also be considered an ethnographic work. As I will 
discuss, it was widely read and received excellent critical reviews. 
McPhee’s most well known composition is probably Tabuh-tabuhan, scored for two 
pianos and orchestra and saturated with Balinese musical ideas.37 He wrote it on a return 
visit to the West in 1935-36. Although McPhee was please with its premier performance 
in Mexico City (conducted by Carlos Chávez), he subsequently suffered disappointment 
by failing to procure a U.S. premier: the work was hear on U.S. radio in 1948 and the first 
U.S. concert performance did not occur until 1953. The discouragement all but ended 
McPhee’s compositional career, and yet Tabuh-tabuhan has been much admired by 
some, in part as a sort of compositional ethnography. Reviewing the 1948 radio 
performance, Henry Cowell remarked: “No Western composer has probably ever known 
the music of another culture so thoroughly as McPhee does the Indonesian, so that when 
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he writes in this style he is able to retain the characteristics that are most important to 
Indonesian culture and at the same time most attractive to us.”38 
My concern in this chapter is with how McPhee crafted some of the earliest 
compositions and texts so as to make Balinese music comprehensible and indeed 
interesting to his American audiences. In the following section I will discuss how the 
success of McPhee’s memoir A House in Bali is attributable in part to his skillful use of 
two authorial techniques: omission and metaphor. Omission is the technique whereby the 
author, particularly the author of ethnography, excludes from the text that information 
that would be unlikely to be meaningful or appealing to his intended audience. Metaphor 
in this context (connected to Clifford’s concept of “ethnographic allegory”, which I 
discuss in the Introduction) is the technique whereby an author presents information 
foreign to his/her audience in a way that will make it seem to be the same as that which 
the audience already knows. 
Following the discussion of McPhee’s handling of omission and metaphor, and the 
success they earned for A House in Bali, I turn to the questions of how and why 
composers of new music in the U.S. early in McPhee’s career were interested in non-
Western musics. I argue that the terms by which modernist composers of the time were 
prepared to and interested in engaging with non-Western music determined the way 
McPhee chose—or was compelled—to shape his representations of Balinese music. The 
remainder of this chapter will then be devoted to a consideration of two of McPhee’s 
earliest representations of Balinese music, the 1935 article published in Modern Music 
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“The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali” 39 and Tabuh-tabuhan. 40 Taking Cowell’s statement that 
in Tabuh-tabuhan McPhee had retained the characteristics of Indonesian culture “most 
valuable to us” as telling, I discuss the many ways in which these two representations 
were, in their content and form, fitted for reception in the modernist community. I argue 
that what those representations said—and indeed could say—about Balinese music was 
determined to a great extent by what American composers were already thinking about 
“primitives,” Europeans, and themselves. The techniques of omission and metaphor, 
which can be considered as compositional as well as authorial, were both crucial for the 
construction of coherent representations of Bali on these terms. 
As McPhee produced a relatively small body of compositions and writings, which are 
quite spread out over his career, my analytical approach is different in this chapter than it 
will be in the chapters on Cowell and Harrison. Whereas for the latter composers 
exegeses of coherence in their long-term outlooks could be developed, for McPhee I have 
focused on the rhetoric he employed in two productive moments in his career, starting in 
1946 with the publication of A House in Bali and then moving back to 1935-36 with the 
publication “The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali” and the performance of Tabuh-tabuhan. 
McPhee’s voice, unlike Cowell’s and especially unlike Harrison’s, shifted considerably 
over his career and depending on his intended audience, making it difficult to draw out 
unifying terms of coherence.  
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Omission and Metaphor in A House in Bali 
A House in Bali tells the story of McPhee’s life on the island, which spanned the 
years 1931 to 1939. It was at once memoir and ethnography: a narrative conveying events 
in temporal order and confining the story to McPhee’s personal experiences, it 
nevertheless directed the reader’s attention toward McPhee’s Balinese acquaintances and 
their music, not toward McPhee himself.41 Its reviewers were astonished with McPhee’s 
success at conveying an unmediated, physical experience of life in Bali (both his own 
experience and, notably, that of the Balinese!), but, as I will argue, the book was in fact 
carefully crafted so as to convey such immediate experiences via imagery that was 
already familiar to McPhee’s readership. The apparent universality of the description was 
thus actually a skillful mediation, directed at a particular, historically contingent 
readership.  
In light of some of the evidence I raise, it will be seen that aspects of McPhee’s story 
were distorted by the omission of information: in particular the omission of the fact that 
he had a wife (the anthropologist Jane Belo) and that he lived among a community of 
Western intellectuals that included the anthropologist Margaret Mead and the painter and 
poet Walter Spies. Yet, as a fact of memoir writing omission is par for the course. I do 
not note these few omissions to correct the story, to provide the crucial details so that the 
“true” story can come to light, but rather raise them in the course of arguing that the art of 
memoir writing is necessarily one of fishing from an ocean of memories a very few 
details to include. The only “true” story would be the impossible narrative organization of 
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that vast continuum of experience that was left behind. As does any personal recollection, 
A House in Bali presents only a partial account of all that really transpired, and yet, the 
potency of A House in Bali, its ability to communicate convincingly and pleasurably 
about its subjects, rests precisely in its design by omission.  
For ethnography, which involves describing people and locations that are utterly 
foreign to one’s readership, omission is the first necessary step that permits the other 
essential technique, metaphor. A metaphor in this case refers to the literary device 
whereby the ethnographer renders something for his/her reader belonging to the studied 
subject (e.g. a concept, perceived object, remembered experience) in terms that the 
ethnographer suggests correspond to something from the reader’s vocabulary. Metaphor 
can be understood theoretically as a feature of all ethnography, as inherent to the art of 
communicating a physical world that is totally unknown. McPhee’s reviewers praised his 
ability to render in words the physical sensation of being in Bali through direct appeal to 
the universal senses: I suggest that McPhee’s success in this regard can be understood in 
terms of his deftness with ethnographic metaphor. While he seemed to have created for 
his readers an experience of physically being in Bali, he did so by stimulating their own 
bodily knowledge of the urban American landscape.  
McPhee’s story begins in 1931, when McPhee set out from New York in search of 
music he had heard on a recording: 
I was a young composer, recently back in New York after student days in Paris, 
and the past two years had been filled with composing and the business of getting 
performances. It was quite by accident that I had heard the few gramophone 
records that were to change my life completely, bringing me out here in search of 
something quite indefinable—music or experience, I could not at this moment 
say. The records had been made in Bali, and the clear, metallic sounds of the 
music were like the stirring of a thousand bells, delicate, confused, with a 
sensuous charm, a mystery that was quite overpowering. (HIB, 2) 
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McPhee described how at the time of the initial voyage he had not planned to stay long. 
But his stay in Bali would linger on for nearly a decade. Some of the major events 
McPhee described include the building of a home in the Balinese style, adopting a son 
who would prove a talented dancer, and initiating a revival of gamelan semar 
pegulingan, a genre that had all but disappeared by the time McPhee arrived. Though he 
never made himself the focus of the stories, he was nonetheless one of his own objects of 
representation. This he accomplished mostly by contrast in his interactions with the 
Balinese characters, and, in one case, with a Westerner. When McPhee first came to Bali, 
A Dutch hotel manager chastised him for riding in the front seat of his car, next to his 
Balinese driver: 
I don’t like to see you there in the front seat. The white man must never forget 
to maintain the dignity of the white race. 
He gave a gentle belch. 
Then as an afterthought he added, If you really must sit in the front, drive the 
car yourself and let the chauffeur sit behind. 
But I continued to sit the way I pleased. We drove with the top down, the hot 
sun beating on our heads. It was only when we passed the tennis court or entered 
the hotel driveway that I felt self-conscious, ostentatious and subversive. (HIB, 
16-17) 
 
As the only other Western character given a voice in the story, the hotel manager 
contributes to an impression of McPhee as quite alone. The manager speaks 
condescendingly about his Balinese servants and lasciviously about the young women 
peddling souvenirs. It would seem, based on this one case in contrast, that the other 
Westerners on the island held attitudes toward the Balinese that were elitist, objectifying, 
and hypocritical. McPhee would have little to do with them, nor they with him. He lived 
only among the Balinese and shunned other Westerners.  
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Bali, as McPhee described it, did not resemble the sexualized image of its earlier 
travel literature. McPhee’s audience would have associated the island with bare-breasted, 
nubile women; such had been central to Bali’s lore in the early days of tourism, the first 
travel brochure having been released by the Dutch government in 1914, only a few years 
after conquering the island in a series of takeovers of the royal courts so bloody and 
disturbing that it shocked the Dutch citizenry.42 McPhee wrote little about Bali’s women. 
His characters were mostly Balinese musicians and dancers, men. This restraint inspired 
praise from some reviewers: “With great skill McPhee brings Bali to life and engages our 
interest without any allusion to sex in any form apart from that of the native mores. 
Hollywood might be aroused by McPhee’s brilliant photographs of Balinese dancers and 
domestic help, but Hollywood would have to invent its own peculiar moral story.”43  
The book’s many positive reviews repeatedly praised McPhee both as a person and as 
a writer. They noticed the ease with which he moved among the Balinese and the 
simplicity and vivid sensuousness with which he committed his experience to prose. 
“[For McPhee], obviously, the process was as natural as taking a swim. It involved no 
loss of face, no surrender of personality, no degradation. These factors simply do not 
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enter his story.”44 Another reviewer commented, “Perhaps McPhee owes his success with 
the Balinese to his personality. The impression we get from his book is that we are 
reading the adventures of one who has been living in paradise and has returned to earth to 
tell us about it.”45 
Although few of the enthusiastic reviewers of A House in Bali were likely aware of 
just how much McPhee had left out of the narrative, to those who knew him personally 
during his Bali years, the book’s omissions must have seemed glaring. McPhee gave Jane 
Belo, his wife of the time, no mention whatsoever, though she had lived with him in the 
“house in Bali” and had in fact paid for its construction, its team of servants, and the 
expenses of the entire Balinese excursion. The development of conflict in their 
relationship and their eventual separation, in large part over McPhee’s hot temper and his 
relationship with a Balinese man, received no mention.46 One presumes that the excision 
of her presence could not have been accomplished without major reconstruction of the 
story. 
Yet of greater bearing for McPhee’s representation of Balinese culture was his almost 
total excision of the other Western artists and scholars on the island. These intellectuals, 
along with a booming tourist industry (which McPhee did briefly describe with some 
distaste), were actively influencing the arts that fascinated them, helping to give reality to 
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the famous claim that in Bali everyone was an artist. McPhee would have interacted with 
the members of this community continuously. All of their studies would have been both 
significantly affected—both aided and curtailed—by the Dutch colonial government. 
Such issues went unaddressed, as did the harsh economic conditions that colonialism was 
currently imposing on the Balinese.47 
One of the most influential Western consociates of McPhee was the German painter, 
writer, and musician Walter Spies, whose two-piano transcriptions of Balinese music 
were likely the inspiration for McPhee’s own many efforts in the same genre.48 Spies’s 
near total absence from A House in Bali (he did receive passive mention) did not escape 
comment by one reviewer: Beryl De Zoete was herself a contemporary of McPhee in 
Bali, and the coauthor of Spies’s Dance and Drama in Bali (1937). Though she otherwise 
wrote positively about McPhee’s book, she criticized his omission of Spies:  
Mr. McPhee was of course at liberty, as his story is personal, to make no allusion 
to other European or American residents in Bali. But as he does make casual 
mention of that very original painter and musician, Walter Spies, the most 
learned, beloved and trusted of all alien inhabitants of Bali, whose death by 
drowning during the war was far more than a personal calamity, one feels that 
recognition of the writer’s many debts to him would have been a becoming 
gesture. Perhaps this awaits Mr. McPhee’s book on Balinese music, which no one 
is so qualified to write as he.49  
 
There were more omissions. McPhee described the pleasures of transcribing Balinese 
music with I Made Lebah, his driver and assistant (Lebah was an extraordinary musician 
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who was becoming famous in his own right, eventually leading the internationally 
renowned gamelan community in Peliatan for many years): “Seriously, leisurely, we 
worked together till sundown” (HIB, 157). He did not mention that his employee found 
these sessions tedious and bewildering.50 McPhee described himself as a gentle and 
detached participant in Balinese life, patient with some of the more difficult personalities; 
he did not mention that Lebah and surely others were disturbed by his sudden outbursts 
of anger when he drank. McPhee described how he had stimulated a revival of gamelan 
semar pegulingan; he did not credit Lebah for having done a good deal of the 
organizational work, while he provided the financial support for the project (which would 
not have been possible without Belo).  
One reviewer marveled that McPhee had done more than render an accurate 
experience of being in Bali; he had transformed his reader into a Balinese:  
So explicit is the translation (of sense, not words), that we glimpse Bali’s shadow-
plays, hear Bali’s music, breathe Bali’s air, not as tourist spectators but as natives. 
This is no easy trick of portrayal, as any who have visited foreign lands—even the 
more analogous countries of Europe—and then have tried to interpret their 
inhabitants to the home folks can testify. . . . Therein, in [McPhee’s] gift for 
accepting a civilization on its own terms and then in those same terms 
representing that civilization to outsiders, lies his success.51 
 
Minna Lederman similarly remarked on the physical immediacy of Bali as relayed by 
McPhee. She found that as she read the book she physically experienced Bali, and, what 
is most astonishing, she did so as though not with her own body but with a Balinese one. 
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She not only breathed Bali’s air, she breathed with Balinese lungs. She found that 
McPhee had successfully abandoned preconceptions and theories, and then had the 
intelligence and integrity to commit his experience unmediated into prose. The key was 
that he had stuck closely to the five senses, which were universal:  
All is sight, sound, smell, taste, touch—an undeviating record of personal 
experience. But when we have read the last word we are in possession of the 
Balinese nature; we know how these islanders feel, play, worship, almost how 
they breathe.”52 
  
These two reviewers described feeling as if they had become Balinese, even though 
McPhee never professed to tell his story from a Balinese point of view, only from his 
own. McPhee himself wrote to Sidney Cowell that he was pleased with how the book had 
come out, and indicated that he was consciously aware of the importance that omission 
had played in the writing process, as well as the importance of directing the writing to a 
particular audience. Rather than stressing how he had created a transparent window upon 
Bali, he stressed how he had managed, by not including too much material, to create a 
sense of mystery (ironically what might be taken as the very definition of “exoticism”): 
Really, I’m pleased with the book. It’s a snobbish book, in a way, for what I’ve 
withheld, and where I’ve placed the accents. And yet it has a wide appeal, I know, 
from the variety of readers who have enjoyed the pieces. The only effect that 
counts in the long run is one of mystery, of what you imply rather than say. 
Perhaps I feel that way because I’ve been trained as a musician, and feel words 
the way I feel tones. The sentence must float, if you know what I mean. Not be 
weighted down. Just as the music of Mozart floats, while Beethoven, my god, and 
Bach too at times, sinks, sinks to the bottom of the glass. That’s what comes of 
being too insistent about being sincere, or putting yourself into it.53 
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A few of the metaphors in A House in Bali are particularly evocative. One example is 
the following, in which McPhee employed two images peculiar to a city like New York 
or Paris in order to evoke the change of light throughout a Balinese day: 
In the early morning the island had a golden freshness, dripped and shone with 
moisture like a garden in a florist’s window. By noon it had become hard and 
matter-of-fact. But in the late afternoon the island was transformed once more; it 
grew unreal, lavish and theatrical like old-fashioned opera scenery. As the sun 
neared the horizon men and women turned the colour of new copper, while 
shadows grew purple, the grass blue, and everything white reflected a deep rose. 
(HIB, 18) 
 
Otherworldly colors—gold, copper, purple, blue, and rose—here collaborated with the 
similes of the florist’s window and the opera set. Both of the latter, as encountered in an 
urban landscape, were themselves representations, pointing to things physically separated 
from the viewer. The florist’s window offered excerpts from a garden that could only be 
imagined. The flowers were encased in glass like artifacts in a museum, and they 
beckoned the passerby into the shop. The opera, perhaps the luxurious, “old-fashioned” 
kind of nineteenth-century productions in particular, cast in artificial lighting the 
fantastic, the alluring, and the bizarre, but only as enactments. These two visual 
metaphors for the Balinese times of day suggested to the reader that an adequate 
rendering of the beauty of Balinese light could be conveyed only through the peculiar 
magic of Western display and theatrical spectacle itself.  
In another episode, McPhee similarly described three young legong dancers with 
imagery from the world of Western representation and display, specifically via the media 
of sculpture and of film:  
Their gestures had infinite elegance, and they seemed like little statues, intricate 
and delicate, that had come to life—not with suppleness, but, like the sequence of 
images in a film, in a series of poses that lasted the mere fraction of a second. You 
felt they were conscious of every sixteenth-note in the music. (HIB, 19) 
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The effectiveness of McPhee’s account, which the readers had remarked upon as 
universal, was in fact contingent upon their occupation of a particular historical position. 
The presence of such metaphors for the young dancers as “statues” and “images in a 
film” suggests that, to the extent that McPhee’s readers felt themselves to be mysteriously 
occupying Balinese bodies, that “trick of portrayal” was accomplished by awaking their 
own bodily memories, in particular their experiences of other evocative representations. 
The fact that Bali seemed so immediate to them was precisely because McPhee had 
drawn upon images from the world that they, as urbanites, already occupied.  
The above discussion of McPhee’s representational techniques is meant to provide 
illustrations of how the task of cultural representation necessitates the cutting away of 
materials, the bringing forth of only a few, and the construction of something coherent 
from those few on formal/ideological terms that are accessible to their new 
readers/observers/listeners/consumers, which may be quite foreign to the people 
represented. In transference for comprehension on new terms, cultural information must 
be processed into the form of knowledge previously consumed, acquiring the taste of that 
which is already understood and desired. The artistry of representing an experience in a 
foreign culture involves choosing which details to forget. It involves knowing the 
suppression of which sensations will evoke the desired, the excision of which details will 
establish an intelligible story, and the inclusion of which would bore, confuse, or disgust 
a person likely to sit down with one’s book.  
In McPhee’s case this is no exclusively theoretical issue. As shown, in A House in 
Bali McPhee’s omissions were extravagant and occasionally brazen, as in his excision of 
Belo from the story. Fortunately for McPhee, he was skillful enough with the technique 
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that there was little suspicion of his artistic cuts. And yet, though I have emphasized how 
McPhee’s representation of Bali was neither objective nor “true” in any naïve sense, 
neither do I argue that his representations were false or even that they were less truthful 
than those of other authors of such ethnographies (though McPhee might have been more 
canny than some other authors about his artistic manipulations).  Based on my own 
experiences in Bali since 2002, no part of McPhee’s description of Bali in the 1930s 
strikes me as improbable, and there is much that feels familiar. Rather than observe that 
McPhee created a false or inauthentic account, I seek to examine how even an earnest and 
informed ethnographer must play elaborate games in order to transform something 
foreign into something intelligible. It is McPhee’s trick of conjuring a non-mediated 
representation of Bali that I seek to unveil.  
A House in Bali was not the first of McPhee’s artistic representations of Balinese 
music and culture, nor was it the first in which he employed the techniques of omission 
and metaphor. As will be seen, these techniques were present in both the article “The 
‘Absolute’ Music of Bali” and the orchestral composition Tabuh-tabuhan of 1935-36. In 
both works McPhee employed metaphors to link the music of Bali and that of the 
modernist milieu of New York. These were not literal metaphors in terms of their syntax: 
there were no statements such as “the Balinese percussion orchestra is the percussion 
orchestra of our contemporary modernist composers.” The latter half of the metaphor 
was, for the most part, unstated. To those from outside of McPhee’s modernist circle, 
those statements about Bali might have seemed to be neutral, perhaps intriguing but not 
reflecting directly upon the Western world. But within McPhee’s milieu, his words would 
have been powerfully charged. Before discussing the metaphors of “The ‘Absolute’ 
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Music of Bali” and Tabuh-tabuhan I will present an overview of the position of 
composers of new music in the 1920s and ‘30s upon “the primitive” (in broad terms), 
which will prepare the discussion of metaphor in McPhee’s works. 
 
American Modernist Views of “the Primitive” in the 1920s and ‘30s 
While McPhee’s compositions were few, he was a successful ethnographer in so far 
as his ethnographic works, particularly the posthumous ethnography Music in Bali, 
continue to be remembered and referred to. As I have argued, McPhee’s accomplishment 
was of a sort that must necessarily be attributed to a successful ethnographer: that of 
having composed convincing partial truths. Already preceding A House in Bali, in the 
brief article “The Absolute Music of Bali” published in Modern Music and the orchestral 
composition Tabuh-tabuhan McPhee represented Bali in prediction of that which 
members of the community of composers of new music had the capacity to hear. The 
themes of representation in each work are in fact much the same. Though McPhee 
constructed a tailored representation of Bali to appeal to his composer colleagues, I do 
not consider that to be a dishonest act. He did not distort what he knew of Bali so as to 
increase its allure. Rather, I am considering his tailored truths as necessary to the act of 
speaking about non-Western music within his particular milieu. 
At the time of McPhee’s return visit to the U.S. in 1935-36, when he created these 
two works, he was already the most deeply initiated of modernism’s voyagers into non-
Western culture. McPhee seems at that time to have been eager to share his Balinese 
musical discoveries and to make a name for himself not only as a composer with a 
specialized knowledge of a non-Western musical tradition but as a composer who, 
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through extended study of such a tradition, had attained special certainty about what 
music (as a trans-cultural concept) most fundamentally was.  
McPhee’s efforts to introduce Balinese music to this audience must be read as taking 
advantage of a broader mode of thinking in the modernist milieu regarding the relation 
between modernist music and music of the “primitive.” Primitivism, on the one hand and 
as it is most commonly understood, was an artistic movement that sought to emulate 
“primitives.” Who these “primitives” were and what they were like was not at all given, 
since most modernist composers had little or no contact with the people that they 
believed to be primitives. Recordings of “primitive” music were less available than 
“primitive” art objects, and even the latter required interpretation if one was to 
understand their “primitive” essence. All this meant that the “primitives” that influenced 
modernist composers were, to a very great degree, their own constructions. This does not 
imply that they were simply fantasies, that the conception of “primitives” bore no 
relationship to any actual living people. Some modernists devoted tremendous amounts 
of time to their studies, and in McPhee’s case, studied through first-hand contact with 
“primitive” peoples.  
On one side of the coin modernists drew influence from “primitives;” on the other 
side modernists created these “primitives” in their own image. This was inevitable, as the 
terms at hand by which to conceive of “primitives” were necessarily the ones of the 
modernists’ own intellectual milieu. The result was a continuous reshifting of modernist 
aesthetics based on new ideas about “primitives” and a continually revised conception of 
the nature of “primitives” in parallel with shifts in modernist aesthetics. In the minds of 
modernists, modernists and primitives were brothers. 
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An explicit articulation of this idea was made in 1934 by Raymond Petit, who argued 
that exotic music was “modern” music, and that in terms of its “modern”-ness—in the 
sense of forward-looking—it fared well in comparison with the supposedly “civilized 
arts” of the concert hall. Petit used the term “exotic” rather than “primitive,” but he 
shared with primitivism the idea of a generalized Other that had universal characteristics 
that Western concert music lacked: 
At all events, exotic music . . . seems to me to be something of the present, as 
modern as many of our socalled civilized arts. A Khen solo intended to aid the 
search for the body of an infant, is as alive and of the present as any artificial and 
ephemeral sonata which flourishes in our concert halls. The congress of 
Mohammedan music held in Cairo in 1932 seems to me as modern as most of our 
music festivals…. In some quite different fashion, the musician of the future 
should be able to guide himself by principles like these, to re-establish contact 
with the universe.54 
 
McPhee’s statements of 1935-36 were located within this paradigm. Prior to his 1931 
departure to Bali, McPhee had been a member of a tightly knit community of young 
composers, and he directed his 1935-36 statements to them. Returning to the U.S. that 
year McPhee had already written to Cowell of his plans: a book on Balinese music and 
the intention to have “a couple of orchestral work[s] finished by fall—a prelude and 
toccata [sic], and a ‘fantasia’ for piano and orchestra on Balinese melodies and 
rhythms—authentic stuff and not dished-up impressionism à la Eichheim.”55 He 
proclaimed: “After those years of silence, and geographical remoteness, I announce my 
return to the land of the living.”  Among those “living” friends and colleagues were the 
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composers Carlos Chávez, and Edgard Varèse, and Cowell himself. McPhee’s statements 
about Bali at this time were uttered in dialogue with those of these composers and others; 
his field experiences served as reiteration and elaboration of their ideas (which were 
mostly uninformed by fieldwork) rather than in contradiction of them. 
Almost a decade earlier, when after a two-year stint of study in Paris (1924-26) 
McPhee had first arrived in New York, the modernist movement in America was still 
quite young. Its members made this a point of pride. McPhee was one of the movement’s 
many promising but not-yet established figures. He had studied composition with the 
avant-garde leader Varèse, and in 1928 became a founding member of the Pan America 
Association of Composers along with Henry Cowell, Carlos Chávez, and Edgard Varèse. 
Modernism in 1920s New York thrived on a desire to be artistically independent from 
Europe. Varèse had observed upon his 1915 arrival in the U.S. that no one seemed to 
know anything about modern music.56 In 1921 he founded the International Composers’ 
Guild with the intention of establishing a footing for modern music in New York. By 
1923, as interest in an American composition had risen, another organization splintered 
off. The League of Composers, whose design was to focus on American compositions, 
began publishing the journal Modern Music in 1924 (it was originally titled the League of 
Composers Review). In 1927 the Guild dissolved, and in 1928 Varèse created The Pan 
American Association of Composers. The formation of this new organization suggested 
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that the Americas (with New York as implied capital), in their explosion of modernist 
activity, now themselves constituted an independent musical culture, not merely a 
satellite of Europe. The mission statement of the Association indicated the newness of 
this situation: 
Encouragement may be derived from the fact that whereas a few years ago it 
would have been impossible to find a sufficient number of American composers 
with new musical ideals to form such an association, today there is a sizable 
group of progressive men and women who, although representing many different 
tendencies, are banded together through serious and sincere interest in furthering 
all the finest music being written in the Americas.57 
 
Besides having his works performed on programs by the Guild, the Pan American 
Association, and other groups, McPhee participated in the community of composers by 
contributing to Modern Music (1924-1946), which was perhaps the most significant 
forum for discussions of “new music” at the time.58 One can see modernism emerge in its 
pages as a movement as seriously believed in by its members on the one hand as it was 
indefinable and diffuse on the other. Buzz words such as absolute music, 
Gebrauchsmusik, mechanism, neoclassicism and (neo)primitivism peppered the journal’s 
submissions. In its mission statement, the editors invited a plurality of opinions united in 
the name of innovation: 
In this magazine we shall present the opinions of informed men who accept the 
changing world of music to-day as inevitable. While the League of Composers is 
not pledged to the support of any new phase or dogma, it affirms a belief in the 
progressive development of art…. Our sole intention is to bring forward the ideas 
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of men who have chosen to lift their eyes from the certainties of the past to read 
the portents of their time.59 
 
This statement reflects the fact that, though in its diversity this American modernist 
movement permitted definition only as a constellation of ideas and compositional 
techniques, the imperative to innovate and to be reflective of present times was clearly its 
pervasive element. The statement’s metaphor for innovation as a “lifting of the eyes” 
reflects the movement’s habit of defining its various endeavors in terms of what it 
awakened from: what they saw as a befuddled European tradition. At their heels was the 
behemoth of romanticism, ahead were the various paths to a more vital future, paths 
perhaps only unified by their point of departure. One of the methods of distinguishing 
themselves from the European tradition was the adoption of various sorts of indigenous 
musical materials, especially but not exclusively those of the Americas. An easy 
familiarity with such materials, it was sometimes stated, was what distinguished 
American composers from overly sophisticated Europeans. For this reason, primitivism 
became one of the main tendencies of American music. Dane Rudhyar, for instance, 
stated that for the Western world 
The gateway to the Orient is through Occidental America. It is therefore natural to 
assume that it will be through America that the influence of Oriental music will 
first be felt in the Occident.60 
 
A paradigm of past/future dichotomies arose. More precisely, the contemporary 
rhetoric tended to divide the history of music into three units. The long past (which might 
be identified in various historical periods and in living “primitive” cultures) and the 
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future (reflected in the works of a few modernist composers) were equated, with the 
immediate past of the nineteenth century, which also represented the current mainstream 
of the Europe-oriented concert-music culture of America, sandwiched in between. What 
the avant-garde heralded in music’s future they also tended to see mirrored in music’s 
long past. Since living “primitive” cultures were commonly viewed as bearing the same 
traits as Europe’s long past, they were often made the object of study and discussion. 
These studies and their resulting innovations lent an increasing “reality” to the equation 
of “primitive” and modernist practices.  Modernists found that their own tendencies were 
inspired by “primitives,” and they proved those tendencies as authentic by reference to 
“primitives.” Among the movements that grew from interpretations of past practices were 
Neoclassicism and Gebrauchsmusik. Indeed, most contemporary ideological movements 
made some association with the long past, even if, as in the case of the absolute music 
movement, their ideological origins were actually in the nineteenth century. 
Frequently woven into discussions of “primitive” musics published in Modern Music 
and similar spaces—earnest, perceptive, and informed as they often were—were 
attributions to those long-past musics of that which was currently of interest in the 
musical centers of the West (e.g. rhythmic complexity). Behind this interest in an 
authentic source of music was not only a desire for compositional guidance but also a 
desire to find antecedents to composers’ already established practices. As I stated in the 
Introduction, I find it best to understand these modernist engagements with cultural 
difference, whether in study of the past or in study of non-Western culture, neither as true 
“recoveries” of the facts of other cultures for the modern world on the one hand, nor as 
pure fantasies of the modernists’ creation on the other. The process of creating a 
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primitivist modernism was necessarily reciprocal: composers were indeed influenced by 
different musics, but this necessitated the construction of an image from which to be 
influenced. The modernists constructed their “primitives” in their own continuously 
shifting image and in distinction from the image they simultaneously constructed of 
mainstream European concert music. Not one of the elements can be understood in 
isolation from or as prior to the others. 
McPhee’s colleague and supporter Carlos Chávez was one such modernist with one 
eye on “the primitive” and the other on a peculiarly American modernism. For Chavez, 
who in 1936 conducted the premiere of McPhee’s Tabuh-tabuhan in Mexico City, these 
complementary interests were both pursued on Mexican soil. Chávez was something of 
an archeologist of Aztec and other indigenous materials. Herbert Weinstock called him 
“one of the men now giving a musical meaning to the geographical term America,” 
suggesting that his stylistic roots sunk deep into the soil of rural Mexico, even as his style 
was emblematic of urban modernity.61 In the same year that he conducted McPhee’s 
Tabuh-tabuhan he conducted his own Sinfonía India (1935-36) on Mexican indigenous 
themes. Also that year Chávez described in Modern Music a program in “free 
composition” that he had established at the Conservatory of Mexico. The program was an 
integrative approach for students to develop individual “technic” through careful study of 
Mexico’s Indian musical traditions.62  
Though few composers in McPhee’s circle adopted the specific designation of 
“primitivist” (as will be seen in the next chapter, Cowell did announce a “neo-primitivist” 
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movement), many displayed the primitivist tendency to think that musics outside of the 
West, whatever their particular features, would necessarily represent humanity at a more 
fundamental or authentic state. It was because of this view, that “primitives” represented 
modern peoples’ more elemental selves, that composers of the modernist milieu took as a 
point of pride the proximity of their own music to that of primitives, and sought to paint 
the romanticist style as distant form that of primitives. Henry Cowell wrote in a 1933 
submission to Modern Music that, though there had been no formal embrace of a 
“neoprimitivist” movement, the tendency “to draw on those materials common to the 
music of all the people of the world” was growing stronger in modern music, and that the 
newest music being composed was far more genuinely related to this primitive source 
than that of any preceding musical period. As far as modern music was rhythmically 
complex, it resembled music of the primitive, “because rhythm is more complex in 
aboriginal than in classic music.”63 Even if such a resemblance was accidental and not the 
result of any true influence by “primitive” music, to Cowell it nevertheless represented a 
real correlation. I will discuss Cowell’s views on “the primitive” at greater length in the 
next Chapter.  
With equal intensity of inspiration and of scorn for those who lacked it, McPhee’s 
associate Lazare Saminsky wrote of how Eastern musics were revitalizing the faded 
Western tradition: 
Marvelous are those flare-ups of a renaissance appearing from an Eastern racial 
direction just in this era of marasmus and death, in an age of visible petrification 
in Western European music! Possibly, the new Russian, Hungarian, Hebrew, 
Spanish and other vibrant and living streams of the Eastern flood now pouring its 
cutting waters into the new music of the West, have as their mission the stamping 
out of creative Ptolemaism ingrained in the Western musical mass-mind. This 
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new and triumphant cortège of the musical East, augurates a real return to our 
common racial spring, heralds a reunion of the musical creed, a tonal merging of 
the Orient and the Occident.64 
 
Occasionally McPhee’s own crassly primitivist side emerged, not when he wrote with 
his characteristic subtlety about Balinese music but when discussing other musical 
traditions. Though never floating to such fanciful heights as Saminsky, McPhee would 
occasionally fall back on the principle, applied a priori as a determinant of authenticity, 
that robust and hard-edged music was “primitive.” By the simple virtue of having those 
qualities, a composition could be championed as representative of music at its most 
essential. By having other undesirable qualities a composition could be labeled as 
“exoticist.” He praised Chávez’s Sinfonía India on those terms:  
One feels on hearing this music first of all a primitive energy that has nothing of 
the exotic but is a clear and forceful expression of racial vitality both youthful and 
healthy. Here one will find none of the Europeanisms or French impressionism 
still lingering in the works of so many Latin-American composers…. The 
orchestration is done in primary colors; the sonorities are hard and penetrating, 
superimposed upon a resilient percussive base composed as far back as 1926…. A 
physical tension prevails from the first note to the last.65  
 
Other than by these methods, it is hard to guess how McPhee, who at the time of this 
review would have had little or no direct contact with native Mexicans, assessed the 
authentic representation of their “racial vitality.”66 From a crassly primitivist point of 
view, direct contact and study didn’t matter. The terms of authenticity for the 
representation of pre-colonial Mexican music were largely based on ideas of “the 
                                                 
 
64
 Lazare Saminky, Music of Our Day: Essentials and Prophecies (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 
1932), 81-83, quoted in CTW, 62-63.  
 
65
 McPhee, “New York—January, February 1936,” Modern Music 13, no. 3 (March-April 1936): 42.  
 
66
 In early 1936 when writing this review, McPhee had not yet been to Mexico. He and Belo would 
travel there in June of that year and stay through the premier of Tabuh-tabuhan in early September. See 
CTW, 100-102 and 117-119. 
 
 74 
primitive” that were pre-established and could be assumed to apply to early Mexicans by 
virtue of their being “primitives.” An authentic portrayal was then not so much a matter 
of demonstrating careful study but of using approved techniques and tropes. “Primary 
colors,” shifting meters and polyrhythms, and extensive use of percussion were proper 
means to express “the primitive.” Impressionistic clouds and romantic storms were not, 
nor were the alluring melodic turns and chromatic harmonies that had characterized many 
nineteenth-century representations of non-Western musics. A few years later McPhee 
called the Sinfonía India “a perfect example of the right way to utilize exotic material,”67 
again giving weight to the style of the utilization among criteria for assessing authentic 
representation. For modernists, a peculiar interdependence developed in this way between 
stylistic concerns developed in an urban milieu—in argument with other, more dominant 
urban musics—and primitivist claims to authenticity.  
When speaking of Bali, McPhee was both like and unlike those of his colleagues who 
were more casually acquainted with foreign musics. Others did little more than detect 
certain predictable features in foreign musics, replacing romanticist clichés with 
differently uninformed modernist ones. Some, when describing non-Western musics, did 
little more than give a self-description of modernism as they saw it—speaking about non-
Western musics was also a method of self definition, and, by negative comparison, a 
method of defining the conservative musical mainstream. It would be absurdly reductive 
to understand McPhee’s investigation into Balinese music, lasting nearly a decade, as 
having taken him no further than the readymade impressions he started off with. 
Nevertheless, the 1935-36 communication of his discoveries in Bali to members of his 
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American world necessitated that he engage with the currently established conventions of 
primitivism.  
 
A 1935-36 Return Visit: Textual Issues of Ethnography in “The ‘Absolute’ Music of 
Bali” and Tabuh-tabuhan 
Printed in Modern Music, McPhee’s first article on Balinese music “The ‘Absolute’ 
Music of Bali” was directed specifically to American composers. Its style was descriptive 
and direct, and at seven pages it was short (though of fair length relative to most of that 
journal’s articles). Aside from its provocative title, it did not employ other current buzz 
words (some of which I will discuss below) of modernism or engage in heavy-handed 
polemics, as did many contemporary articles in Modern Music. Nevertheless, when read 
among other articles in that journal, McPhee’s flat, neutral descriptions do begin to buzz 
argumentatively in the style of those others. Only in a few parts of the article did McPhee 
explicitly contrast Balinese music and “our” music, “ours” being not literally his own 
compositions, but the music he identified as emblematic of Western culture (i.e. 19th-
century concert music):  
In conception Balinese music is static, whereas ours is dynamic and generally the 
expression of a crisis, a conflict. In execution Balinese music is extremely 
dynamic, while paradoxically much of our own music, especially that of the 
nineteenth century, seems by comparison, turgid and lethargic. The very phrasing 
of our music is declamatory; our orchestras are heavy and lack buoyancy. A 
breath of fresh air needs to be let into the concert halls. (AMB, 164) 
 
McPhee’s authorial persona was of a former naïf, who had only come to his 
expressed realizations about the true nature of music after living in Bali. Through 
extended exposure to Balinese music (which McPhee stated was essentially the same as 
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that of other Oriental musics), he had arrived at an entirely new and “purified” 
understanding of how musical truth was grounded in human nature: 
What can be the reactions of an Occidental, after prolonged contact with such a 
music, so essentially different from his own? What influences will penetrate his 
growing acquaintance with it? For four years the writer has lived in Bali, in an 
isolation broken only by brief trips to Java, Siam, China and Japan, where the 
approach to music is fundamentally like that of Bali, abstract and anonymous. 
During such a period of time one’s conceptions inevitably experience some 
change, become, it is hoped, broadened and purified. (AMB, 163) 
 
McPhee explained that the nature of Balinese musical expression was entirely 
inexpressive, its forms in no way intended to give voice to individuals’ emotions. He also 
discussed the function of music in Balinese society, its percussive instrumentation, the 
manner in which the Balinese might arrange old musical materials into a new 
composition, and how they organized pitch and rhythm. As will be seen, these were not 
in fact uprecendented observations; these “discoveries” in the field were all echoes of 
McPhee’s compositional concerns prior to his 1931 voyage to Bali. 
The same was true of Tabuh-tabuhan. It would have seemed that in its incorporation 
of authentic Balinese musical materials, Tabuh-tabuhan was bringing something truly 
foreign and perhaps revelatory into the concert hall. Yet, as I will discuss, the medium of 
this work determined its content: it was music for the concert hall, and it was ultimately 
only capable of speaking in the concert hall’s vocabulary, however novelly. In the very 
same utterances with which Tabuh-tabuhan “spoke” about Balinese music, purportedly 
as “a breath of fresh air” in the concert hall, it recycled modern music’s sounds and 
expressed its familiar themes.  
Table 1 presents some metaphors that I argue McPhee implied in “The ‘Absolute’ 
Music of Bali” and realized musically in Tabuh-tabuhan. The left column lists quotations 
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from “The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali” that describe aspects of Balinese music. The right 
column lists modernist ideas to which these quotations correspond. In the case of 
“absolute music” McPhee used the buzz word itself. On other points he did not, and made 
no explicit reference to modernist music. Taken literally, he was simply describing 
Balinese music in a neutral fashion. In the following sections I will explain what McPhee 
meant by “absolute music” and several of these non-explicit connections, point-by-point. 
For the most part I will not be discussing the accuracy of McPhee’s statements about Bali 
in “The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali.” My purpose rather will be to illuminate how the 
article’s statements about Bali were in fact reflections upon modernism, as they would 
have to be.  
 
 
Description in “The ‘Absolute’ Music of 
Bali” 
Modernist Concept apparent in 
Tabuh-tabuhan 
“absolute,” “impersonal and non-expressive” absolute music 
“primarily utitlitarian” 
“At a ceremony its presence is as necessary as 
incense, flowers, and offerings” 
Gebrauchsmusik 
 
“The apotheosis of percussion” percussion orchestras 
“The present tendency...to break up the old 
compositions and weld fragments or episodes 
from these into new works” 
textural juxtaposition 
“no voice in gamelan is without its rhythmic 
function” 
polyrhythm, polymeter 
“aerial sonority” 
“each of the five notes of the scale may be a 
point of gravity, thus forming five tonal 
centres through which the melody may pass at 
will” 
pandiatonicism, panpentatonicism 
“often four or more types of gamelans will be 
assembled..., a barbaric splendor of clashing 
tonalities” 
Polytonality, bitonality 
 
Table 1. McPhee’s Metaphors Between Balinese Gamelan and Modernist Composition 
(Quotes on left are taken from McPhee, “The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali”) 
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I am not sure that McPhee intentionally invoked all these metaphors. In “The 
‘Absolute’ Music of Bali” he made his assessment of Balinese music as “absolute music” 
explicit. As for the other double-meanings that I discuss, it may be that some were 
intentional, some were unconscious, and some, within that milieu, were simply beyond 
his prevention.  
That Balinese music was “absolute” music was McPhee’s boldest assertion. What did 
he mean in applying to Balinese music the concept of absolute music, particular as it was 
applied to the concerns of his own artistic milieu? Though the term is clothed in 
quotation marks in McPhee’s title, it appears without them in the body of the text, and 
there is no indication that he intended it with irony:  
[In Bali] is a music which has successfully achieved the absolute,—impersonal 
and non-expressive, with a beauty that depends upon form and pattern and a vigor 
that springs from a rhythmic vitality both primitive and joyous…. The original 
nature of music reveals itself with ever greater clarity as a phenomenon of sound 
rather than of language, as something springing from the urge to rhythmic 
expression, spontaneous and physical, rather than as a means for unembarrassed 
self-revelation. (AMB, 163) 
 
What McPhee implied by absolute music was a more complex idea than simply music 
without a program. His was a more radical concept of music of pure form and without 
emotion, defined in differentiation from German orchestral music, which expressed 
programs, ideas, emotions, and the unique personality of an individual. German 
orchestral music was fettered to language, and as such doomed to contingency. The 
absolute music McPhee claimed to have discovered in Bali had a rhythmic vitality by 
which it bypassed semantic and subjective levels and connected directly to the human 
body. In the West, such a pure form of music could only be proposed, experimented at, or 
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argued for, but in Bali McPhee claimed to have found it, “achieved,” in the living culture 
of a people.  
Such ideas about “the original nature of music” were already in circulation among 
modernists before McPhee arrived in Bali in 1931. In fact, McPhee’s statement came 
around the same time as, and indeed may have been directly or indirectly influenced by, 
similar remarks by Antonin Artaud, whose relationship to Balinese arts was far more 
casual. Artaud had witnessed a Balinese dance drama at the 1931 Colonial Exposition in 
Paris, and based on that performance he had declared that “The Balinese have realized, 
with the utmost rigor, the idea of pure theater, where everything, conception and 
realization alike, has value, has existence only in proportion to its degree of 
objectification on the stage. They victoriously demonstrate the absolute preponderance of 
the director (metteur en scène) whose creative power eliminates words” (Artaud’s 
italics).68 This would be the independence of theater from language, a theater with its 
own language which would emerge directly from the body of the actor.  
Other composers spoke similarly about the non-expressive “nature of music.” As 
already noted in the Introduction, Stravinsky stated, “I consider music, by its nature, 
incapable of expressing anything, whether a feeling, an attitude, a psychological state, a 
natural phenomenon, etc. Expressiveness has never been an immanent feature of 
music.”69 Absolute music was, then, music reduced to its “immanent” features, and it was 
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as such the music of that most elemental segment of humanity “the primitives,” who it 
could be expected would exhibit it un-self-consciously. 
Ironically, though among musicologists today the term absolute music is most often 
associated with Edward Hanslick, romantic philosophy, and 19th-century instrumental 
music, for those in McPhee’s circle the chief foil of the absolute had become precisely 
that same German orchestral tradition. McPhee’s crowd tended to articulate their ideas of 
what absolute music was through statements of what it was not: the gloomy, self-
absorbed moans and enervated sobs that they saw as characteristic of German music.70 In 
a 1925 publication in Modern Music Adolph Weissman took note of both this combative 
character of the movement and its primitivist associations. His explanation of the term 
had a note of parody, as he in fact felt that the ideal was too uncompromising:  
One of the chief tenets in the doctrine of the new music is evolution toward the 
absolute,—in other words toward pure music, or better still, pure counterpoint…. 
The tendency, it is obvious, has been developed in opposition to the music of the 
nineteenth century. It is in conflict with the romantic, the emotional and the 
naturalistic. It demands of music the abolition of everything realistic, everything 
human, so that the art may emerge in its native purity.71 
 
Among composers of new music, there was no consensus as to the meaning of 
absolute music. Musical purity was its critical theme, but purity from what? Most 
inclusively, absolute music sought purity not from “everything human,” as Weissman 
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suggested, but from everything that limited it to being human in any particular time and 
place. The modernists’ objective was precisely to create a music that was more purely 
human—a human stripped of its ideas and emotions, down to its body, unadorned and 
pulsing with energy. This ideal contained within it the promise of a “true” music, 
independent of culture, and further the possibility that such a music actually existed in the 
world, somewhere far outside of the concert halls of the West.  
Though my purpose in this chapter is not to challenge the accuracy of McPhee’s 
statements about Bali, I feel that is worth discussing how his claim that Balinese music 
would “never contain an emotion” may be impugned simply on its face, as it implies that 
he had access to the emotional lives of all Balinese. It is contradicted in Tilman Seebass’s 
discussion of the expressive differences that were emerging in the 1920s and ‘30s 
between classical genres such as gong gede or semar pegulingan and the newer genre of 
gong kebyar:  
The function of the [traditional gamelan repertories] is to fill the air with sound 
and to establish an emotional state. This is also true of the traditional musical 
accompaniments in drama, where music underlines and illustrates specific 
emotional states and does not function in a narrative fashion. Action, however, is 
the key word for kebyar. Several scholars describe it as a potpourri of styles and 
techniques, in which the various pieces, used in an extended theatrical 
performance for the illustrations of topical scenes (love, grief, joy, battle), are 
compressed into a single composition.72 
  
Kebyar was the style emerging as dominant during McPhee’s years in Bali, and it 
seems to have been the first to catch his attention.  At the time of writing “The ‘Absolute’ 
Music of Bali” McPhee was certainly aware of the distinctions among styles, although he 
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wrote later that he did not begin to analyze the older forms until his later period in Bali.73 
Either the older or the newer Balinese music might have been interpreted as more 
“absolute.” Kebyar tended to incorporate materials from various sources, setting them in 
rapid juxtaposition, the result of which might be thought of as “absolute” or “formalistic” 
in the sense that no single emotional tone was allowed to dominate for long. Meanwhile, 
the classical genres with their consistent moods and precise structures might equally have 
been regarded as formalistic. Neither sort could really have been defined as emotionless 
(if emotion is understood to be immanent to the music itself), or to have existed in an 
emotional vacuum. Today an ethnomusicologist might discuss emotion (or non-emotion) 
in Balinese music by offering accounts of individual Balinese people’s descriptions of 
their musical experiences. In “The Absolute Music of Bali” McPhee “omitted” such 
accounts; only by this omission was he able to make claims about the music’s immanent 
features (and non-features).74 
After his return to Bali in 1936, McPhee gained a deeper understanding of the genre 
distinctions, and in fact developed a disdain for kebyar which had so dazzled him before. 
(It was at that point that he began work to stimulate a revival of the older style of 
gamelan semar pegulingan.) Upon his second return from Bali, McPhee wrote another 
article for Modern Music, in which he criticized kebyar as a corruption of true Balinese 
aesthetics. Ironically, he once again framed the issue as a dichotomy of formalism versus 
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expressivity. While the same concepts were operative, McPhee this time swiveled in his 
argument, claiming that the more emotionally characteristic genres were the truly 
“formalistic” ones, while kebyar, formerly an exemplar of the “absolute” music of Bali, 
now became “feverish and melodramatic” and an “aimless form of expression”:  
The beauty, the strength, the artistic significance of Balinese music lay in its 
formalism, in the tradition which kept it the anonymous but individual expression 
of a race. Its development was slow and logical, the changes which gradually 
gave it a distinct Balinese quality were imperceptible. But in the past twenty years 
a new form, known as the Kebyar style, feverish and melodramatic, has suddenly 
arisen out of the old. While spectacular in its brilliance and occasional 
extraordinary virtuosity, this new music carries within it all the germs of decay. 
Tradition has been thrown overboard, and law and order discarded for innovations 
which, though at times beautiful in themselves, can in the end lead only to empty, 
aimless forms of expression.75 
 
In 1949 McPhee again described an absence of emotion in Balinese music (though at 
this point he only mentioned the topic in passing). This time his anger at kebyar seems to 
have softened (though by many accounts he continued to dislike the genre until the end of 
his life), and he apologized for the genre and reinstated it as an exemplar of the 
physicality of Balinese music:   
[Balinese] music furnishes appropriate background for dance and drama, fills the air 
with festive sound. It is a formal, abstract art, created for the occasion, and the 
composers are unknown. It is true that in the newer music there is a dramatic 
surging of crescendos and diminuendos, a constant changing of mood. But the 
contrasts are like sunlight and shadow; they are the expression of the purely 
physical exuberance of the group rather than the expression of any emotional 
tension.76  
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These reversals might be taken as an indication that the absolute music concept was 
so foreign to Balinese aesthetics that its application in one way or another was practically 
arbitrary. That kebyar was continuously reinterpreted so as to exemplify one side or the 
other of the “absolute” versus “emotional” dichotomy, that McPhee would continue to 
grasp at these concepts despite his shifting understanding of Balinese music, is an 
indication of how important these concepts were to him. The more significant point here 
is that in writing about Balinese music for his particular audience, these were the terms 
by which he felt compelled to speak. It was as if they were the part of the playing rules by 
which one was permitted to speak about non-Western music at all. 
Walter Spies, another artist living in Bali at the same time as McPhee, did not belong 
to the same discursive community and did not play by the same rules. Seebasss has 
observed that Spies, a German, found that kebyar confirmed his expressionistic 
tendencies, that it was resonant of “subjectivism” and “extravagance.” Such ideas would 
of course have been, at least on the surface, totally antithetical to McPhee’s (though both 
called kebyar “melodramatic,” one in praise and the other in condemnation). According 
to Seebass:  
There is an inner affinity and sensibility for this music in Spies as Expressionist, 
hence the esthetic identity of the descriptive mode of his language and the object 
described; his “expressionistische Tonkunst” (Seebass’s term). Subjectivism, 
extravagance, dynamism, and, in particular, a new definition of the creative 
experience as the totale Erlebnis (total experience) are the characteristics of the 
literature and visual arts of the Expressionist movement. It is very striking to see a 
literary scholar describing the total artistic experience of the Expressionist as a 
“kaleidoskopisches Zusammenrücken von Wirklichskeitsfragmenten” 
(kaleidoscopic falling together of fragments of reality). One could not find a 
better description for the composition or centonization of kebyar piece.77 
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While McPhee’s concept of absolute music was formed in contradistinction from 
German music, he also described Balinese music using language reminiscent of another 
movement of German origins. This was the movement of Gebrauchsmusik, which had 
taken hold in the U.S. by the time of McPhee’s 1935 return trip. McPhee described the 
functionality of Bali’s music:  
The primarily utilitarian nature of this music…emphasizes a conception rather 
different from ours,—that music may be something which is not to be listened to in 
itself. It may be marched to, danced to, or used to precipitate a state of trance by its 
hypnotic power; but never will it become personal, or contain an emotion. At a 
ceremony its presence is as necessary as incense, flowers and offerings. (McPhee’s 
italics) (AMB, 165) 
 
McPhee repeated again and again that Balinese music was joyously useful, stressing 
that music and dance “play a most important part in the life of the people,” and that, most 
of all, “what inspires the musician with wonder and envy, is the satisfactory raison d’être 
of music in the community” (AMB, 163). It seems the idea that Balinese music was 
Gebrauchsmusik was the one that McPhee most wanted to impress upon his readers. He 
also stressed that there were no composers in Bali, that music was very much an activity 
belonging to the general populous, and that the role of composers is taken up by gurus 
(teachers), who ensured music’s continuation and development in the community without 
becoming a wholly original creative ego. Balinese music never resembled the inactive 
music of the concert hall, autonomous from life as truly lived. 
Ideas of musical autonomy appear in both the Gebrauchsmusik discourse and the 
absolute music discourse. This is potentially confusing, for whereas in discussions of 
absolute music the stated objective was to create music “autonomous” of the 
contingencies of language and history, proponents of Gebrauchsmusik insisted upon 
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turning away from or finding an alternative to music as “autonomous,” in the sense of 
being isolated from everyday life and experienced passively. It was not inconsistent to be 
in favor of autonomy at one moment and against it at the next, as by both one could 
imply opposition to the excesses of music in the nineteenth century. The latter sense of 
the term implied that new music, whether or not it had ideological or emotional content, 
was to be enjoyed actively, and was to be woven into life’s fabric.  
At its genesis the term Gebrauchsmusik was tied to primitivist notions. Paul Nettl, a 
scholar of dance music of the 17th century, was one of the first to employ the term in 
antithesis to the autonomous music that he saw as characteristic of his time. He observed 
that 17th-century dance music had diverged into two strains: on the one hand was music 
intended for actual dancing and on the other was an “increasing stylization” found in the 
suite of mixed dance forms. Nettl described a “certain removal from popular 
primordiality (Volkstümliche Ursprünglichkeit)” characteristic of the stylized suite. His 
contemporary Leo Kestenberg communicated this ethic of “primordial” utility as a 
concern for contemporary composers, writing in 1921 that Gebrauchsmusik ‘is 
artistically as important as, and nowadays materially more promising than, concert 
music.”78 For Modern Music in 1930, Hans Gutman characterized Gebrauchsmusik as a 
sociological concern of “Young Germany,” again framing the issue as an aesthetic 
argument with the nineteenth century: 
During the nineteenth century music passed definitely into the class of luxuries 
reserved for the entertainment of the upper classes, and ceased to be an integral 
part in the life of the people. For the new audience which was ushered into 
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existence and power by the Revolution, the outmoded sociological approach to 
music, handed down by the previous generation, has proved unserviceable. Hence 
the birth of the new “Gebrauchsmusik,” the music for everybody, for everyday 
use, which is to replace the “Luxusmusik.” Obviously these new goals can be 
reached soonest in the fields now just opening up to music. Opera as well must 
yield to radical change. And—by no means least important in this program of 
reform—the auditor is to be roused from his lethargy, stimulated and induced to 
make music himself, instead of uncomprehendingly following the conductor’s 
baton.79 
 
As with absolute music, Gebrauchsmusik simultaneously cast itself as a revolution 
rolling across a Europe and America newly awake to their true modern situation, and 
drew its power from the claim that it was apparent in most or all places and at most or all 
time periods, except the time and place of Western concert music. Gebrauchsmusik 
contended to be one of modernism’s most profound discoveries of the obvious.  
According to McPhee, one reason Balinese music was ideal as both an abstract music 
(without meaning or emotion) and a music suited to stimulate people from a state of 
lethargy into action, was its instrumentation—it was percussion music: 
The apotheosis of percussion, these orchestras consist of many forms of gongs, 
large and small, cymbals, drums and a great variety of metal-keyed 
instruments,—an ideal medium for the abstract but at the same time dynamic 
nature of the music. (AMB, 164)  
 
This passing statement about Balinese music’s instrumentation might have provoked the 
imagination of McPhee’s readers, as in the ten years prior to the composition of Tabuh-
tabuhan there had been an explosion of interest in percussion among composers of new 
music. In Cowell’s 1933 article on “neo-primitivism,” he noted this new interest and 
identified it with the growing closeness of modernist musicians to “the primitive”: 
Among the more radical works written by non-proletarian American composers 
recently, there may not be anything so very definitely primitive in style, but there 
are strong tendencies to use primitive means in creating new sorts of structures. 
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Up to this year, in my experience as a music publisher I have never been offered 
any work for percussion instruments alone. This season I have been offered 
fifteen different works for such combinations, the two most interesting being 
Varese’s Ionisation, and William Russell’s Fugue for Eight Percussion 
Instruments.80 
 
In 1930 Amadeo Roldán wrote his Ritmicas V and VI for percussion ensemble, and in 
1933 New York saw the premiere of Varèse’s Ionisation for 13 percussion instruments. 
The next year Cowell wrote his own Ostinato Pianissimo for eight percussion 
instruments, and in Australia Percy Grainer gave a series of lectures collectively titled A 
Commonsense View of All Music, the eleventh of which, “Tuneful Percussion,” made 
mention of “Bali bell-orchestras” and “Javanese gong-orchestras.” Following the lecture, 
Grainger presented his adaptation of Debussy’s “Pagodes,” which he believed to have 
been inspired by Javanese gamelan—Grainger arranged it for a percussion ensemble of 
harmonium, celeste, dulcitone, three pianos (twelve hands), xylophone, ‘metal marimba,’ 
and wooden marimba.81 Chávez, in a 1936 Modern Music article “Revolt in Mexico,” 
described how his students used indigenous percussion instruments of Mexico to develop 
an original compositional technique and wean themselves of “academic” imports from 
Europe82; his Sinfonía India of the same year employed, in addition to strings and winds, 
a percussion menagerie including a clay rattle, a water gourd, and a string of butterfly 
cocoons. John Cage and Lou Harrison also began to work with percussion in the 1930s. 
                                                 
 
80
 Cowell, “Towards Neo-Primitivism,” Modern Music 10 (March-April 1933): 153. Another work for 
non-pitched percussion alone, Amadeo Roldán’s Ritmicas, nos. 5 and 6, also saw its premier in 1930. 
 
81
 Grainger, “Music: a Commonsense View of All Types (Melbourne, 1934). Also see John Blacking, 
“A Commonsense View of All Music”: Reflections on Percy Grainger’s Contribution to Ethnomusicology 
and Music Education (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987). 
 
82
 Carlos Chávez, “Revolt in Mexico.” 
 
 89 
Antheil’s Ballet Mécanique had its New York premiere in 1927—McPhee had played 
piano in it along side Aaron Copland. That performance employed six xylophones, 
electric bells, two wood propellers, a metal propeller, tamtam, four bass drums, siren, ten 
pianos, and pianola (electric piano). For Antheil, the piece paid homage to the modern, 
“the primitive,” and the machine: to “America, Africa, and Steel.” In his 1923 Parisian 
debut Antheil had presented several works of percussive pianism on these themes: Sonata 
Sauvage, Mechanisms, and Airplane Sonata. He remarked, “I feel that in these few pages 
I have embraced all mankind, the fear, impossible hopes, and electricity of the 
unconscious from the primitive to the mind that dies in the airplane.”83  
By the late 1920s percussion had two seemingly contradictory associations, one with 
the jungle and the other to the increasingly motorized streets and skyscrapers of New 
York. Modernists found a hard, angular, and energetic imagery and an unemotional, 
brutal aesthetic common to both locations. This was not—as it was sometimes 
portrayed—through “discovery” of inherent similarities between their own world and that 
of “primitives.” These similitudes between the Machine Age and the Stone Age rather 
came into being through mutual differentiation from the “torpidity” of romanticism’s 
orchestral idiom. In the visual arts, the angular forms of skyscrapers and African masks 
paralleled the crisp timbres of percussion in their anti-emotional directness.  
McPhee himself saw machinery as an inspiring object. He had been the student of 
Varèse at the time when the latter was writing Ionisation, and had even been labeled by a 
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critic for the New York Sun as a “young American futurist” as early as 1926.84 Just before 
his departure for Bali in 1931, McPhee composed a piece titled Mechanical Principles 
(now lost),85 which was performed in conjunction with a film by Ralph Steiner—
ironically, there was a mechanical failure of the projection equipment during the 
showing. The next year, in a letter written from Paris after he had already lived six 
months in Bali, McPhee testified that mechanical aesthetics were presently at the 
forefront of his thoughts:  
From [Mechanical Principles] on I have been trying to express through music an 
emotion resulting from contact with daily life—its noise, rhythm, energy, and 
mechanical daring. Do not think I mean program music. I have no more definite, 
concrete idea in mind than the construction of logical music whose rhythms 
derive from mechanics, whose tonal structure, while orderly and complete, is as 
complex as the structure of a large bridge.”86 
 
McPhee later found that aesthetic in Balinese music. In “The ‘Absolute’ Music of 
Bali” he described the music as “strangely rational”: “no voice in gamelan is without its 
rhythmic function” (he would later come to see it evidenced in classical genres but not in 
the “decay” of kebyar.) In the 1960 program notes to Tabuh-tabuhan, he defined the title 
as “a Balinese collective noun, meaning different drum rhythms, metric forms, gong 
punctuations, gamelans and music essentially percussive.”87 In choosing this title and 
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interpreting it as he did, McPhee stressed the logical, geometric, indeed mechanical 
design of Balinese music and its metallic and percussive instrumentation. 
McPhee’s scoring of Tabuh-tabuhan was reminiscent of the Ballet Mécanique and of 
Stravinsky’s Les Noces.88 Tabuh-tabuhan’s instrumentation included a standard 
symphony orchestra and a “nuclear gamelan,” consisting of two pianos, celesta, 
xylophone, marimba, and glockenspiel. The scoring for multiple pianos is a particularly 
noteworthy feature, as it recalled both of those earlier works, as well as Poulenc’s 1932 
Concerto for Two Pianos, which had in fact alluded to Balinese gamelan. There was also 
a likely Balinese inspiration for McPhee’s scoring hinted at in A House in Bali—McPhee 
recalled how the Balinese gender accompaniment to the shadow play had stirred his 
imagination: “Four musicians sat facing one another, and as hands moved with incredible 
rapidity up and down above the keys, I could only think of four perfectly co-ordinated 
little pianos” (HIB, 37). It would seem that in this way an ethnographic metaphor was 
conceived and then employed: the gender wayang McPhee heard in Bali reminded him of 
a current modernist genre of “perfectly co-ordinated” pianos; with Tabuh-tabuhan he 
brought this association home to modernists, reminding them of their own genre with the 
invocation of gender.    
McPhee stated that Balinese music was perfectly coordinated, carefully structured, 
and “its chief strength is its rhythm” (AMB, 166). Balinese syncopations and cross-
accented polymetric groupings acted as a kind of dissonance, taking the place of Western 
music’s tonal dissonance. He argued that Balinese music’s importance for the occidental 
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was in such complexities, which far outshone the rhythmic resources available to 
Western musicians. It would have been understood that this comparison was not only true 
of Bali versus the West: Balinese music would have been taken by most as an exemplar 
of a larger category of “primitive” musics. This attitude is reflected in Cowell’s 1933 
categorical statement, “rhythm is more complex in aboriginal than in classic music.”89 
McPhee described Balinese music as rational in construction to the point that it was 
not only polyrhythmic at a local level, but contained elaborate polymetric structures. He 
transcribed a passage of a series of gestures in five (see Ex. 1). Above the staff he 
graphed a 4/4 conception of the passage, which showed that the groups of five ultimately 
come to rest at the downbeat in the fourth 4/4 measure. “Often,” he wrote, “[the Balinese 
orchestra] plays in unison highly syncopated passages which, although bewildering 
enough at first hearing, upon analysis resolve themselves like mathematical problems” 
(AMB, 168). He stated that this example was only the simplest example of its kind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex. 1. “Shifting accents…that sound as though composed of units of five notes” (AMB, 
168), 
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McPhee saw a special affinity between rhythm in Balinese music and in many others, 
including jazz, and excluding European classical music. In a later article in Modern 
Music, “Eight to the Bar,” (1943), he argued that the syncopations of jazz did not 
originate in Africa, but rather were a pan-Asian phenomenon. The idea that jazz had 
originated in Africa was a faulty product of primitivism in its 1920s form:  
The theory still survives that the syncopation peculiar to American jazz is a form 
of rhythmic expression that had its birth ‘on some Negro’s dull tomtom in Africa.’ 
The lingering obsession is not unconnected with the feverish cult of the Negro 
that flourished in the ‘twenties after the still earlier discovery of African 
sculpture. The idea, of course, is dated; it belongs to an era of art-galleries 
crammed with primitive carving, of Josephine Baker in Paris, the exploration of 
Harlem, La Création du Monde—a period or romantic anthropology long past.90 
 
If at this point McPhee distanced himself from the earlier primitivist movement, it is 
clear that he maintained a conception of a “primitive” category of people and music. The 
view he expressed here was that the syncopations found in jazz actually can be found in 
many parts of the world, in India, the Middle East, to a lesser extent in China, and to a 
great extent in Bali. In all these places there was music that displayed a common 
tendency to subdivide the 4/4 bar into uneven divisions of three and two eighth notes. 
McPhee found that the most basic and widespread manifestation of this tendency was the 
following: 
   1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 
1    2    3    4   
   
 
McPhee argued that this is a pattern of both “universality and antiquity” (p. 242). His 
precise conception of the matter is hazy, for at points he suggested that the pattern spread 
through cultural contact, which would seem to undercut his argument for its universality. 
On the side of universality, his comments suggest an at least vaguely Freudian view. He 
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stated of the phenomenon of various performers performing different subdivisions of the 
4/4 bar that 
This is the very essence of polyrhythm. In the brief ostinato we see a basic 
rhythm, the march-step with its alternation of right-left, its relation to the heart-
beat of contract-expand, eject-draw-in, given a secondary accentuation whose 
primary purpose is to negate the other, as though to conceal the weakness, deny 
the implications of exhaustion and death that lie in the second beat. (p. 238) 
 
A belief in the psychic unity of mankind, which this analysis implied, was a feature of 
primitivist thought following Freud. Here, though, McPhee was not necessarily making a 
primitivist argument; on an explicit level he was divesting himself of primitivism, stating 
that the rhythm of interest was “a far cry from the wild tumultuous drumming of the 
primitive African groups. . .” (p. 242). He was making the case that the 3 3 2 rhythm, 
representative of the universal psyche, was the property of a particular segment of 
humanity, which stretched through Asia, into Africa by way of the Arabs, and onward to 
the Americas. To drive home this argument, he stated: 
I never could get the Balinese to listen thirty seconds to any record containing 
culture-music of the West. “What noise!” they would exclaim. “Like wailing! 
And where is the beat?” But they would listen to one jazz record after another. 
They found them grotesque but comparatively intelligible. (p. 242) 
 
This article provides some insight into the composition of Tabuh-tabuhan, for in that 
work rhythmic materials dividing the bar in this manner are densely layered. For those 
not familiar with Balinese music, many sections (such as that shown in example 2) might 
be rather be reminiscent of jazz. 
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Ex. 2. Syncopations of the 3 + 3 + 2 variety (movement 1 “Ostinatos,” mm. 49-52, piano 
I). 
 
Perhaps McPhee intended a double allusion to Balinese music and jazz from the time 
of the work’s conception, or perhaps he observed that his Bali-inspired composition 
sounded jazz-like as he was composing it. In 1936 McPhee described the work to Cowell 
as “Bali-jazz-and-McPhee.”91 In 1960, McPhee would again identify the importance of 
jazz in the notes to the published score: 
Many of the syncopated rhythms of Balinese music have a close affinity with 
those of Latin-American popular music and American jazz—a history in itself—
and these have formed the basic impulse of the work from start to finish.92 
 
The correlation of Balinese and jazz as more-or-less equivalent influences (whether 
because they shared a historical link or represented a universal instinct) upon the 
modern composer had a polemical resonance. In “The ‘Absolute’ Music of Bali,” 
McPhee identified Americans, not Europeans, as able to successfully assimilate jazz 
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influences into their compositions. Americans more than Europeans were connected 
to the living culture that jazz represented. Because of this, they were, by implication, 
in a position to connect with other influences, which to McPhee in their rhythmic 
materials and social functions were essentially the same as jazz: 
Just how much, and in what manner a so-called primitive music can be utilized by 
the occidental composer is a question for each individual conscience. The 
difference between a pastiche and a creative work in which foreign material has 
been so absorbed by the artist as to become part of his equipment is something 
which has never been completely recognized. It can, however, be detected in the 
variety of influences which jazz has exercised on the composers of today. By 
Europeans jazz has never been convincingly assimilated or more than 
superficially felt; but it has entered the blood of the Americans and become a 
tonic whose stimulating virtues are well established. (AMB, 168)  
 
McPhee did not emphasize the important of pitch and scale for Balinese music as he 
did rhythm. He stated that, “Although the melodic contour is always sure and often 
exceedingly beautiful, the scales, perhaps because of their strong characteristic flavor, 
offer fewer possibilities to the occidental” (AMB, 169). He described Balinese music as 
making nearly indiscriminate use of the notes of the scale, usually of five notes. Each 
note of the scale could be used as a tonal center, thereby offering variety. He stressed 
however that, “The polyphonic nature of [gamelan’s] orchestration rises spontaneously 
from a musical idiom uncontaminated by any conception of harmony. A singularly aerial 
sonority results. . .” (AMB, 168), and postulated that “The absence of harmony or 
modulation illustrates clearly the inherent power of music to sustain itself through purity 
of line and vitality of rhythm” (AMB, 169).  
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Ex. 3. “The melodic outline is generally restricted to some form or other of a pentatonic 
scale. . .” (AMB, 169). 
  
 
 
In McPhee’s application of the principle of “aerial sonority” in Tabuh-tabuhan there 
is an affinity with the pan-diatonicism that was currently in use among many modernist 
composers. Composer colleagues such as Copland and Chavez used the pandiatonic 
sound as a pan-American signifier.93 It can be found in the opening measures of Tabuh-
tabuhan, where the seven notes of the diatonic scale were distributed into three layers 
distinguished by timbre. The first in the flutes and clarinets, contained four pitches; the 
second and in the piano 1 right hand contained four-pitches, three of which were the same 
as those in group 1, so that together the two layers produced a 5-pitch sonority. The piano 
1 left hand completed the diatonic collection, playing just the two remaining pitches. The 
total diatonic sonority had a Lydian quality, and yet the first two layers, audibly distinct 
through their differentiated timbres, spun out the “aerial sonorities” of a smaller pitch 
group. The piano right hand was indeed characteristic of Balinese patterning as found in 
McPhee’s transcriptions. The result was a sonorous effect that at once represented 
Balinese scales (especially in the Piano 1 right hand) and the tonal language of 
contemporary American composition.  
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Ex. 4. Flute and Piano I figuration at the opening of Tabuh-tabuhan (mvt. 1 “Ostinatos,” 
mm. 1-6) 
 
This layering of distinct small collections of four or five pitches is found throughout 
Tabuh-tabuhan. In some cases, as above, the total sonority that is the aggregate of all 
layers were diatonic, at other times more than 7 pitches appeared together, so that the 
sonority would become quite dissonant. One of the most startling moments of 
differentiated layering occurs in the second movement. This particular layering had a 
programmatic significance, as it depicted a common occurrence in Bali, which he 
described in “The Absolute Music of Bali”:  
The festive note may even be dissonant and confused, for often four or more types 
of gamelans will be assembled within the temple walls—each with its separate 
idiom of music and instruments—to resound simultaneously at the climax of 
ritual, in a barbaric splendor of clashing tonalities. Here a state of music is 
required for a certain length of time, nothing more. (McPhee’s italics) (AMB, 165-
66)  
 
In Tabuh-tabuhan this gave McPhee an opportunity to experiment with the sort of poly-
tonal composition in which layers of tonally and timbrally distinct material depicted a 
scene in which separate musics emanated from different sources. Example 5 shows a 
moment in the second movement (“Nocture”) in which two tonally and timbrally distinct 
sets of materials are set in polyphony. One represents a 4-tone gamelan angklung (pitches 
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A-flat, B-flat, C, and E-flat), the other represents the flute of an Arja (sung drama) 
performance (pitches E, F-sharp, G-sharp, B, and C-sharp). The two sets, while 
enharmonically forming the full seven diatonic pitches of an B-major scale, retain 
independence. The effect is that of two sound sources within the same environment. This 
is still a phenomenon of Balinese life (especially notable in odalan ceremonies, which 
mark the anniversaries of temples). The technique McPhee used was described as “full 
polyphony” by Cowell (in reference to the music of Ives).94 
 
 
Ex. 5. Movement 2, mm. 93-96. “A barbaric splendor of clashing tonalities” 
 
 
 
On the topic of compositional process in Bali, McPhee referred specifically to the 
kebyar genre:  
The present tendency, especially in the secular music, is to break up the old 
compositions and weld fragments or episodes from these into new works which, 
though they may lack the unity of the older music, glow with fresh life and 
vitality. (AMB, 165)95 
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A few years later McPhee would have been unlikely to have spoken this positively 
about kebyar. As noted, he came to resent the Balinese tendency to break apart older 
styles and paste them together again haphazardly (as he would later bitterly describe the 
process). In 1935, however, he seems still to have regarded the compositional process of 
kebyar as interesting,96 and this was likely because he recognized in it a similarity with 
the technique of pasting together texturally dissimilar fragments that was in currency 
among modernists. This rebellious manner of composing—rebellious in that it broke with 
traditional demands of continuity and unity—is traceable to Stravinsky, who in 1913 was 
already employing the technique in the Rite of Spring. Juxtaposition would become a 
Stravinsky trademark, exemplified in works such as the Symphonies d’instruments à vent 
(1920) and Les Noces (1921-23).97 Antheil, Varèse, and others had their own manners of 
juxtaposing materials. Meanwhile the similar technique of montage was employed by 
contemporary film makers such as the Soviet Sergei Eisenstein, and collage and 
assemblage paralleled in painting and sculpture.  
Tabuh-tabuhan made vivid this suggested similitude between Balinese and modernist 
juxtaposition. Transcribed themes and new inventions upon Balinese pitch and rhythmic 
materials succeeded each other rapidly, sometimes disjointedly. McPhee offered the 
Balinese explanation for this practice in the program notes: 
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In modern-day Bali, it is common among the youngest generation to make 
compositions in a new form called kebyar, making good use of melodies and 
motives chosen from the ample repertory of classical music.98  
 
With this statement, he implied that his own use of Balinese melodies and motives 
was not mere pastiche but was an engagement with Balinese music-making throughout, 
to the very level of compositional process. McPhee’s audience would have heard musical 
montage, with which they were by then more than familiar, and have been invited to 
believe that they were hearing kebyar. The very opening of the first movement ruptures 
with juxtaposition by measure 9 (ex. 6). Though both forming the same diatonic 
collection, the two juxtaposed blocks have different intervallic contents. Major 2nds and 
minor 3rds in the block of winds and Piano I evoke a sort of “slendro,” while minor 2nds 
and major 3rds in the xylophone, Piano II, and violins, evoke “pelog.” 
 
Ex. 6. Two juxtaposed textural blocks (Tabuh-tabuhan, movement 1, mm. 7-11) 
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As with the other metaphors that I have discussed, that implied by juxtaposition in 
Tabuh-tabuhan formed a union between a technique drawn from a “primitive” culture, 
and an already developed trope of modernist, primitivist composition. As such, the 
persuasiveness of this union of two “present tendencies,” Bali’s and modernism’s, lay in 
the seamless, un-noteworthy way in which Balinese music became refined into material 
that could act as supporting evidence for modernism’s already formed view of “the 
primitive,” and further of modernism’s view of its primitivist self. At the same time, such 
visions of “the primitive” did not simply reinforce static concepts and styles but 
contributed to the continual shifting of concepts and styles of modernism. It is in this way 
that the process of influence of foreign musics upon modernism can be most clearly 
understood. 
For McPhee, then, it was the capacity of an observation about Balinese music, such as 
kebyar, to bolster modernism’s own practices that made it worthy of mention in this 
context. Other observations about Balinese music—not false but necessarily limited—
would go unmentioned. In the context of Modern Music such representations would have 
not only been beside the point, but impossible.99  
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Conclusions: McPhee in Retrospect 
In a 1993 review of Oja’s biography of McPhee, the composer Larry Polansky100 has 
questioned the importance of McPhee’s compositional legacy. Unenthusiastic about the 
prospect of a McPhee revival, Polansky argues: “McPhee’s ‘marginalization’ comes from 
the fact that many of his pieces are in rather strongly established styles, and his most 
‘famous’ work, Tabuh-tabuhan, has often been thought of (rightly or wrongly) as an 
example of how not to incorporate non-Western elements into Western art music.”101 It is 
not really surprising that McPhee, who was once an arbiter of, as he said, “the right way 
to utilize exotic material,” would through the vicissitudes of stylistic change in 20th-
century composition become the very cautionary example used by later arbiters. As seen, 
the development of stylistic trends in 20th-century composition has been continuously 
inflected with the concern to portray ever more authentically foreign musics; at the same 
time, I have attempted to show that among 20th-century composers what has been said to 
be the “right” or the “wrong” way to implement non-Western materials was often 
determined by the speaker’s position on stylistic arguments that were internal to his/her 
own Western milieu. Style and authenticity have been inextricably interdependent in the 
twentieth century.  
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As an illustration I will quote two recent arbiters at length, each a critic of Tabuh-
tabuhan. First is the British composer Douglas Young,102 who praises Tabuh-tabuhan as 
outstanding among compositions representing Asian musics. This is because Tabuh-
tabuhan represents the “true East,” which Young describes in terms reminiscent of the 
modernists’ of the 1920s and ‘30s:  
Compare McPhee’s work with another orchestral monster which purports to 
be Oriental in inspiration—Messiaen’s Turangalîla (1948). Despite post-dating 
Tabuh-tabuhan by more than a decade, Turangalîla looks back to an essentially 
19th-century view of the East. What Messiaen offers us in an orgy of exotic 
sexuality in which hallucinogenic phantoms from Wagner, Tristan, Edgar Allan 
Poe, sundry Eastern Philosophies, and myriad upon myriad of oiseaux, congeal 
into a pseudo-mystical union, whilst embracing little more than the flesh: the 
perfect work for latter day d’Annunzios. 
What Messiaen’s Hindo-Kitsch actually gives us is Western man’s (more or 
less) repressed desires projected onto the East, which he then conveniently labels 
‘mysterious, exotic mystical, intuitive’ etc…. So long as one talks of the East in 
terms of meditation, levitation, archetypes, Yin-Yang, I-Ching, Mantra/Tantra, 
Zen (‘…say it and feel New’) everyone seems perfectly cock-a-hoop. The greater 
the hocus-pocus the wilder the euphoria. But if anyone dare present a different 
picture of the East, woe betide them. 
That is exactly what McPhee did. 
Tabuh-tabuhan is the obverse of the 19th-century European view of the East: 
McPhee gives us energy in place of enervation; reality, with all its brashness, in 
place of ‘mysticism’; health and reason in place of a fetishism of insanity and the 
extreme; ‘the lineaments of gratified desire’ rather than an exotic voyeurism. 
And all this in 1936: the date is faintly shocking, as we realize how today, 50 
years on, the 19th-century view of the East is if anything more pervasive than it 
was then.103 
  
Young criticizes Messiaen and others who perpetuate the “19th-century European 
view of the East” for projecting onto the East images that were manufactured in the West. 
Yet Young’s 1986 comments make clear that, if the “19th-century view of the East” is 
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going strong, the 1930s view of the East is alive as well. What Young stresses about the 
rightness of Tabuh-tabuhan was not its faithfulness to any particular Balinese practices 
(though he did offer a description of a generalized “East” to which he felt it was faithful), 
but rather how it avoided the errors of other composers. McPhee had made proper 
stylistic choices that would necessarily ensure his works fidelity to the “East.” Young 
describes these correct stylistic choices through their distinction from false ones, 
elsewhere noting that Tabuh-tabuhan was “not for flatulent Germanic orchestras.”104 
Such statements can be understood in terms of how conflicting definitions of the East 
serve different interests, bolstering or diminishing different stylistic legacies, and 
flattering or insulting different ideological positions. Young praises McPhee for giving us 
“energy,” “reality,” “health,” and “gratified desire,” and is “shocked” that such a clear 
vision of the East could have been conceived as early as 1936, close as it was to the 
nineteenth-century. He argued that McPhee was brave for giving us the real East, in spite 
of the unpopularity of such a vision. Meanwhile, I have argued that McPhee went to great 
lengths to represent Bali precisely according to the image that was popular among his 
modernist colleagues in the 1930s, by whose approval McPhee would have measured his 
success. 
In a review of Carol Oja’s biography of McPhee, the British composer, musicologist, 
and “educationist” Wilfred Mellers105 rejects Tabuh-tabuhan’s vision of Bali. Meller’s 
assessment is the opposite of Young’s, and yet its approach is similar. Mellers describes 
                                                 
 
104
 Young, “Colin McPhee’s Music,” 17. 
 
105
 See Leslie East and Gordon Rumson, “Mellers, Wilfrid, Grove Music Online ed. L. Macy (Accessed 
6/6/2008), http://www.grovemusic.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu. 
 
 106 
the work’s faults through distinction from Lou Harrison’s Piano Concerto for Keith 
Jarett, another work influenced by gamelan (Javanese). For Mellers, the specific problem 
was that McPhee’s work was for orchestra and pianos in twelve-tone equal temperament. 
Equal temperament was not faithful to Balinese music, which Mellers suggested involved 
just intonation: 
…One has only to compare McPhee’s Tabuh Tabuhan with the magically 
beautiful Piano Concerto written by Lou Harrison for Keith Jarrett in 1985 to 
realize that McPhee’s piece founders on a deceit. For although the main reason for 
the superiority of the Harrison work is that he is the better composer, there is also 
a matter of principle involved. McPhee, transcribing Balinese gamelan for equal-
tempered modern instruments, destroys the music’s soul—which is inherent in its 
relatively just intonation. Any system of temperament must be to a degree a fall 
from grace, though some declensions are steeper than others. There is little 
evidence in this book that McPhee, though he had written expertly of the 
traditional tunings, was much bothered by their philosophical and even 
physiological implications. This is why Tabuh Tabuhan, whatever its virtues, 
remains a part of what Steve Reich called “the old exoticism trip”; whereas 
Harrison’s concerto in which the piano is tuned in a subtle compromise between 
East and West, is an aural revelation to, and a spiritual experience for, us divided 
and distracted twentieth-century creatures. 
Not [sic] is it entirely fanciful to relate this technical matter to the disastrous 
story of McPhee’s life. While he intermittently exhibited a charm that beguiled 
well-wishers other than his long-suffering wife, his jeremiads about the state of 
the wicked world (especially in reference to his own talents), his self-absorption 
and his infantile petulance prove increasingly tiresome…. Drink may have been 
his craven answer to the neglect he thought he suffered from—and to the loss of 
the beautiful brown boys of Bali, who were no doubt as solacing as the 
tintinnabulations of their bells and gongs. Of course it wasn’t the sexually 
permissive Balinese but McCarthyite WASPs who eventually drove him from his 
island paradise.106 
 
The issue of whether Harrison’s just intonation is authentic to Javanese music will be 
taken up at length in chapter 4; I will only mention here that it has received serious 
challenge. Mellers’s condemnation of Tabuh-tabuhan would seem to be a case in which 
the authenticity—and indeed the morality—of a modernist work has been assessed a 
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priori by terms that were entirely specific to the community of composers in America and 
had nothing to do with musical concerns among Balinese. Mellers favored the work of 
Harrison, and his understanding of what was true about Balinese gamelan versus what 
was merely fantasy “exoticism” was shaped by Harrison’s work. 
Polansky also preferred the work of Harrison to McPhee. He found McPhee’s method 
of transcribing Balinese music for the piano absurd, remarking that the transcriptions 
“completely obliterate tempo fluctuation, timbre, tuning, dynamics, musical and cultural 
context, ensemble variation, and most importantly, the musical and performance 
variations of the original.” He ultimately found that McPhee transcribed little besides 
“some kind of approximation of rhythms and melodic contours,” and observed that, “the 
only thing [McPhee’s transcriptions] made possible for ‘the West’ was to hear these 
transcriptions themselves.”107 Polansky preferred the transcriptions of Harrison, among 
others.  
I would argue that what McPhee’s transcriptions make it possible to hear must be 
understood as a dialogical matter. Their content is located inevitably along the 
ideological trajectory between himself and his audience. What his compositions say, and 
what is beyond their capacity to say, can be examined as a result of the coincidence of his 
own horizon and that of his audience—if McPhee’s transcriptions say less than they used 
to, that is because there has been a shift in what his audiences want and are able to hear. 
As will be seen, Harrison’s representations are no different.  
Again, in such statements of “right” and “wrong,” even if what is preferred is based 
on a sincere commitment to authenticity of representation, the way authenticity is 
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assessed is a fact of the current science of representation in the field, which is in turn 
determined by aesthetic concerns of the field, and by other internal arguments. In each of 
the above critiques, assessments of the quality of McPhee’s composition were entwined 
with accusations, pointed one way or the other, that somebody operating under a false 
and pernicious musical aesthetic had misrepresented the Balinese. Both Young and 
Mellers took the primitivist position that authentic Balinese music was the same as an 
authentic human music: this was Young’s “energy,” “reality,” “health,” “reason,” and 
“gratified desire” and Mellers’s just intonation. Both writers found in their respective 
false representations conventions associated with Western thinking in the 19th century: 
Young found depictions of the Orient as orgiastic, sensational, and mysterious and 
Mellers found equal temperament. In spite of their complaints against the nineteenth 
century, both of these late-20th-century writers saved their most vitriolic criticisms for 
early-20th-century predecessors. Both Young and Mellers went further, mentioning 
moral, especially sexual, weakness in their critiques: Young claimed that Messiaen’s 
“pseudo-mysticism” actually “embraces little more than the flesh” and represents 
“Western man’s (more or less) repressed desires projected onto the East,” while Mellers 
commented on McPhee’s “craven” drinking and his interest in “the beautiful brown boys 
of Bali.”  
With the intense intellectualism of modernist composition has come a phenomenon of 
aesthetic disagreements that are not merely quarrels over whose music sounds better. 
Aesthetics have become intimately tied to a range of ideological issues touching upon 
national and international politics, sex and sexuality, cultural representation, class 
relations, and science and technology. These issues are frequently so bound together that 
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to be a composer with a style is to be a total moral being, a person with a distinct position 
on truth in the world, whose professional purpose is not only to find performers of his/her 
music but also to persuade others of a vision of the world.  
In the following chapters we will see two examples of such total visions. Both Henry 
Cowell and Lou Harrison went to great lengths in crafting their music to suit their world 
and crafting their world to suit their music. And, as with McPhee and so many other 20th-
century composers, for Cowell and Harrison non-Western musics played an integral role 
in the construction and maintenance of that vision. Cowell will be the focus of the next 
chapter.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter III: Henry Cowell and the “Whole World of Music” 
 
 
Difference and hybrids are good he said 
And agreed that people have lived before 
And not been fools because of that, and that 
They’ve lived in other places too and not 
Been fools because of that. No single way 
Suffices now, and knowing at least one 
Other music well he felt illumines  
Mind and heart as Mozart thought of travel, 
That it is to an artist essential. 
 --Lou Harrison, from “Tens on Remembering Henry Cowell” 
 
In Beyond Exoticism Timothy Taylor argues that Henry Cowell was ideologically in 
sync with the early-twentieth century impulse of cultural relativism, meaning that he 
advocated an understanding of musical meaning and value as variable to cultural context. 
Taylor aligns him with the anthropologist Franz Boas, “who was important in overturning 
the old model of evolutionism,”108 and states that in the writing of his United Quartet 
(1936) Cowell was “armed with Boasian notions of culture and cultural relativism” (p. 
110). As evidence, Taylor offers quotes by Cowell that are suggestive of this relativist 
attitude. In Cowell’s 1935 article “The Scientific Approach to Non-European Music,” he 
stated that understanding such music, “can be reached only upon the basis of a more 
extensive and profound knowledge firstly, of the technical processes and critical standard 
involved, and secondly, of the role of music in the social system from which it has 
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sprung.”109 Taylor states that it was Cowell’s position “that musics should be studied not 
only from the standpoint of science,” but also (now quoting Cowell):  
from the point of view of the peoples themselves. An attempt should be made to 
discover which element of music is most emphasized by the particular tribe in 
question, and what the native conventions are with regard to it. (p. 62) 
 
Taylor also quotes Cowell saying that the new-primitivist stylistic movement he 
visualized was  
not an attempt to imitate primitive music, but rather to draw on those materials 
common to the music of all the peoples of the world, to build a new music 
particularly related to our own century.110 
 
I agree with Taylor’s assessment: Cowell was clearly sympathetic to the relativist 
style of thinking and participated whole-heartedly in its advocacy of cultural tolerance. 
And yet, looking closely at the quotations provided by Taylor, there are words that do not 
seem to conform to relativism as it is commonly conceived today. For instance Cowell 
claimed that a “scientific” knowledge of non-European musics could be arrived upon. 
Another example is his advocacy for the consideration of which “elements” of music 
were valued by particular tribes. As will be seen, in spite of his relativistic ideals, Cowell 
also held notions about music as a phenomenon that might be studied objectively, and 
about which understandings might be reached in terms of absolute, non-relative truths. 
Cowell’s model researcher was a “scientist” investigating “elements,” which, though they 
might be differently valued by different peoples, had an objectively observable existence 
independent of their valuation.  
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Also there is Cowell’s claim in the above quotation that he was not interested in 
imitating “primitive” music. In spite of this disclaimer about imitation, Cowell 
maintained that there was such a thing as a “primitive” person and a “primitive” music. 
The notion of the “primitive” was the centerpiece of the cultural evolutionist conception 
of culture, which Boas had done so much to dismantle in The Mind of Primitive Man. 
Though Boas, Mead, and other anthropologists did refer to non-literate peoples as 
“primitives,” as will be seen, Cowell’s use of the term was far more deeply entwined with 
evolutionist notions than were theirs.111  
Thus, Cowell’s views on musical difference were in two respects the very antitheses 
of what is today commonly conceived of as relativism. First, his views on the variability 
of musical values were founded upon and limited by strict principles that he conceived of 
as scientific and absolute—in other words, not relative to culture. He presented these 
views in detail in his treatises New Musical Resources and The Nature of Melody,112 and 
also referred to them in piecemeal throughout his many articles. Second, he conceived of 
all the musics of the world as representing different stages of a common historical 
developmental line, a view that is commonly referred to as cultural evolutionism.113 
Though today it is often remarked, as Taylor does, that the historical rise of cultural 
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relativism in the early to mid twentieth century represented a rejection of cultural 
evolutionism, I find that in Cowell’s case the two were aspects of a single, coherent 
viewpoint on music and difference.114 His evolutionist and relativist views, along with his 
scientific theories, were mutually supporting.  
Aspects of Cowell’s views were shared by many colleagues, and were reflective of 
contemporary trends in the social sciences. A reconsideration of Cowell’s views, 
alongside those of Charles Seeger, Joseph Yasser, and Joseph Schillinger, will help to 
provide a more nuanced picture of the shifts in twentieth-century theories of music and 
difference. It also shows that many of Cowell’s statements about non-Western musics 
proceeded as much from the scientistic and evolutionist aspects of his inquiries (which 
might today be held in great skepticism by ethnomusicologists) as from his relativistic 
side.  
This investigation of Cowell’s theories of music and difference opens up new 
possibilities for the understanding of the motivations and planning of his compositions. In 
this chapter, I also discuss his United Quartet (1936), in which Cowell proposed to be 
moving toward a musical style transcendent of culture. I discuss how he staked this 
universalist claim for the piece within his relativist, evolutionist, and positivist theories. 
Through detailed consideration of the concepts that Cowell used to understand worldwide 
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musical difference it becomes possible to avoid reductive assessments of the authenticity 
of Cowell’s compositional influences by non-Western musics. On the one hand we need 
not uncritically accept Cowell’s claims about his compositions, such as his having 
achieved a universal musical style in the United Quartet, for we may critique the terms 
by which Cowell claimed their truth. On the other hand, we need not dismiss Cowell’s 
compositions as exoticist fantasies (or as “world music kitsch” as John Corbett has 
described Cowell’s 1957 Persian Set115), for we may see that they proceeded from 
earnest studies, and were, at least on the terms Cowell set out, authentic. 
In this chapter I attempt to paint as completely as possible Cowell’s vision of music 
and culture and of his own special role as an experimentalist composer. I will explain 
what Cowell meant when he used terms such as musical “elements,” “resources,” 
“experiment,” “melody,” “rhythm,” “development,” “primitive,” “Oriental,” and 
“peoples.” His use of these terms was fairly consistent and reflects a tightly connected 
(though not “air-tight”) set of views on music and difference. Cowell made his most 
explicit statements of his theories on music and culture in his treatises, but nowhere did 
he state them in as full a form as I do here. For me they have come into focus through 
examination of a broad selection of his publications. It may be that some aspects of what 
I describe were too fundamental to Cowell’s way of thinking for him to articulate. It may 
also be that certain aspects of Cowell’s views were so broadly held in his intellectual 
circles that he did not see the need to articulate them explicitly. 
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I will begin by describing succinctly Cowell’s views on music and difference. I will 
follow this outline of Cowell’s views with thematic subsections, in each of which I will 
discuss the development of these views in overlapping periods of Cowell’s career. This 
chronological organization makes visible the subtle shifts in Cowell’s views. The focus 
of my present study ends around 1940. After that point Cowell’s interests took a new 
turn, which, even though they continued to build upon the lines traced here, raise 
substantially different issues, and will require separate treatment. In the conclusion to this 
chapter I will briefly discuss those later interests, and how they were elaborations upon, 
rather than departures from those of his earlier career.  
 
An Outline of Cowell’s Views on Music, Experiment, and Culture 
Fairly early in Cowell’s career he fixed upon conceptions of musical materials as 
“resources” and “elements.” He took on as the principal model for the composer that of 
an “experimenter,” in the sense of a scientist who tests resources or examines elements, 
and both creates and discovers for the material advancement of society. He held a 
particular understanding of the nature of music. On the one hand, it was a complex and 
creative medium with widely varying formal possibilities; on the other it was always 
constructed upon certain unvarying elemental bases, the potentials and limitations of 
which lay latent within them. In any particular musical piece these various resources 
might be developed or not.  
Besides the model of the “experimenter,” for Cowell a second way to study the 
potential for development of musical resources scientifically was through study of the 
world’s musical cultures. He believed that in any particular culture certain resources 
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would have been communally developed, while others would have not. For instance, 
some cultures were highly sophisticated in their use of rhythm, while others were 
sophisticated in harmony. This fact is critical to understanding the idiosyncratic nature of 
Cowell’s relativism: he saw that the musics of different cultures were differently 
valuable, not because there could be no absolute field of musical values (i.e. not because 
all musical values are ultimately culturally based), but because different cultures had, 
through time, developed differently within a vast but theoretically unified field of musical 
possibilities. Cultures were, in a sense, workshops for the development of musical 
resources, with different cultures having specialized in different “sub-fields” of musical 
development (e.g. rhythm, melody, and harmony). While no single culture had advanced 
beyond all the others in every area of development, it certainly could be held that some 
cultures were more advanced than others in a given area. Each culture was advanced on 
its own terms, and it could logically be said, given this singular field for assessing 
advancement implied in Cowell’s writings, that all cultures were equally advanced.  
This question of differences in cultural advancement points to another aspect of 
Cowell’s relativism that may seem idiosyncratic when opposed to what was later 
articulated as cultural relativism by anthropologists such as Melville Herskovitz (I will 
discuss Herskovitz in the next chapter). Cowell understood all presently existing cultures 
as occupying different historical positions relative to each other. The sort of advancement 
a culture displayed could be taken as an indication of its position in a unilinear scheme of 
worldwide cultural evolution, with the most “primitive” cultures exhibiting the greatest 
advancement in rhythm, and with Western culture exhibiting greatest advancement in 
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harmony.116 To be clear, this meant that a “primitive” culture would necessarily be 
historically undeveloped—meaning that it represented more-or-less a former cultural 
state of now more “civilized” societies—and yet, in terms of rhythmic resources, it would 
be the richest. Any culture, wherever it was located along this single historical line, could 
be said to be as rich as any other in musical resources. That Cowell held these 
evolutionist views may today strike readers as surprising, since it is often remarked that 
cultural relativism was a movement that aimed at refuting evolutionism, and ultimately 
succeeded in supplanting it. 
The role of the experimental composer then was to develop resources, to improve 
musical technology, and to do so either through meticulous first-hand experiment with 
the elements of music or through anthropological scrutiny of the products of other 
cultures, with an eye toward discovering how those products demonstrated local means of 
developing elements, which were theoretically universal in applicability. This could lead 
the composer in a great variety of directions, and so it followed that very different 
projects by different composers ought to be regarded as equally valid: one composer 
might develop certain elements and another composer different ones. This was the 
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grounding for Cowell’s pluralist views on modern composition and his own incredibly 
plural compositional output.117 
Cowell’s theories served his modernist project that was pluralist but not exactly 
relativistic as the term is conceived today. Cowell’s modernism, conceived as 
experimentalism, was characterized by rather absolutist scientific values of discovery and 
progress. His goals were, in a word, positivistic; he was dedicated to advancement in the 
understanding of materials whose significance lay immanent within them. They were not, 
however, socially disinterested. As a neutral discoverer, Cowell’s composer/scientist was 
in a position to offer critiques of society and offer suggestions for social development.  
Cowell could, at certain times, conceive of musical interest as dependent upon 
contingent values, and at other times assume interest to be inherent to the musical 
elements. He would, at certain times, take evolutionist views, at others decry evolutionist 
thinking. These contradictions demonstrate both the enormous breadth of his intellect and 
also, perhaps, that his knowledge was somewhat disarticulated. Here I am, however, 
focusing on the logic that unified these seeming contradictions, even while respecting 
that this logic cannot sufficiently explain them all. 
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 Steven Johnson notes that Cowell produced “nearly one thousand compositions in a diverse array of 
genres and styles. Indeed, the most consistent thing about his work is its lack of consistency. A thoroughly 
abstract, dissonant piece may follow a simple diatonic one. The same piece may harbor modernist noise in 
one hand and a modal folk tune in the other, or a piece built with traditional harmonic materials may 
exhibit radically new formal concepts. Works based on American vernacular, baroque concerto grosso, and 
Japanese gagaku traditions may appear in close proximity; and Javanese gamelan and Latin-American 
dance styles may appear in the same piece at the same time.” See Johnson, “’World of Ideas’: The Music of 
Henry Cowell,” in The Whole World of Music: A Henry Cowell Symposium, ed. David Nichols 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 16. 
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New Musical Resources 
In 1919 Cowell finished a draft of what would be his first book, New Musical 
Resources.118 It was an assemblage of ideas he had developed under the guidance of 
Charles Seeger at Berkeley, and some of the ideas were Seeger’s own.119 The book also 
owed much to Schönberg’s Harmonielehre, but as Cowell saw it his own book went 
further in developing a rational and systematized theory of the many expanded resources 
of modern musicians: “[Schönberg’s treatise] explained many moderately complex 
harmonies by combining more chromatic passing tones and pointing out some well-
known primary overtone relationships; but his work fails to explain music as involved as 
Schönberg’s own compositions”.120 
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 New Musical Resources is considered by some to be one of the most important theoretical treatises 
of the 20th century. Kyle Gann has remarked that “it is more relevant today than it has ever been before. 
Whether a composer starts out reading it (and it should be required reading for undergraduate composers at 
every university in America) or discovers it further on down the road, the book stands as a monumental 
guidepost pointing the way to fascinating new territories of musical experience.” Gann finds that NMR 
predicted the innovations of post-war composers such as Messiaen, Boulez, Stockhausen, and Babbitt, 
particularly their subjection of rhythm to the same controls as pitch. Whether any of them were directly 
influenced by Cowell is unknown, and none of them credited him. Gann also lists a host of living 
composers who have been more directly influenced by NMR: James Tenney, Ben Johnston, La Monte 
Young, Peter Garland (“perhaps Cowell’s most direct compositional descendent”), John Luther Adams, 
David First, Larry Polansky, Ben Neill, Rhys Chatham, Glenn Branca, Mikel Rouse, Michael Gordon, and 
Gann himself. See Gann, “Subversive Prophet: Henry Cowell as Theorist and Critic,” in The Whole World 
of Music, 186-89. 
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 In its division of music into these two aspects, Cowell’s treatise resembles that of Seeger, “Tradition 
and Experiment in (the New) Music,” published in Charles Seeger, Studies in Musicology II, 1929-1979, 
ed. Anne M. Pescatello (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1994). Their discussions also share a division 
of music into two realms, one of pitch and one of rhythm, and the development of an innovative approach 
to the latter (which they both considered to be relatively undeveloped) in analogy with more commonplace 
theoretical treatments of the former. See also Taylor A. Greer, “The Dynamics of Dissonance in Seeger’s 
Treatise and Crawford’s Quartet,” Understanding Charles Seeger, Pioneer in American Musicology 
(Urbana and Chicago, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1999), 13-28. Seeger also fashioned a theory of musical 
relativity after Einstein’s theory. See Bell Young, “Modern Physics to Modern Musicology, in 
Understanding Charles Seeger, 172-183. Young’s description of Seeger’s theory draws from Seeger’s 
writings of the 1950s and later, quite a bit after the publication of Cowell’s New Musical Resources. 
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 NMR, xv. On Cowell’s instruction at Berkeley, and the influences he received from various 
professors there, see Michael Hicks’s beautifully written, Henry Cowell, Bohemian (Urbana and Chicago: 
Univ. of Illinois Press, 2002), 64-79 (hereafter cited as HCB). The basing of an entire system of harmony 
 120 
New Musical Resources articulates much of what was outlined above. The text 
advanced a picture of and a model for contemporary composition whereby it could be 
regarded as more-or-less scientific—or at least as having a wing, necessary to the field as 
a whole, dedicated to its development along scientific lines. This involved an 
understanding of music as constituted of isolatable elements that could be objectively 
perceived and analyzed and usefully exploited. The observable, testable aspect of music 
would exist independently of the values driving its creation and reception.  
Cowell explained that through the study of overtones he had arrived at a “theory of 
musical relativity”: “It is discovered that the sense of consonance, dissonance, and 
discord is not fixed, so that it must be immovably applied to certain combinations, but is 
relative” (NMR, xvii). The combinations of tones associated with the lower end of the 
overtone series were those most readily understood as consonant. As tones of the upper 
reaches of the series were added, the complexity of the sound increased, from consonance 
into dissonance, and finally into discord.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and rhythm on the overtone series, which was the principal features of New Musical Resources, was an idea 
that Cowell received from his professors, including Seeger. 
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Ex. 7. The Overtone Series (NMR) 
 
The exact locations at which consonance became dissonance and dissonance became 
discord were, however, a matter of how accustomed the listener was to various sounds: 
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It is a notable fact that certain combinations accepted as satisfactory by one 
listener are found to be unsatisfying to another, and this acceptance or rejection of 
a given chord depends very largely upon the familiarity of the ear with the chord 
in question—that is to say, upon the musical experience of the listener. The points 
in the series, therefore, where consonant chords leave off and dissonance begins, 
and where dissonance leaves off and discord begins, are not rigidly fixed, as was 
assumed by most theorists, but depend upon the ear of the particular listener, who 
is in turn influenced by the musical age in which he lives. It is this fact, proved by 
the history of musical progress, in conjunction with the fact that, acoustically 
speaking, there is no point at which any other than an arbitrary difference between 
them can be shown, which establishes the relativity of consonance, dissonance, 
and discord. (NMR, 10-11) 
 
This “relativity” was a sort of relativism. There was no immovable point at which 
music became “consonant” or “dissonant,” and therefore all degrees of dissonance could 
be recognized to be valid or not only in respect to their particular historical periods. Yet, 
this “relativity” was a far cry from the cultural relativism I will describe more fully in the 
next chapter. It did not recognize as culturally contingent the concepts of “consonance,” 
“dissonance,” and “discord,” only the contingency of the location of their boundaries. 
Cowell understood the concepts themselves and that of the spectrum that organized them 
(the overtone series) to reflect a scientific, immutable nature to music, and it was upon 
that very absolute basis that there could be proven with certainty that there were a variety 
of equally valid ways of making music. Cowell’s “relativity,” with its nod to Einstein’s 
theory of relativity, was fundamentally positivist in its orientation.   
At the time of the publication of New Musical Resources, Cowell’s views were also 
relativistic in the sense that he understood there to be different values guiding musical 
creation. He explained that his scientific theories were not meant to establish the terms by 
which musics were to be regarded as valuable. “Values” as Cowell conceived of them lay 
apart from, or on top of, the more objective basis of music that he considered himself to 
be discovering scientifically. Cowell referred to values variably as “taste,” “fashion,” or 
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“convention”: these were aspects of music that were subject to change, being an accident 
of history.121  
Cowell’s framework for the understanding of music and its valuation consisted then 
of 1) an aspect of intrinsic features of musical materials that were 
scientifically/experimentally understandable, and 2) an aspect that was socially 
conditioned. The former sort of value could be assessed in terms of its accuracy, the latter 
in terms of its persuasiveness:  
It is my conviction…that the finest taste and the perfect use of scientifically co-
ordinated materials go together, and that the musical resources outlined add to the 
possibilities of musical expression and are therefore vital potentialities, rather 
than merely cold facts. (NMR, xxi) 
 
Significantly, according to Cowell’s model these aspects of “taste” and “science,” or 
historically based versus inherent musical properties, were not aspects of a single diad as 
they were in the theories of Seeger,122 but rather each existed as an independent stratum, 
with the aspect of taste on top of the more fundamental and independent objective layer. 
Music could be written that made no use of established conventions and appealed to no 
contingent values (though Cowell did not hold that this was the single desirable goal). 
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 Prior to writing the introduction to New Musical Resources, in a 1925 article titled “The Value of 
Eclecticism” (The Sackbut 5, no. 9 [1925]: 264-265), Cowell preached a relativistic ideal for music 
listening, stating that the listener must have the capacity to recognize different values in different 
composers: “The most impossible method of getting anywhere in listening to music, is to try to fit it into 
the Procrustian bed of a pre-conceived idea of what music should be like” (p. 265).  
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 See Robert R. Grimes, “Form, Content, and Value: Seeger and Criticism to 1940,” in 
Understanding Charles Seeger, 64-83. Grimes traces the development of Seeger’s theories of value until 
1940, the approximate time at which he turned toward a more “ethnomusicological” orientation. In most of 
his publications until that time, Seeger discussed musical value as an aspect of the whole musical fact, 
inextricable from that dimension that might be discussed scientifically. Seeger’s orientation was distinctly 
Marxist: he regarded music as existing in the form that it did in the interests of a particular class. Value 
could be defined as the way that particular class interests were realized in the music. As noted, Cowell 
tended to separate the scientific aspect of music from that which was the result of particular values. For 
Cowell, it might be said, whether a piece of music had value (or no value) in its fundamental aspect (its 
scientifically examinable aspect) was entirely determined by the development of its elements along lines 
which were more or less objective. Values, understood as variable, did exist, but did not apply to this 
fundamental aspect. 
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Cowell’s notion of there being objectively perceivable properties to music reflected his 
being well versed in contemporary social sciences literature: at the time there was a 
commonplace understanding that social practices had inherent constitutions that could be 
objectively observed and analyzed, much like the objects of study in the natural 
sciences.123  
In this vein, Cowell found that the laws of harmony as they were conventionally 
taught contained “discrepancies.” It was not faulty to imagine that harmony used in 
composition might be guided by natural laws, but current convention in the teaching of 
harmony was based in part on “underlying science and more inevitable principles” and in 
part “on the taste of a former era of music” (NMR, xviii). There was nothing wrong with 
composing with such a concoction of fact and fashion, but it would be important to 
recognize the conventional “laws” of harmony for what they were, mere fashion, and 
rather outmoded fashion at that, and to be open to “new resources” as supplements to the 
old.  
Old fashions could be regarded as outmoded because there was, according to Cowell, 
evidence of a natural trajectory of progress in the development of dissonance. He noted, 
for instance, that modern instruments were capable of producing more overtones than 
were older ones. Having familiarity with the complex sounds of modern instruments, 
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 See R.F. Ellen, ed., Ethnographic Research: A Guide to General Conduct (London and Orlando: 
Academic Press, 1984). Ellen notes that anthropology’s conception of its principal method of participant 
observation had to shift as its conception of the nature of its subject shifted: “The importance ascribed to 
observation as the main data yielding procedure (in the early 20th century phase of anthropology) derives 
directly from anthropology’s ideas about the constitution of its subject matter which, like the subject matter 
of natural science, should be directly observable, as well as from its insistence on empirical scholarship 
characteristic of science. This notion can be traced back to Malinowsky’s (1922) requirmenet of ‘the 
description of the imponderabilia of actual life’.” The idea of participant observation would gradually be 
amended to put more focus on the meaning ascribed to studied practices by the subjects themselves, the 
social sciences thereby becoming distinct from the natural sciences, whose objects could be studied through 
direct observation. 
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modern listeners were naturally more prepared to hear dissonance than were listeners of 
previous eras. The evolution of tonality had moved, according to Cowell, quite 
consistently along these lines: 
Looking back over the history of music, it must be admitted that we have no 
means of knowing exactly what was done by the very ancient peoples; there is 
some evidence, however, to support the theory that in ancient Greece the great 
choruses sang in unison, using no harmony whatsoever, and that the instruments 
which accompanied the choruses also simply played the melody with the voices. 
There are references to the lack of musicality on the part of any singer who sang 
notes apart from the body of the chorus. 
A melody with percussion accompaniment but no harmony is characteristic of 
nearly all primitive music. (NMR, 12)124 
 
Cowell’s views on evolutionism and their implication for his construction of a 
concept of “primitive music” will be taken up at length in the next subsection. Here, I 
wish to point out how Cowell’s relativism, positivism, and evolutionism all mutually 
supported each other. The scientific basis of all tonality in the overtone series 
(positivism) provided a framework from which to understand the history of musical 
“progress” (evolutionism) as a shifting of the powers of society to apprehend greater and 
greater levels of dissonance. The fact that there was this historical shift (evolutionism), 
and not a fixed point that demarcated the boundaries between “consonance,” 
“dissonance,” and “discord,” suggested that there were many different ways of 
distinguishing the three that were equally valid (relativism). The ultimate thrust of all this 
was not only to scientifically vindicate the intense dissonance of new music as “equally 
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 Gann (“Subversive Prophet”) has argued that there were flaws in Cowell’s historical argument: 
“While he correctly asserts that the major third was originally considered a discord and only later accepted 
as a concord, he does not take into account that in the Pythagorean tuning of late medieval France the ratio 
of the major third was defined as 81/64, very high up in the overtone series indeed. Getting the interval 
reclassified as a consonance with a ratio of 5/4 involved not only hearing differently but overthrowing a 
system of theory, as well as altering the way organ pipes and stringed instruments were tuned” (p. 178). 
Gann finds that Cowell’s systematized theories of pitch based on the overtone series fall short of their 
potential because he fails to make an argument for just intonation (just intonation will be discussed further 
in the next chapter on Harrison). 
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valid,” but to suggest (though never to state explicitly) that it represented the pinnacle of 
the harmonic practices of history. 
Following these theories on pitch, with which as described Cowell had attempted to 
subsume all known and possible harmonic materials into a single system based on the 
overtone series, he presented his theories on rhythm. Cowell put forth a new sort of meter 
that he developed in direct analogy with the ratios of tone vibrations in the overtone 
series. He noted that both harmonic intervals and metrical relationships could be 
expressed with numerical ratios: for instance, the ratio 2:1 might refer to a passage with 
two parts an octave apart in pitch, or it could refer to a passage with one part moving in 
whole notes and another part moving in half notes. From there, he noted the poverty of 
conventionally employed rhythmic resources relative to those of pitch, for while pitches 
commonly were employed in complex ratios such as 5:4 (“major third”), 6:5 (“minor 
third”), and conceivably unlimited others, the ratios between rhythmic events tended to 
be limited to powers of 2, such as 2:1, 4:1, 8:1, and so forth. He suggested that just as the 
two tones of a major 3rd vibrate at a ratio of 5:4, so might a new sort of meter be created 
in which rhythmic events occurred in cycles of 5:4. Any ratio might be used, and beyond 
such rhythmic diads there might further be rhythmic triads, of 5:4:3 for instance, and 
denser layerings. Further extending the analogy, Cowell observed that, just as harmony 
tended to shift from measure to measure, so might this “metrical harmony.” He argued 
that the adoption of such an expanded conception of meter was overdue, and asked the 
reader to consider, “If in lieu of a melody the same note were to be repeated for an entire 
work, it would be considered absurd; yet this endless repetition is just what is expected in 
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metre, in which hundreds of the same metrical units, such as measures of ¾, etc., follow 
one another without change” (NMR, 69). 
 
Ex. 8. Examples of Polymeter (NMR) 
 
Thus it can be seen that, on the one hand, in New Musical Resources Cowell hoped 
that his inquiry into the nature of musical resources would facilitate their better 
exploitation for myriad compositional uses, just as a scientist who tested steel would hope 
to facilitate its greater usefulness for myriad purposes in industry; on the other hand, he 
hoped his discoveries would validate his own previously developed compositional 
practices and those of his modernist colleagues. He attempted to procure this validation 
by relativising the accomplishments of more conventional (hegemonic) Western music 
(e.g. by “proving” that its harmonic language was not based on immutable laws but on 
contingent fashions), and through demonstration that the compositional techniques that 
he and his colleagues had arrived at intuitively turned out to have scientific validity. 
 128 
“’Modern’ music,” he assured, “is not proceeding blindly” (NMR, xviii). Cowell 
described, for instance, how through the present study he had discovered the scientific 
bases of his own earlier work with tone clusters, even though he had developed them 
intuitively: “namely, by sounding together a number of tones related through the higher 
reaches of the overtones, in the same spacing in which they occur in the overtone series” 
(NMR, xxi). The implication was that, even if modernism was not the only valuable 
movement in music, it could be claimed that it was the only one that made scientific 
validity an aim.125 Even with its highly controversial practices, modernism could through 
Cowell’s study make a sturdy claim to legitimacy. 
The theory not only had the ability to vindicate the past, but also to predict the future. 
For instance, not only could the presence of microtones in works of new music be 
justified, but it could be predicted which microtones would become the next accepted 
additions to the common palette: “there is a strong possibility that the next development 
may be to add to music the next highest overtone after the half-step, our present most 
complex interval. This would not give the quarter-step, but an interval a little smaller than 
a half-step” (NMR, 19). Since some time had passed between the original development of 
the theory in 1919 and its publication in 1930, Cowell could at that later date already 
comment on how the theory’s predictive powers had been proven in the intervening 
achievements of composers such as Ruggles, Hindemith, and Schönberg: “Such progress 
                                                 
125
 Cowell described his own role as developer and tester of musical materials for the purpose of their 
general use in his later article “How Relate Music and Dance?” Dance Observer 1, no. 5 (1934): 52. 
Cowell called for the use of new tones, ones especially appropriate for dance, and reported on his own fall 
and winter experiments with these new tones. This is one example of how Cowell conceived of himself, 
within the field of composition, as having the special role of technological innovator. 
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is encouraging and seems to give further proof that the theory as postulated has validity” 
(NMR, xxiii).  
Besides justifying his earlier stylistic practices, Cowell’s theories set forth in NMR 
also provided the basis for some new compositions. His Quartet Romantic (an excerpt of 
which is shown in ex. 9) serves as an example of his own work with polyrhythm. 
Cowell’s sort of polyrhythm is found throughout, including the opening with groupings 
of 6 (flute 1) 5 (flute 2) 4 (violin) and 2 (viola) beats. Later groupings such as 6 2/3 beats 
2 2/3 beats emerge. His Quartet Euphometric is similar, except in its style of notation. In 
that piece, rather than having continuously shifting groupings but consistent barrings, the 
barrings and time signatures shift and do not align among parts.  
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Ex. 9. Quartet Romantic 
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Mr. Ch and Chinese Meter 
The ideas on rhythm the Cowell expressed in New Musical Resources reappeared 
later in a different form in a 1929 article describing the reaction of a respected Chinese 
scholar and musician named Mr. Ch who tried to learn about Western music from 
Cowell: “To my ears, alas, it is devoid of meaning.”126 Mr. Ch does not understand 
harmony. Though he is a good-natured, earnest, and intelligent student, he is nevertheless 
both unimanginative and ethnocentric. He cannot, even on an earnest attempt, grasp 
musical values different from his own. 
There was no actual Mr. Ch.127 Cowell created him as a tool for broadening his 
readership’s imagination of musical difference. This was a didactic piece, like so many of 
Cowell’s, intended to spread awareness that different musics had both different forms of 
development and were motivated by different values (those were not precisely the same 
issues in his mind), and that members of one culture often lacked the capacity to 
recognize beauty that was plain to members of another. In the voice of Mr. Ch., Cowell 
deployed a representation of Chinese musical values in order to likewise represent and 
simultaneously make relative Western musical values.  
Mr. Ch cannot understand why the orchestra needs so many instruments: “what use is 
one more instrument if you cannot hear the melody it plays?” He asks slyly if they are not 
merely for “pomp and show.”128 Through such remarks, the reader was given an 
opportunity to recognize with shock and delight how unwieldy, and empty of (melodic) 
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 “Music of the Hemispheres,” Modern Music VI, no. 3 (1929): 12-18. 
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 This is indicated by Sidney Cowell in script at the bottom of a letter of inquiry about the article from 
Kuo-Huang Han, April 30, 1970 (Henry Cowell Collection, New York Public Library). 
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 “Music of the Hemispheres,” 13. 
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interest their own music would seem to an outsider, and presumably to become aware 
that there were worlds of musical meaning that they themselves were oblivious to.  
The reader was further encouraged to see Western music from a perhaps unfamiliar 
angle when Mr. Ch. remarks that Bach and Schönberg “are very much alike” (p. 15). The 
element of harmony, which so utterly differentiates them for the Westerner, is 
undetectable by Mr. Ch. He finds Schönberg to be a bit more to his liking because it is 
clearer. Chopin is his favorite because of the rhythmic independence of the lines (cross-
rhythms), which reminds him of his native art; and yet Mr. Ch finds Western music to be 
generally unsatisfying in its lack of “rhythmic development,” and notes that, “were the 
melodies truly independent, each would have a different metre that would change at 
separate times” (pp. 15-16). 
In so describing the nature of Chinese meter, Mr. Ch articulates the very sort idea of 
rhythmic development Cowell had put forth in New Musical Resources. As seen, 
Cowell’s ideas for this sort of development did not stem from a study of Chinese music, 
but were developed logically in analogy with his the use of pitches in intervals. With 
these words by Mr. Ch, it was as if Cowell had found for—in actuality granted to(!)—his 
invented sort of meter the support of a native authority, which validated its viability as a 
musical practice among a people, and indeed the entire theory of a truth “out-there” of 
which it was a part. He did not here mention that Mr. Ch’s description of Chinese meter 
was reminiscent of that he had described in New Musical Resources and as applied in the 
two quartets described above. 
At the end of the article Cowell made Mr. Ch a mouthpiece for the sort of cultural 
relativism that I will describe at length in the next chapter as a contrast with the views of 
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Harrison. In this view, the value and meaning of a particular musical material, such as a 
portamento, are not given as inhering in the materials themselves. Rather materials derive 
their meaning from a body of associations that are culturally specific. Mr. Ch explains, 
“Such slides or portamentos, regarded as out of taste in your music, are fundamental in 
ours. They appear in our speech, we find them in the sounds of nature, the wind and the 
sea, and we consider them great assets to our music” (p. 16). In his conclusion to the 
article, Cowell reflected on the culture’s centricity in the apprehension of value:  
For myself I realized that it would be folly to attempt a judgment on Chinese 
music, our own laws being no guide thereto. But the visit of this fixed 
academician of the Orient served to provide me with a refreshing if distant 
glimpse of other planetary orbits of music than our own. (p. 18) 
 
As seen in Cowell’s New Music Resources, his conception of culture-based meaning 
did not necessarily conflict with his positivist views. Cowell saw that there were two 
sorts of musical values: those which were culturally/historically contingent and those 
which were inherent to the materials themselves (the latter sort was that respect by which 
music might be interesting to listeners regardless of their historical/cultural positions). 
Cowell spoke disparagingly of the contingent sort (using terms such as “fashion”) only in 
cases when it seemed to him that they had become the basis for ethnocentrism and 
rigidity.129 
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 Cowell further discussed contingent values in an entry on “Oriental” Music in The Encyclopaedia of 
the Social Sciences (New York: 1930-35.) He described a consistent concern with producing specific 
emotional/sprititual states in Oriental music (which would distinguish it from the subjectivism of European 
music). The means of producing these states varied from region to region, but the purpose was always the 
same. Cowell described Javanese music as esoteric, with each note possessing a particular emotional 
resonance, and Balinese music as being less formal, more closely tied to Indian origins, more “folk-like,” 
and as having more rhythmic inventiveness. I am unsure what precisely “less formal” meant, since I have 
not found the term to appear regularly in Cowell’s writings. It is also unclear to me what about Balinese 
music made it seem “folk-like” to Cowell, but it is likely that this statement as well as the comment on it’s 
being more rhythmically inventive tie into Cowell’s evolutionist understanding of culture: Bali would 
presumably have been more “primitive” than the “cultivated” Java. Though the statement about Balinese 
music being more closely tied to Indian “origins” might suggest diffusionist thinking, I have not found such 
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Folk Music, “Primitive” Music, and Nations 
As with other composer/ethnographers, such as McPhee and Harrison, Cowell’s 
ethnographic and theoretical writings served a peculiar double function. They 
simultaneously represented foreign cultures and gave directions for the compositional 
field at home. For example, a 1926 trip to Moravia (in the modern Czech Republic) 
piqued Cowell’s interest in folk music as a basis of a new compositional style,130 and in a 
resulting article (citation) he employed this sort of hybrid rhetoric. Cowell wrote that 
Moravian music included “many effects we have considered to be of recent invention in 
‘modern’ music, many things not to be found in any known music new or old, and above 
all, a method of procedure of its own.” The functions of this argument were 
simultaneously descriptive (Moravian music is like this), prescriptive (modern music 
could further develop if it followed it in this direction), and polemical (both are similarly 
free of the worst failings of conventional Western music, those being this).  
Cowell suggested that Moravian folk musical elements might be taken as a 
foundation for a new art music. In a 1929 article titled “Hidden Irish Treasure” (Modern 
Music) he similarly argued that   
In this age of great harmonic development, it may prove valuable to observe 
certain little known modes of melodic usage. A special style of unfamiliar 
conception, not to mention actual tunes, may offer the composer the basis of a 
new and individual music.131 
                                                                                                                                                 
thinking to be otherwise much evidenced in Cowell’s writings. Other entries on “Music and Musicology,” 
“Primitive,” and “Occidental” were written by Charles Seeger, and Helen Roberts. 
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 See David Paul, “From American Ethnographer to Cold War Icon: Charles Ives through the Eyes of 
Henry and Sidney Cowell,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 59, no. 2 (summer 2006): 399-
458. Paul has argued that Cowell’s description of the possibility for Czech composers to create a new 
thoroughly original style based on Moravian folk music matched what he later suggested Ives had 
accomplished with New England folk music.  
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David Paul has pointed out that here Cowell was arguing that folk materials 
(“resources”) be transported across borders, and not that they be developed strictly along 
national lines (as is associated with the nationalist ideals of Dvorak). I would add that this 
was in part because Cowell maintained a conception of music as technology, the 
development of which ought not to be limited to national borders as a style might. Here 
Cowell was not arguing per se that modernist composers should draw from Irish music so 
as to conjure an Irish atmosphere in their works, or in any other way to make explicit 
reference to Irish culture (Cowell did do so himself in a number of his early piano 
pieces). Rather, his interest was more in trans-cultural technological development. 
Western composers, steeped as they were in harmonic technologies, might find it 
refreshing to draw from the melodic technologies of Irish music. 
In 1929 Cowell gave a concert in Cuba, and in 1931 published an article on the 
Cuban son, which alluded to his concept of “the primitive” and also made reference to his 
conception of musical resources as various, with different societies possessing different 
resources, all of which were open to be “tapped” by composers internationally. Cowell 
was interested particularly in sones among Cuban song styles, finding many others to be 
“saturated with the most commonplace type of Spanish song,” and even showing “some 
alarmingly poor Italian opera influence.”132 Nothing about those songs was really Cuban 
“except the words and some minute distinctions of rhythm.” Yet, in the son he found a 
music played by Black performers with “a whole set of unique native instruments,” 
which were used in greater numbers than “is usual in purely primitive music.” “The 
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 Cowell, “Hidden Irish Treasure,” Modern Music 6, no. 4 (May-June 1929): 31.  
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 “The ‘Sones’ of Cuba,” Modern Music 8, no. 2 (1931): 45-47. 
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rhythms are indigenous and although the melodies and harmonic outlines are not so 
unique, the whole effect of these songs is of a tonal texture utterly distinctive.” His 
singular assessment: “Cuban music is really folksong with a barbaric accompaniment.” 
Cowell did not define the term “barbaric,” but it would have been understood as 
equivalent to “primitive.”133  
Cowell also described two Cuban composers “of originality,” Alejandro Caturla and 
Amadeo Roldan. Though he had positive things to say about each, he found that neither 
had 
tapped all the remarkable resources which the folk-music of their country 
suggests. These could be utilized to build up a full-blooded, tropical style, 
gigantic but unsentimental; diversified, and with less ostinato than is used by 
Roldan and Caturla. Perhaps some other as yet unknown composer will come 
forward and achieve the wide sweep and glory of rhythm presaged by these 
Sones.134 (my italics) 
 
Cowell’s nearly exclusive interest in that which was original (from his perspective) in 
the son is indicative of both the relativist and positivist aspects of his thinking. As a 
relativist, Cowell was seeking to discover new dimensions of difference that might 
disrupt ethnocentrism and counter the hegemonic values of traditional Western art music, 
spreading tolerance and opening the creative terrain for modernist composers. As a 
positivist, Cowell was seeking to discover original musical materials as resources that 
might be added to the totality of scientific knowledge of music’s potentials. Caturla and 
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Roldan had “tapped” those resources, though not to his full satisfaction.135 It is interesting 
that, besides employing a battery of descriptors typical of publications in Modern Music 
during this era such as “full-blooded,” “gigantic,” and “unsentimental,” (an image of 
enormous power in the synergy of the “modern” and the “primitive,” both dark and 
utopian) Cowell identified the full potential of those resources as manifesting in a 
“tropical” modernism (neither a specifically Cuban modernism nor an international 
modernism). Cowell would not have objected to trans-national tappings of son. He was 
not interested in exclusively nationalist forms of musical development. Meanwhile, more 
recent concerns about the ethics of appropriating musical materials from other cultures 
probably did not occur to him. 
In 1933 Cowell edited a collection of essays titled American Composers on American 
Music,136 his rationale for which sheds light on his views on nationalism, particularly 
American nationalism, at the time. In his introduction he divided the composers currently 
working in America into eight groups, and these included those who had moved to the 
U.S. from Europe (such as Edgard Varèse from France and Nicolas Slonimsky from 
Russia) and those who drew their primary influences from various European traditions 
(such as Adolph Weiss and Wallingford Riegger, who drew from the German, and Henry 
Eicheim and Virgil Thomson, who drew from the French). Only relatively few of the 
composers Cowell mentioned were native-born Americans who developed “indigenous 
materials” (and by indigenous materials Cowell did not seem to mean specifically “folk” 
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materials, but quite broadly anything, including the most experimental, dissonant 
techniques, that had not been imported from Europe). 
All of these classifications aimed to account for the very international, especially 
European, nature of American composition. How then might it be meaningful to 
assemble all of these figures under the banner of “American” music? Cowell’s answer 
was that it was only meaningful as far as it won America its “independence,” freedom 
from the compulsion to imitate: 
Nationalism in music has no purpose as an aim in itself. Music happily transcends 
political and racial boundaries and is good and bad irrespective of the nation in 
which it was composed. Independence, however, is stronger than imitation. In the 
hands of great men independence may result in products of permanent value. 
Imitation cannot be expected to produce such significant achievements. (p. 13) 
 
Cowell felt that, once independence had truly been achieved in all nations, “self-
conscious nationalism will no longer be necessary” (p. 13). A nationalist ideal of the 
development of a distinctive national style by drawing upon the nation’s folk materials 
did not seem to appeal to him at this time.137 His reference to “permanent value” can be 
seen as reflective of his concept of a form a value, perhaps the most important sense of 
value at this point in his career, which transcended historical limits, and was valuable by 
virtue of its successful exploitation of musical elements and development of resources. 
Such value ultimately transcended national boundaries, but could only be hoped to be 
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realized within a context of creative independence from limiting foreign models. (In 1932 
Cowell wrote, “Public favor comes to those great enough to be independent. Ives is 
independent and truly great.”138) 
 
Neo-Primitivism and the Proletariat 
That indigenous materials were at this time not interesting to Cowell so much as the 
raw materials of distinctive national idioms, but as the raw materials for trans-national 
movements, can be seen articulated in his 1933 article “Towards Neo-Primitivism.”139 
“Everyone interested in modern music,” he stated, was aware that “primitives” and 
modernists had a lot in common. Cowell elaborated on what the similarities between 
“primitives” and modernists there already were, and, significantly, pointed out that there 
were few commonalities between “primitives” and high-profile modernist composers. 
“Primitive” music was simple, while these modernists strove for ever greater complexity. 
Only in its increasing rhythmic complexity did their music approximate that of the 
“primitive.” Cowell did not make explicit why “primitive” music, if it was so simple, 
should inspire progressive composers to become primitivists. 
There is at least a clue in Cowell’s reference to the releasing of “primordial 
elements.” The counter movement he proposed would be “full blooded and vital.” It 
would draw upon “primary music elements,” without resorting to a “supercilious 
formalism of a return to the particular style of some past century” (read: neoclassicism). 
It would also be based upon all the world’s musics, and therefore it would have a certain 
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“truth” grounded in universality (as opposed to an ethnocentric claim to truth) that early-
century modernists greatly wished to claim for their projects. In his usual style, Cowell 
retroactively declared certain new musical practices as primitivist ones, including the use 
of harmony in percussive ways and the use of tone clusters (his own). But he also 
cautioned against the casual conception of primitive music as “something wild, confused, 
with raucous cries and noisy instruments all bound together by powerful rhythm.” He 
remarked that since, as it so happened, this was also the casual conception of modernist 
music, it was not surprising that the popular imagination had formed a superficial link 
between the two. But really, “the primitive is often soft, melodious and soothing—and 
modern music is, after all, a highly organized, involved and sophisticated art.”140 
Cowell took advantage of a popular image of the physicality and primalness of 
certain non-Western practices, and, pointing to the difference between such practices and 
those of high-brow Western Europeans, he painted the latter as contrastingly deflated and 
effete, overly artful, and lacking in physicality. In this he singled out the supposed 
primitivist Stravinsky, whose influence from the “primitive” he called “comparatively 
slight and highly sublimated.” He also rejected both the general “over-complexity of the 
earlier modern music” and the “sentimentality and pomp of later romantic music” in 
favor of, respectively, the simpler values of “experiment” and “feeling” that would 
characterize his primitivism. And, as noted, he rejected neoclassicism’s “supercilious 
formalism” but not the use of “primary musical elements,” by which he referred to a 
singable melody with little harmonic support and simple percussive accompaniment. 
Cowell also identified as “primitive” the use of sliding tones, of percussive chords (rather 
than chords “exploited” in a “harmonic connection”), and of tone clusters. 
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Such rhetoric linking the progressive American composers and “primitives” and 
dichotomizing the two from the Western Europeans (which Cowell here associated with 
the fad of neoclassicism, implying that it epitomized the failings of the bourgeoisie) 
effected an ironic (though, as I discuss in the Chapter on McPhee, fully standard within 
Cowell’s milieu) jumbling of more commonplace dichotomizations of civilized 
EuroAmerican culture and the culture of savages, of masculine and feminine (the most 
“civilized” European composers now became effete), and of high and low, all of which 
were twists upon more dominant demarcations of Western and non-Western.  
Cowell published these statements on neo-primitivism in Modern Music, in which 
dichotomizations of Europe and America were pervasive (as discussed in the Chapter on 
McPhee); as such in noting that Western Europeans did not make good primitivists he 
was claiming primitivism as a national movement for America by default. He did not, 
however, regard it as exclusively an American endeavor. Soviets too had developed 
primitivist music of interest. It was, in fact, music composed for proletarian choruses that 
Cowell found to have the most authentic claim to affinity with “primitive” music. 
Cowell’s list of the most primitivist composers included Eastern Europeans, Americans, 
and Hans Eisler of Germany, the only Western European. 
Cowell was at this time involved with the New York Composers Collective, a group 
with unofficial links to the Communist Party that was dedicated to the production of mass 
songs.141 In the same year that he wrote “Towards Neo-Primitivism” he and Seeger 
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offered a seminar for the Collective titled “Historical and Theoretical Factors in the 
Composing of Workers’ Songs,” from which was produced the Workers Song Book 1. 
Herein lies another key to understanding the appeal of primitivism to Cowell. The 
Collective was facing philosophical challenges; for Seeger, the frustration of trying to 
create an appropriately proletarian music led to a reevaluation of his views on musical 
value, and was the beginning of his interest in folk song. Seeger’s dilemma was that what 
he saw as radical music—involving the systematic inversion of conventions, such as 
those of consonance and dissonance, exclusively considered within the context of “’Good 
Music’, capital G, capital M,”142—proved distasteful to the masses and useless in 
communal music-making. His political and musical progressivism, which until that point 
he had understood as one, became incompatible.  
For Cowell there was no such dilemma.143 He had already shed the notion that the 
most progressive music was the one that systematically overturned all convention: he had 
come to see conventions as plural, and in his conception the most salient sort of progress 
would be the widening of tolerance for the conventions of others. Therefore what was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dunaway, “Unsung Songs of Protest: The Composers Collective of New York,” New York Folklore 5, nos. 
1-2 (1979): 1-19, and “Charles Seeger and Carl Sands: The Composers’ Collective Years,” 
Ethnomusicology 24, no. 2 (1980): 159-168. 
 
142
 Seeger, interview by David K. Dunaway, in “Charles Seeger and Carl Sands: The Composers’ 
Collective Years,” Ethnomusicology 24, no. 2 (1980): 162. Seeger described his problematic conception of 
revolutionary music: “Music doesn’t take any cognizance of the dichotomy between what is revolutionary 
and what is not revolutionary. To change musical technique is not revolutionary, outside of music. I 
considered myself a musical revolutionist simply by reversing old technical devices, such as the preparation 
of consonance. Instead of preparing a dissonance and resolving a dissonance, I turned it upside down, and I 
prepared a consonance. My first species of counterpoint was all dissonance. Well, that was musically 
revolutionary, but it had no significance socially. And it wasn’t revolutionary musically; it was simply a 
change, a stunt I could do” (p. 167). 
 
143
 The members of the Collective had various strategies for creating an appropriately proletarian 
music. Seeger recalled in his 1976 interview with Dunaway that the other members of the collective had no 
knowledge of and no interest in anything other than concert music. This was not true of Cowell. Also Marc 
Blitztein was becoming interested in jazz and popular song during his years in the Collective. 
 143 
progressive could be the unconventional implementation of the conventions of others. 
Primitivism offered a solution whereby music could be both fully progressive and 
because of its simple nature and peculiar conventionalism ideally suited for use by the 
proletariat. Though Cowell did not explicitly say so, it is likely that in envisioning an 
evolutionary logic by which particular forms of social organization and particular musical 
styles could be seen to consistently correspond throughout history he would have 
regarded the exclusive use of “primitive” musical elements as effecting a return to pre-
capitalist social formations. What Cowell would have really wanted musically and 
socially was not a return, but a forward progression that drew wisdom from “the 
primitive.” 
Cowell cautioned that “primitives” should not be “lumped into one group.” This 
statement may appear odd in the context of his larger argument that there may be a 
“primitive” basis of new music; as such it would indeed follow that there is such a thing 
as a “primitive” type of music. He was not being contradictory. By Cowell’s 
understanding of culture, he could caution that there was great variety to “primitives and 
their tribes” while still maintaining that they formed a cohesive category set apart from 
the also varied yet cohesive “cultivated” peoples and their “nations.” Though there was 
certainly variation among “primitive” musics, there were also many commonalities: 
Most of it is sung to the accompaniment of percussion; melody and rhythm are 
thus the main elements. Where several different voices sing together they are 
either in unison or heterophonic, making a free polyphony in which each part is 
quite independent except that it must come out with the others in the end. Further, 
nearly all primitive music has rapid rhythmical changes, syncopations, 
polyrhythms and cross-rhythms. In the melody there may be a wide range of 
different sorts of pitch curves as well as straight lines of sound. The tones either 
wabble back and forth or slide up or down—not carelessly, but as a vital part of 
the musical scheme.144 
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“Primitives” were people who shared a particular stage of cultural evolution, and it was 
therefore inevitable that they would share many practices, such as music and social 
organization. 
 
“Primitives,” Dance, and Percussion 
In 1934 Cowell published an article titled “How Relate Music and Dance?” that 
further explained the nature of “primitive” music. In all cases “primitives” used dance 
and percussive music together.  
Irrespective of geographical location, almost every primitive tribe in the world 
performs ceremonials which utilize dance and sound together…. The sound is, of 
course, not “interpreted” by the dancers. Yet it would seem that the sound is the 
first step toward inducing the proper rhythmical urge which finally bursts into 
bodily expression. For in all ceremonials the drums begin beating first. The 
dancers begin after the atmosphere has been surcharged with rhythmical impulse 
by the drums, and often also after singing has begun. In the most primitive places 
the dancers apparently burst into movement as the surrounding waves of rhythm 
beat in on them irresistibly.145 
 
And, differentiable from these “most primitive” dances—in which the percussion 
would swell, eventually taking hold of the body of the dancer from within and unleashing 
its sensuous energy in an unplanned and unpredictable explosion of movement—there 
were also dances of “higher primitive civilization,” in which there was some level of 
planning, the dance beginning after a set number of beats. Among “primitives” there was 
further variety in all this interaction of percussion and movement: in some cases non-
dancing members of the tribe would sing; in other cases the dancers themselves would 
sing, or would play percussion instruments, or (in the South Seas) even perform the entire 
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role of the percussion through clapping. But in all cases there was dancing and 
percussion, and in all cases the percussion began and the dancing followed. “Primitive” 
societies shared these features that separated them from “cultivated” societies. In 
“Primitive” music and dance it was also inevitable that the role of conductor would be 
held by the principal percussionist, who would lead by giving all players and dancers the 
beat. This practice “still holds in the cultivated music of the Orient”: “The wood-block 
and gong player conducts the movement of a Chinese orchestra in operatic performances 
today.” Furthermore, “The same type of beats are still preserved by our symphonic 
conductors, and the Chinese orchestra is where they originated” (p. 52).  
It is unclear in what sense Cowell spoke of these practices “still” holding in Chinese 
and Western music: did he mean that there was direct cultural influence from one 
civilization to another, or did he in fact mean that these commonalities were reflective not 
of a history of cultural contact but of various societies’ retention of practices of more 
primitive phases along civilization’s (singular) inevitable line of development (the very 
latest phase of which being the very modernists of Cowell’s affiliation)? Furthermore, it 
is unclear on what Cowell based his descriptions of “primitive” music and dance, since 
he made only vague references to “higher” and “lower” primitives, not to the 
particularities of any geographically located people. It is likely that his ideas about 
“primitives” were at least in part developed by logical extrapolation into a totalizing 
system, in which “lower primitives” represented the far extreme of a continuum. If the 
“lower primitive’s” dancing was unplanned and physically inspired by rhythm, it was 
only so because the most cultivated tradition (that of Cowell’s own milieu) so strongly 
stressed planning and rationality. If to the 21st-century reader this seems to be an 
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illegitimate method of developing representations of others, it should be noted that the 
social sciences in Cowell’s time were replete with similar theories about “primitives,” 
many of which were very high profile.  
These observations were intended to settle questions about the relationship of music 
and dance in contemporary American choreography, specifically whether dance should 
be choreographed so as to “interpret” the music. Cowell noted that recent choreography 
practice was to sever the dance completely from the music, leaving them more-or-less 
unrelated, so as to avoid having the dance “interpret” the music and become a mere 
servant to it. Cowell’s response was that, in examination of primitive practices, it was 
clear that there might be a kinetic connection between dance and music whereby the 
music would inspire the body of the dancer into motion. The “primitive” dance was not in 
such cases “interpreting” the music, because in actuality there were no correspondences 
between the semantic content of the music and dance, nor were there any 
correspondences between the formal plan of the music and dance. 
I see no reason why a dancer should be afraid that he or she will be accused of 
being “interpretive” (this now being in great disrepute) if he bases the dance on 
some definite rhythmical flow, and this flow is given forth through the sound of 
instruments, or other sonal means. If he does so he is in step with the practice of 
primitives whose art of the dance is the most strongly ingrained of any which 
exists in the world.146 
  
Cowell spoke of “primitive” dance being “strongly ingrained” as if this had been 
empirically observed. Whatever the extent of his experience observing all those dances 
that he characterized as “primitive” and determining their physiological “ingrainment” in 
each “primitive” person, the categorization of a culture as “primitive” meant that any of 
its practices could be taken, a priori and whatever their actual features, as humanly 
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authentic and as non-reflected, or “ingrained.” It was because of this that “primitives” 
offered the surest illustration of “how relate music and dance.” More specifically, the 
“primitive” might offer a guide to modern dance because “primitive” art was—by its very 
essence and a priori as “primitive”—non-referential and unplanned. The way that Cowell 
here constructed and invoked the “primitive” in order to influence contemporary 
aesthetics with a special form of authority was closely paralleled with McPhee’s 
statements about Balinese music being “absolute,” published in Modern Music the 
following year. 
In invoking the authority of “the primitive” to direct the development of modern 
music and dance, Cowell was not advocating a full return to “the primitive” per se. He in 
fact complained about recent projects that used only percussion with dance (in itself a 
“fundamental and normal relationship”), saying that they had “simply gone back to the 
primitive, adding little or nothing to the connection between the dancer and the beats, 
usually less rather than more interest and varied than among primitive peoples.”147 
Cowell rather advocated rediscovering the “primitive” bases of music and dance so as to 
move forward from there. The task of the composer and the dancer was still to embrace 
experiment and development. In the 1940 article “Drums Along the Pacific” he would 
offer further clues as to what the proper relationship between the “primitive” and 
innovative aspects of composition ought to be. When writing music for percussion, he 
cautioned that there was not only a danger of becoming too “primitive,” but also 
becoming blindly innovative and disconnected from the essential bases of percussive 
music in practice: 
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Percussion music is not all alike, nor is it all related to one school of music. The 
approach of the Italian futurists was in essence artificial, the basic idea being to 
create, ready-made and without gradual development, or experience with the 
instruments, a highly complex and sophisticated art-form. Varèse’s music was the 
culmination of this tendency.148 
 
According to Cowell there were two current groups of composers who were 
combining the “primitive” and innovative aspects of successful composition in the 
percussion medium. First, there were the Cuban composers, who “create from direct 
experience; they are in close contact with the native Afro-Cuban music which is largely 
based on enticing primitive percussion rhythms.” He had already discussed this group in 
his 1931 article on son. Second, there was a new group: “Our newest Pacific coast 
group—Cage, Green, Harrison, and Strang—have also developed their interest naturally, 
as composers for the modern concert dance” (p. 48). “Natural” involvement with 
percussion thus meant either being in contact with percussion’s roots in a living 
“primitive” culture, or writing music for dance, which was percussion’s natural role to 
accompany (or, more precisely, to induce).  
 
 
“The Nature of Melody”  
Cowell’s second treatise, which he finished in late 1937 while in prison,149 continued 
the experimentalist theories and methods of New Music Resources. This new work, The 
Nature of Melody, was an exploration of potentials of the “melodic element” of music via 
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logical processes. It was Cowell’s stated goal to break apart the so-called “musical 
fundamentals” (he applied his own quotation marks to this term) as conventionally 
taught, and to build in their place a new music theory which would make the most basic 
features of music—objectively observable and logically accessible—its bases: “Learning 
to read the notes is essential to be sure; but what about learning something of the nature 
of the notes which are to be read?” (NOM, I: 9). To this end Cowell recommended, for 
instance, that a system of neums be reinstated for instruction on melody, the most basic 
three of which would designate upward motion, downward motion, and non-motion. 
From this very simple starting point, Cowell suggested that an entire system could be 
elaborated with which to understand all “melody,” an “element” that he implied as 
immanent to all music and transcendent of culture.150  
In a manner similar to that of New Music Resources this treatise was not only a 
proposal for a systematic and integrated approach to the study of all music, but was at the 
same time, through evolutionist assumptions, a proposal for a systematic and integrated 
study of the history of music, encompassing all times and with living non-Western 
cultures corresponding to historical periods of Western music. This was not laid out as 
the central purpose of the book. Rather Cowell made occasional references to the music 
of various historical periods and non-Western cultures as illustrations of his logically 
built arguments. These attributions were generally to vague traditions (e.g. “primitive,” 
“Oriental,” “Christian”) and mostly appeared without evidence. Cowell would not have 
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understood his speaking of “primitives” in generalized terms as sloppy. By his 
understanding, that which he observed “is true of primitive tribes of the same degree of 
development irrespective of what part of the Globe they are from” (NOM, II: 2). For 
instance, Cowell stated authoritatively that “primitive” song and speech were more-or-
less indistinguishable, and that with increasing “cultivation” came increasing distinction 
between the two modes of vocal production: 
[Among primitives] many sounds are used in speech which have no other 
purpose than to express feelings in terms of sound; such sounds may not have any 
meaning as words. Some such sounds are still left in our own speech, but they are 
comparatively rare. The primitives make very frequent use of them. On the other 
hand, saying the same words over again on different pitches, or repeating them 
rhythmically or in sequence are devices often used by primitives to indicate a 
certain meaning; while among more cultivated peoples, this is almost never a part 
of speech. The primitive man will often break from speech into song, and back 
again unaware that he has entered two different fields. The stronger the feeling 
concerning what he is relating, the greater his tendency to marshal the forces of 
rhythm and changing pitch to aid him in expression. Remnants of this may be 
observed in the preaching in “revival” meetings. (NOM, II: 1-2) 
 
Cowell’s other statements about “primitives” included that the concept of scale was 
foreign to them: a “primitive melody” was simply a successions of intervals without 
reference to an abstracted “scale.” In another case, seemingly in contradiction, Cowell 
described one “primitive scale” as containing the octave and the fifth, plus two more 
tones precisely in between each of those intervals (yielding C, E-half-flat, G, and B-half-
flat). Such contradictions may have been the result of Cowell’s various ideas about 
“primitives” having been developed in isolation, each as part of a separate logical 
problem, in which “the primitive” was constructed to represent the far end of a 
continuum of practices. It is difficult to assess Cowell’s methods of inquiry, because, as 
stated, most of this authoritatively spoken knowledge about “primitives” was offered 
without citation to other authors and without direct reference to any particular “primitive” 
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person or people. It should be mentioned that, as Cowell was in jail at the time that he 
wrote this book, he might not have had access to the materials that informed his study, 
and therefore would have been forced into stating his arguments in vague, generalized 
language. Nevertheless, the style of this treatise is not dissimilar to that of his other 
publications. 
Cowell here maintained his views on the separability of conventional and inherent 
aspects of music, which he had previously discussed in the 1930 introduction to New 
Music Resources. Yet, in this later treatise he placed new emphasis on the conventional 
aspect, encouraging composition students to be aware that much of music’s interest, 
specifically its capacity to convey meaning, came through play with convention (in this 
respect music could be differentiated from language, which was entirely dependent on the 
conventionality of sounds). “The Student should become able, as far as possible, to 
decide what values in music are inherent in its own materials, and which are of value 
because they are established conventions” (NOM, III: 1). Compositions could be written 
without convention but the student should be advised of the effect of music without 
standard meaning upon the listener. “Part of the appeal and value of music then, lies in 
inherent factors, which remain the same in all music, and another part is concerned with 
the language of a certain musical procedure, which differs in each musical system, and to 
a more limited extent in styles within a single systems (sic)” (NOM, III: 1). Music with 
inherent interest could be directed at any audience, whereas music of convention could 
only be of interest to a particular audience, and the composer would have to be quite 
careful in considering the likely auditory background of his listener. Cowell did not see 
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the listener as bringing his/her auditory history to bear upon the entire musical 
experience, only on this particular dimension of it designated as “convention.” 
In one application of this argument, Cowell stated that the human body was 
predisposed to respond to conjunct melodies. Psychologists had discovered that as people 
listened to a melody they would flex and unflex their vocal chords as if singing it. If the 
melody became very disjunct, most listeners would no longer be able to follow it and 
would stop flexing their vocal chords. The point was that, for a melody to have wide 
appeal, the composer would have to be prepared to write conjunctly, or else only to 
present his/her work to a “cultivated” audience. While Cowell was by no means rejecting 
experimental, challenging compositional styles, conventionalism was becoming 
important to him by its very nature as convention (a relativist notion), as well as by its 
capacity to indicate which sorts of music were most immutably human (NOM, II: 3-4). 
 Note that “cultivated” was the word that Cowell uses in antithesis to “primitive.” His 
understanding of the shifting tastes and conventions of music was to some extent 
integrated with his evolutionist views. In other words, tastes were variable among 
different groups, but these shifts to some extent occurred along predictable and inevitable 
lines of historical development. Rules then ought to be contingent to conventions, which 
were appropriate to one’s particular phase of historical development. Rules of a past age 
were not bad in and of themselves, but blind devotion to the rules of another age was 
inappropriate. Some rules, still maintained in conventional harmony, simply harkened 
back to particularities of historical change, and had no meaning at all in the present day. 
Along these lines, Cowell argued that though there had once been significance to the 
injunction against the use of parallel fifths, there was no longer any sense to it: 
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This [rule] originated at a time in early medieval Europe when music was just 
emerging from a period in which consecutive fifths were required at all times, 
until everyone became bored and disgusted with them (in organum). So the rule 
required that they should not be consecutive—meaning at first, probably, that 
something should be inserted between them, it being expected that every other 
interval would be a fifth. This rule has been retained, although no one would be 
bored by consecutive fifths now, since the period in which they were so much 
used is happily past. Every leading composer has shown how consecutive fifths 
may be used to the greatest musical advantage. Science shows that through the 
second overtone, which can plainly be heard, consecutive fifths are obtained with 
every tonal succession; if there is anything wrong with them all music would have 
to be eliminated, since they occur, willy-nilly! (NOM, I: 12)  
 
Much of The Nature of Melody reads as an argument with the conventional 
instruction of music theory and composition, which Cowell again and again accused of 
ignorance, rigidity, lack of imagination, and absolutism. In this way, the treatise not only 
set out to represent the “nature” of melody as a universal phenomenon, but also stood as a 
representation of the state of contemporary music instruction in the West (Cowell painted 
the dimmest picture if it). He pleaded with educators to acknowledge that there was a 
great deal of variability to “good” and “bad” in terms of melody, and that their absolutist 
assessments of quality were rarely made with sufficient knowledge of the whole melodic 
field. Conventionally, harmony was really the only element of music that was studied at 
all, and its science was faulty: 
There are two main reasons why the study of harmony is generally 
unsatisfactory. One is that the study has not been made into a scientific and 
reasonable exposition of the subject of harmony. It is a leftover from the time 
when the aim was not to know facts about harmony, but to know the conventions 
of “good taste” as recommended by famous and skilled musicians.  
The second reason is that harmony is only one of several musical elements. 
Even a very excellent knowledge of harmony would be sure to leave a great deal 
about the other important elements in doubt. Harmony is a less fundamental 
element than rhythm and melody. Rhythm and melody were employed for no one 
knows how many years—thousands, certainly—before anything that could be 
called harmony became a part of musical art; and even today, all the music of the 
world employs melody and rhythm, whereas harmony as an art is used only in the 
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music of the European system, or music which has been adapted to the principles 
of that system. (NOM, I: 7-8) 
 
Harmony was, in fact, not a particularly fundamental musical element, but was a 
“somewhat complex flowering of an already highly developed musical growth.” That 
latter growth was melody, and it would therefore be necessary, prior to any but a 
superficial study of harmony, to develop a scientific study of melody. Such a study was 
of course what Cowell’s treatise represented. He proceeded with the understanding that 
there was a single, if highly complex, melodic field the world over, which it was his aim 
in the book to map. The intention of this mapping was to challenge what he saw as small-
mindedness of the common Western musical mind with the presentation of a much 
broader and ultimately more logically compelling conception of the element of melody as 
a world phenomenon.  
What I most wish to stress is that Cowell’s challenge to limitedness and absolutism 
was built upon a style of inquiry that was ultimately positivist, even if in its mood it was 
reminiscent of cultural relativist critiques. The world of melody was much bigger than the 
small-minded conception of it that he argued with, but it was possible to at least move 
toward a full accounting of it as it “really was.” The limited capacity of a listener to 
accept musics that were unfamiliar to him was to a great extent a failure to recognize the 
“inherent values” of that music that would be evident to a listener who was already 
familiar with it. Cultural differences were to be understood as differences of experience 
within and differences of perspective upon a musical field which was ultimately unitary, 
and which, to a scientist like Cowell, could theoretically be known objectively and in its 
entirety. And, as stated, Cowell’s approach to knowing this field was as much a matter of 
logical deduction as it was of empirical discovery. 
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It should be noted that, while one of Cowell’s purposes in writing The Nature of 
Melody was to contradict the naïve idea that the Western major and minor were the only 
two scales, and to introduce the possibility of new vistas of scales that would represent 
the dissolution of certain false absolutes, the book’s systematic and deductive methods 
necessitated the employ of a concept of scale with it’s own absolutes, purportedly 
meaningful to all melodic practices of the world.  It was only with these presupposed 
bases of a universal concept of scale that Cowell could state, “It is the aim here…to 
indicate what fields in scale construction have been neglected in our music” (NOM, III: 
54). The implication was that there was a single worldwide field of scale production, and 
that all scales, with their various forms of development, exhibited the same fundamental 
scalar properties.  
 
Joseph Yasser 
Nancy Yunhua Rao has demonstrated that this treatise was the child of Cowell’s 
affiliation with the New York Musicological Society, the members of which included 
Charles Seeger, Nicolas Slonimsky (a guest member), Joseph Schillinger, and Joseph 
Yasser. Infamously, the members did not include Ruth Crawford, on whom because she 
was a woman the doors of the inaugural meeting had literally been shut (she was later 
allowed to attend as a “guest”). As Rao shows, there was a great deal of overlap in the 
members’ (and “guests’”) concerns, with two general tendencies of the group significant 
to Cowell’s book: systemization and exoticism. Like Cowell, Yasser, Schillinger, and 
Slonimsky also developed theories of scale by methods that were, on the one hand, 
logical and systematic—Slonimsky’s relentless method yielded 1,330 scale patterns(!)—
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and, on the other hand, inductive in their development of theory based on study of non-
Western musics (or at least in the correlation of knowledge, arrived at deductively, with a 
variety of documented musical practices). These projects also tended to be radical in their 
critique of conventional Western music theory, for instance of the concept of a scale that 
falls within the octave limit and is reproducible at the octave level.151 
Joseph Yasser (1893-1981) had emigrated from Russia in 1923, and was one of the 
founding members of the New York Musicological Society.152 His work can be taken as a 
key to the problems inherent in the method they shared of developing knowledge of 
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music and difference (which involved research into musical practices from around the 
world, the development of musical theories through logical deduction, and the fitting 
together of the two). Yasser was concerned with developing a theory of the evolutionary 
development of scales worldwide. He understood there to be a logic by which tonality 
had progressed through history that would enable him both to place any given culture 
within this scheme of progression and also, by extension, to predict how tonality would 
develop in the future. He found that the diatonic scale, with its seven regular and five 
auxiliary tones, had evolved out of the pentatonic scale, with its two auxiliary tones. The 
next phase in the evolution of tonality would be a twelve-tone scale with seven auxiliary 
tones. 
Because Yasser found that there was a logical development to melody and harmony, 
that melody in one part of the world might be seen as a precursor to melody in another, 
he took the position that it was more important to understand any given melodic practice 
within the total logic of the evolutionary scheme than according to the theories of its 
practitioners. It could therefore be said that the pentatonic scale was not “the exclusive 
musical appanage of a given nation or group of nations or even of an entire race, but 
simply represents a certain stage of the musical development of mankind in general,”153 
and that Gregorian plainchant represented roughly the same stage. Terminology derived 
from one could be used in discussion of the other. He applied the term pien-tones, 
borrowed from Chinese music, to Gregorian chant, with the understanding that the term 
was relevant for theoretical discussions of both because the two traditions were 
evolutionarily equivalent.154  
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Meanwhile, he claimed that “the Far-Eastern nations [never] possessed a correctly 
evolved theory of music which would aid them in the exploitation of the intrinsic 
resources of [their own] infra-diatonic scale” (my emphasis).155 (Yasser’s term “Infra-
diatonic scale” meant “diatonic scale of a lower order”: it was the five-tone scale with 
two auxiliary tones, a smaller and less evolved version of the Western diatonic scale’s 
seven-tones with five auxiliary tones). Since Far Eastern theory was inadequate, the 
“logical development of what is potentially involved in this material” became the subject 
of one chapter of Yasser’s treatise. To Yasser, the theoretical implications of most of the 
world’s music were beyond the reach of those who did not have access to his scientific, 
evolutionist “big picture,” and even their musical practices could be criticized for not 
conforming to its logic. It was the music, and not the scheme that purported to understand 
its “resources” (conceived of as transcendent of the musicians’ use of them), that was 
wrong. 
It is very unlikely that statements of such arrogance would have been articulated by 
Cowell, and yet it is one logical outcome of a method of inquiry that was not unlike his 
own. (I imagine that Cowell would have avoided drawing such a conclusion, but would 
not have objected to the thought process by which it was drawn.) In pursuing a positivist 
mode of musical discovery and analysis while holding that certain cultures’ musical 
practices could be seen as exemplars of that which had been derived deductively, Cowell 
also left open the possibility that a gap might become apparent between a logically drawn 
theory and a given cultural practice. This could lead to the “discovery” that the practice 
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was in some sense wrong, either misunderstood or improperly practiced by its own 
practitioners. Cowell in fact did occasionally articulate such a view in regard to one 
particular culture, that its members did not understand their own music. That was 
Western culture, as seen for instance in the introduction to New Musical Resources, 
where Cowell asserted that harmony (the special invention of the West) had a scientific 
basis apart from its usual construal in ordinary harmony instruction. It was only Cowell’s 
concept of a conventional aspect of music, which ran separately from the scientific 
aspect, that saved the West from an accusation of musical malpractice. 
Otherwise, the tension between deductive and inductive aspects of Cowell’s project 
becomes evident at points where he remarked that possible features of melody that had 
been “discovered” through deductive processes were not to be found among the world’s 
peoples, and thus had no practical value. Rao has suggested that such moments are the 
result of “two contradictory tendencies”: “On the one hand, Cowell eagerly embraces the 
new scales; on the other hand, he relies heavily on convention to validate these new 
scales, either referring to the diatonic system, or alluding to the new scales’ origin in 
another culture, or emphasizing their inherent logic. Paradoxically, the newer the territory 
that he explores, the more he leans on convention.”156 This tendency to view evidence 
from living cultural practice as the validation for experiment (deduction) was more a 
feature of this later phase of Cowell’s experimentalism. In New Musical Resources, by 
contrast, he had stated that it was not important whether the materials that he had 
developed logically were in actual use: “The very fact that such materials are built on the 
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overtone series….shows that they probably have potential musical use and value.” At that 
time, Cowell had argued confidently that if many of the resources he presented had not 
yet been used, that fact only made “the field which is opened all the richer” (NMR, ix), 
for now came the opportunity for composers of new music to use them. 
The increased importance Cowell placed on conventions (understood as plural) for 
delimiting the radical possibilities of experiment might be taken as evidence of a growing 
conservatism. Yet, such a label as “conservatism,” as with so many others, attaches 
awkwardly to Cowell. His increasing “conservatism” was characterized, not by nostalgia 
or a return to the comfort of a simpler absolutism, but in an increasing respect for the 
plural nature of values. This meant that the conventionality his compositions increasingly 
exhibited (e.g. writing symphonies) was motivated by a deepening of the relativistic side 
of his views, and a diminishment of the importance of absolute values that had motivated 
his earlier, more radical tastes.157 This shift was seen in the 1940 discussion of new music 
for percussion, “Drums Along the Pacific.” There Cowell found, on the one hand, that 
experiment was still viable and valuable. Percussion could still be viewed as a new and 
exciting field, and it could still be understood that the potentials of elements lay latent 
within them, waiting to be discovered and converted into useful resources: 
The string quartet may at times be quite boring as a combination of instruments. 
Percussion alone may prove monotonous, but it is less apt to, because it is still in 
a state of experiment. New tones and rhythms are constantly being discovered. 
When the young experimenters have succeeded in fully exploring the field, there 
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will still remain the untried possibilities of combining these results with the 
better-known resources of the full orchestra.158 
 
But, on the other hand, as seen in Cowell’s critique of the Italian Futurists and Varèse, 
pure experimental development of musical resources could yield results that were 
“artificial.” For Cowell it was becoming clear that the legitimacy of resources discovered 
through experiment would have to be checked anthropologically (i.e. through discovery 
of their presence in living cultures). 
 
The United Quartet 
If at the time of writing The Nature of Melody Cowell was becoming more interested 
in the conventional, variable dimension of music, he was also expressing interest in the 
unity among all peoples. His student Harrison much later recalled a series of 
conversations they had at the time; while in prison, Cowell spoke about his United 
Quartet and the deep unity that he believed connected all humans: 
He once told me that it was there [Redwood City Jail] that he wrote his beautiful 
United Quartet (1936, L522) which so handsomely brings together musical ideas 
from, or certainly suitable to, many musical cultures. Once, when I visited him in 
San Quentin Prison, he said something which revealed his ecumenical outlook. I 
had written a string quartet in which I had composed for the sounds of the body of 
the instrument as well as the strings. I had not known that he had done that too, 
and he told me how we were all part of an ocean of intelligence over which there 
was (of course) a surface tension rather like a thin rubber sheet, and that (here he 
used his index fingers) one would rise up over here and another would rise up 
over there, and they would look across at one another as though separate, but that 
they were all the time of one nature underneath.159 
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Harrison’s account indicates that Cowell’s sense of clarity about human unity was not 
entirely dependent upon analysis; yet, even if Cowell’s case for universalism was a 
spiritual one, it was also indeed grounded in the analyses of The Nature of Melody. That 
the United Quartet (Quartet No. 4) based its claim to universality on the same logically 
derived findings laid out in that treatise is evidenced in Cowell’s notes to the score, in 
which he remarked that this “attempt toward a more universal musical style” was “unique 
in form, style and content,” and yet “easy to understand because of its use of fundamental 
elements as a basis... (emphasis mine).”160 By basing a composition on “fundamental 
elements” drawn from various of the world’s “peoples” (“elements” that he had imputed 
upon those “peoples” in the first place), Cowell could make this special claim to 
universality. The “inherent,” “non-conventional” aspects of music were understandable to 
anyone, anywhere, and Cowell ensured universal comprehension by ample repetitions of 
the materials.  
This was one solution to a persistent problem facing composers in the 1930s. By his 
very original procedure Cowell ingeniously satisfied both the demand of innovation 
required in his own modernist milieu (despite the work’s theoretic universality, it was 
only within the small world of new music that the work would receive attention) and that 
of accessibility. Again and again he iterated this point: the work was innovative in spite 
of being simple because the primary resources it drew upon were not merely those of the 
European tradition, but those of the whole world:   
The Quartet should not only be easy to understand, without following any known 
pathway, but it should be understood equally well by Americans, Europeans, 
Orientals, or higher primitives; or by anybody from a coal miner to a bank 
president. The main purpose of it, of course, is not in its technique, but in the 
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message, which, of course, is not suitable for expression in words. It may be said 
that it concerns human and social relationships. The technique is for the purpose 
of conveying the message to the widely differentiated groups who need to be 
united in these relationships.161 
 
Cowell’s statement that the message of the quartet could not be expressed in words may 
reflect his view that music had a universal layer of inherent meaningfulness that underlay 
all of its variable forms worldwide, whereas language was historical through-and-
through, and there were no words ever capable of being meaningful to all people.   
Cowell listed the various principles he drew upon from the world’s various “peoples.” 
As in the nature of melody, he referred to these “peoples” not by nation, tribe, or as 
individuals, but in broadly generalized, categorical ways: “Orientals,” “primitives,” 
“archaics,” “moderns” and so forth. Strikingly, through this broad categorical approach to 
the understanding of musical history and anthropology, Cowell could not only claim that 
he presented an intercultural work, but that he presented a comprehensively intercultural 
work. “There are in it elements suggested from every place and period.” His categories, it 
would seem, together spanned every corner of the history of humanity. He enumerated 
some of these categories, and explained how he had made use of the principles that 
exemplified them: 
For example, the classical feeling is represented, not by the employment of a 
classic form, but in building up a new form carefully planned.  Carefully planned 
form is a classic concept. Primitive music is represented, not by imitating it, nor 
by taking a specific melody or rhythm from some tribe, but by using at times a 
three tone scale and exhausting all the different ways the three tones can appear, a 
procedure of some primitive music; and by its underlying rhythmic beats—like 
primitive music, but taken from no specific instance. The Oriental is represented 
by modes which are constructed as Oriental modes are constructed, without being 
actual modes used in particular cultures. From Western culture, the archaic is 
represented by foundational harmonic intervals of 5ths, 4ths, and octaves. The 
classic is represented by the form and development of themes. The romantic is 
represented by the emotional outpouring of the melodies. The modern is 
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represented by the use of unresolved discords, by free intervals in two-part 
counterpoint, and by the fact that the whole result is something new—and all that 
is new is modern.162 
 
Cowell did not specify any particular individuals, locations, and dates that might 
exemplify this “classical” principle of careful formal planning. Such would have been 
unnecessary, as careful formal planning was the essence of the “classical” style that he 
spoke of, and as such any careful formal plan could exemplify it (we will witness a 
similar mode of thinking in the next chapter on Harrison). The “classical” form of the 
United Quartet indeed bore little resemblance to the form of, for instance, a Haydn 
symphony; yet Cowell argued that in essence his form and theirs were the same.  
In brief, Cowell built his highly planned “classical” form out of a five beat rhythmic 
motive / / ˘ / ˘ (“/” being a stressed beat and “˘” being an unstressed beat). David Hall 
explains that “This dynamic pattern applies to the beats of a measure, to the measures of 
a phrase, and to phrases grouped in fives to form the sections. Successive movements 
begin loud, loud, soft, loud, soft.”163 With careful formal planning designated as the 
essence of “classical” style, Cowell might have regarded his tight micro/macro 
structuring not only as “classical” but as the very height of “classicism.” This was not a 
claim that he explicitly made, but it seems to be an implication of the project. 
David Nichols has offered commentary on several of Cowell’s above attributions; for 
instance, that when speaking of “modes which are constructed as Oriental modes are 
constructed” Cowell meant a variety of non-diatonic modes. Nichols offers the example 
of the quartet’s second movement (Ex. 10), in which the scale contains two non-varying 
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notes, C and G, as well as variable pitch pairs that allowed scalar movement through the 
gamut of the twelve tones. He argues that this in fact resembles the Bhairavi family of 
Indian ragas: “Such a wide (and indeed, fully chromatic) collection of available pitches 
might not be thought of as particularly Indian, but in fact the North Indian family of ragas 
bearing the collective title Bhairavi has the basic scale C, D-flat, E-flat, F, G, A-flat, B-
flat, and C. Within this family the particular raga called Bhairavi includes the possibility 
in performance of admitting D in the ascending form of the scale and alternative F and F-
sharp in both ascent and descent.”164 Nichols notes that Cowell could have conceivably 
been acquainted with such ragas through his 1931 study in Berlin with Professor 
Sambamoorthy from Madras.  
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Ex. 10. 2nd Movement, United Quartet 
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Nichols’s observations, if correct, would suggest that, as with Cowell’s “classical” 
designation, his “Oriental” designation involved the induction of a particular principle 
from a particular observed practice (here the principle was the variability of particular 
scale degrees in the course of melodic movement), and the imputation of that principle as 
an essence of the music of a certain broad category of humanity (here “Orientals”). It is 
also possible that this principle of “Oriental” scales was not derived through such 
inductive methods but through the deductive ones which he favored in the creation of 
totalizing systems (similar to Yasser’s system, in which “Oriental” scales were 
understood to be logically in between “primitive” and “modern” ones). It is likely that 
both forces were at work. In any case, Cowell’s further expansion upon the “Oriental” 
principle, making all of the tones of the scale variable, might then have represented a 
development of that “Oriental” essence to its logical and scientific limits. In this way, the 
United Quartet’s scale would have been more “Oriental” than any in the Orient, just as its 
form would have been more “classical” than those of any of Europe’s past. He did not, 
however, explicitly make such a claim.  
 
The Schillinger System 
Cowell never abandoned his positivist mindset. He maintained, for instance, an 
enduring enthusiasm for the total systematizing work of Joseph Schillinger, who had 
been a fellow member of the New York Musicological Society. The Schillinger System of 
Musical Composition165 (1946) had some similarities with Harrison’s Music Primer, 
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which came later, and Cowell’s own treatises, which came before it: they all purported to 
be accounts of the reality of music as a world-wide phenomenon and at the same time 
guides to composition. None of them saw a necessary distinction between the two. 
Schillinger’s was the most radically comprehensive and systematic. He referred to issues 
of music theory as "musico-scientific problems" and used a form of graphic notation 
instead of traditional staff notation. His comprehensive theory, based upon rhythm, rather 
than harmony, was laid out in his composition treatise, which Cowell introduced as 
representing “a lifetime of work in research, coordination and creative discovery.”166 This 
was the very tripartite mode of inquiry that, as seen, had been so problematic for Yasser. 
Schillinger had indeed gone further than Yasser; his system was capable (so Cowell 
believed) of providing the student of composition with the analytical method appropriate 
to the analysis of any material that he might come upon: 
The idea behind the Schillinger system is simple and inevitable: it undertakes the 
application of mathematical logic to all the materials of music and to their 
functions, so that the student may know the unifying principles behind these 
functions, may grasp the method of analyzing and synthesizing any musical 
materials that he may find anywhere or may discover for himself, and may 
perceive how to develop new materials as he feels the need for them. Thus the 
Schillinger system offers possibilities, not limitations; it is a positive, not a 
negative approach to the choice of musical materials.167 
 
The reader may note a certain disconnect between Cowell’s increasing interest in the 
plurality of conventions and his embrace of such a totalizing theory. Nevertheless, even 
at this point the two were not necessarily contradictory. Shillinger’s system, though 
totalizing, replaced the inhibiting rules of traditional composition treatises with scientific 
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principles, which through logical deduction might allow the composer to move creatively 
in plural directions. Cowell, along with Sidney Roberts (with whom he had been married 
since 1941), elsewhere argued that it was necessary for the composer to arrive at his 
compositional choices using such laws and not merely raw creativity or intuition: the 
composer at the keyboard differs from a playful child because the composer sets 
materials “in order, organizes them in accord with some definite scheme of 
relationship.”168 These plural “orders” which Cowell spoke of were not precisely things 
that the composer would give to the materials, but rather were already immanent to the 
materials. The composer would simply play with this internal order creatively: “The 
reasons for his choice can never be more than partly objective, but the range of 
possibilities offered to him may surely be entirely so” (p. 226). It was for this reason that 
the true composition treatise would necessarily be a hybrid: on the one hand a study of 
the natural laws of music in scientific style, on the other a manual of instruction. The 
treatise would carry out each function at the same time in the very same syntactical units 
and graphs. 
The Cowells explained that with the Shillinger system the fundamental properties of 
all musical elements had been established, charted, and set into equations for use. 
Shillinger had quite literally “charted the musical range,” which meant that, as Slonimsky 
had already declared, Schillinger did for music what Mendeleyev had done for chemistry: 
“he has provided an exhaustive periodic chart of all its elements, making possible the 
discovery of those that have not yet been used” (p. 226). This new science of music, in 
establishing a single field in which all musics could be situated, excited the Cowells’ 
                                                 
168
 Sidney and Henry Cowell, “The Schillinger Case: Charting the Musical Range,” Modern Music 23, 
no. 3 (1946): 226. 
 
 170 
egalitarian sensibilities. Schillinger’s system had finally delivered the singular principles 
by which all musics, including those of modernists (particularly Cowell himself and 
Schönberg) and non-Western peoples, could be assessed as equal: “The theoretical 
systems of Hindemith and Schönberg are now seen to be equally logical and find their 
places within Schillinger’s organization of musical theory, along with the tonal systems 
of India, Persia and Africa, sixteenth century counterpoint, classical harmony, dissonant 
counterpoint, harmony based on fourths or on seconds” (p. 226)  
Besides reiterating the general theme of science having vindicated both modernist 
music and non-Western musics, the Cowells here returned to the specific concept of 
musical relativity, a theory of which Henry had claimed to have developed in the 1930 
introduction to New Musical Resources. Einstein, they now claimed, had turned reality 
into a flux, the consistency of which it was impossible to have any lasting knowledge:  
We cannot know what it is but only how it acts. Nature then consists of movement 
and relationship, that is to say, of rhythm. Any natural phenomenon becomes an 
event in this modern rhythmic conception of the universe; Einstein found that the 
only objective way of studying these events was to chart their periodicities, with 
their reinforcement or interference, on a graph. Schillinger believed music might 
be included among the natural phenomena which can be examined in this way. 
His system uses a comparatively simple form of Einstein’s graph, with its time-
space co-ordinates. (pp. 226-27) 
 
It was a concept of “rhythm,” then, that formed the link between music as a natural 
phenomenon and as a social phenomenon. To Cowell, Schillinger had successfully 
demonstrated that music could be expected to replicate rhythmical processes found in 
nature, namely “growth, motion, and evolution.” Toward the scientific verification of this 
thesis Schillinger had examined “great works of art.” “Confirmation was dramatic, for he 
actually found in works of the masters the same patterns, expressible in the same 
formulas which are used to describe the formation of crystals, the ratios of curvature of 
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celestial trajectories, and the division and multiplication of cells, for instance” (p. 227). 
This was an important finding, because it demonstrated that musicians, even when 
composing intuitively and in ignorance of the natural rhythmic laws of their craft, were 
obeying those laws through intuition. The “great” composers were in fact especially 
faithful to those laws, and therefore it could be argued that the better the music, the more 
natural. From there the argument could easily follow that taking a rational, scientific 
approach to composition would ensure a more thorough engagement of those natural laws 
than would be possible relying upon intuition alone: the best composer would be a 
scientist. Cowell did not, however, explicitly state this last claim. 
It was not usually Cowell’s style to hold the “great masters” up as exemplars of 
musical truth; he was ordinarily more interested in relativizing their achievements so as 
to get out from under them. Yet in this case Schillinger’s method permitted Cowell to 
reiterate an argument similar to one he had made in New Music Resources, that inquiry 
into music’s natural laws had vindicated the controversial (sometimes ridiculed) 
techniques of modernists, who could retrospectively be seen to have been intuitively 
abiding by those laws. Such arguments will be familiar to any alert musicologist, and 
they are not really scientific. They are circular: the “greatness” of the chosen masters 
proves that the given property their music exhibits represents an immutable truth of 
music (incidentally, as these works tend to be long and complex, it is possible to reduce 
them to illustrations of a wide variety of patterns); meanwhile that property, understood 
as representing an immutable truth of music, by being present in these works validates 
the composers’ status as “great.”  
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Ultimately Cowell saw Schillinger as having dispelled the illusion that art was 
somehow different or opposite from science. With The Schillinger System, art was proven 
to hold position among other rational phenomena, and all domains of life were now more 
susceptible to the same styles of scrutiny and categorization. The universe was rhythmic. 
In the 19th century, the field of biology would have provided the models of internal 
integration to which music would aspire. Cowell kept the older interest in integration but 
rejected organicism and looked instead to the logic of Einstein’s physics. 
Meanwhile, in his own review Seeger observed that Schillinger overshot the science 
to which he aspired: “One of the basic aims of a logical handling must be to recognize its 
own limitations in a field.”169 By organizing every conception of music from the known 
world into a single system, and by making grandiose statements about the importance to 
music (especially that of the “great musicians”) of extrinsic natural patterns (while 
providing meager evidence), Schillinger had paid too little respect to the unknowable. 
Schillinger was representative of a recent predilection for the total incorporation and 
subsuming of the opposing traditional and radical wings of the musical discipline that had 
been in battle since the start of the 20th century.  
Cowell also pointed out that Schillinger had produced a synthesis of the conflicting 
tendencies of his time, and he articulated the issue in terms reminiscent of his own 
treatises: 
Many have criticized the confusion of style and taste with “law” in music, as 
being a holdover from nineteenth-century religious thinking. Schillinger felt the 
trouble lay in a limited and faulty idea of what music is, which resulted in the old 
anachronistic dichotomies of art and science, art and life, art and nature. Once 
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these sets of apparent opposites were understood to share the pattern-in-
movement, or rhythmic, nature of things, the arts fell into their natural place.170 
 
Yet, for Seeger, in attempting to present an ecumenical and authoritative answer to these 
opposing forces, the Schillingers of the world (and Seeger noted that systematizing was a 
contemporary obsession all the way from “theoretical physics through the social sciences 
to, lastly, the arts”) fell into their own folly of over-doing “the logical and rational.” In 
his favored role as “the balancer,” Seeger here found a dialectical process at work, and by 
observing that Schillinger’s work represented an extreme in need of a balancing 
antithesis, he was indirectly saying the same of Cowell’s work, especially the sort of 
work presented in New Musical Resources, which Cowell had originally developed 
alongside Seeger, and of the milieu of the New York Musicological Society in which 
they had both participated. 
 
Conclusion 
After 1940 Cowell’s thinking about cultural difference shifted. In general, after 1940 
the sociological aspects of his thinking grew in importance over the positivist music-
theoretical aspects. During the Second World War Cowell was employed as a 
propagandist, programming radio broadcasts for every region of the world. He used the 
word “propaganda” unapologetically in his published descriptions of these activities: 
“Propaganda is rather a new word, and we do not often think of it in connection with 
classic music; yet any music which serves a definite purpose may be said to have some 
propaganda aspect.”171 Cowell attempted to demonstrate to the world through these 
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programs that the United States was a pluralist society that valued music from all regions 
of the world and was not controlling of musical expression as were the totalitarian 
regimes it fought against.  
Politics became more central to Cowell’s statements about music and difference. In 
1954 he wrote, “I used to be almost totally uninterested in politics; but it becomes 
increasingly clear to me that ethical individualism cannot flourish under radically 
extreme political conditions.”172 As is obvious considering Cowell’s involvement in the 
Composers Collective, this was not entirely true. During the war and into the Cold War, 
Cowell spoke out for American style liberal democracy as a necessary first step toward 
pluralist society and cultural relativist philosophy. His interest in folk music intensified, 
as the antithesis to urban music, as communal rather than egocentric, and as the basis of a 
(liberal and democratic) nation: “Folk music is the music of the people, as democracy is 
government of the people.”173  
In spite of these new inflections in Cowell’s thinking after 1940, he also continued to 
iterate statements of the sort I have been describing throughout this chapter. In the course 
of advocating that Americans become more actively interested in the musics of other 
peoples, he made his view that musical difference was based in unilinear evolutionary 
movement even more explicit. Americans would benefit from studying the musics of 
other peoples, if they wished to understand the music of their own past:  
Moreover, it is possible to find, living today in various parts of the world, types of 
music which must have characterized earlier periods in our own musical history. 
Anthropologists believe that the various elements of a given cultural complex 
appear together. So if a tribe living in the 20th century may be accurately 
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described as belonging to the Stone Age, it may be expected to reproduce the 
music of the Stone Age just as it has reproduced the more tangible artifacts of the 
Stone Age of pre-history. Therefore it is possible to say that certain very primitive 
Esquimo tribes, for example, sing as men of the Stone Age probably sang 
thousands of years ago.174 
 
Cowell also used the following explicitly evolutionist logic to justify Cage’s work with 
silence:  
The dynamics of silence, a relativity of silence as well as of sound, expressed by 
rests and extreme pianissimo, is a major concern in most of Cage’s music. This 
feeling for the rhythmical pregnancy of silence seems an ultimate sophistication. 
In primitive music, beats must always be actually sounded; as music becomes 
more elaborately cultivated there are more and more places in which the beat, 
once established, may be taken for granted. Sometimes in the improvisatory jam 
session of jazz players, there will be, by agreement, at fixed intervals in the music, 
a sudden two-measure silence, after which everyone comes in full tilt with gusto. 
Obviously the exact duration of two measures and their division into beats must 
be forcefully present in the minds of the performers during that silence. Cage 
enjoys presenting longer and more complex silences in the course of his works. 
Sometimes he leads one toward absolute silence by increasingly greater degrees 
of softness, until one can hardly tell whether one is really hearing anything or 
not.175 
 
As these quotations show, Cowell’s later evolutionism was if anything more explicit 
than in earlier years. One senses that once again the “primitive” music Cowell 
represented was merely dependent upon a vaguely hypothesized continuum of practices 
from most primitive to most cultivated, in this case a continuum running from no silence 
to maximum silence. Cowell’s belief in history as logical unilinear development seems to 
have been strong enough as to make such loosely generated theories of musical change 
seem legitimate. 
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As we have seen with his 1946 commentaries on The Schillinger System, Cowell 
remained unwaveringly dedicated to positivist music-theoretical studies and 
systematizations. His advocacy of the cultural relativist perspective, though intensifying 
in ardor, continued to be idiosyncratic in its assumption that there were properties 
immanent to music that might be objectively studied. It was from this basis that he 
continued to argue for pluralism, as he had in New Musical Resources. Musical values 
were all, ultimately and at their base, singular. Yes, it might seem as though Western 
music was superior in certain regards, but “the reason for this is simply that different 
cultures the world over have developed different aspects of music, so that ours is varied 
where that of other peoples is monotonous, and vice versa” (p. 5). Often, he encouraged 
his readers that by simply repeatedly listening to recordings of unfamiliar musics they 
would gradually develop a familiarity and understanding of the music.  
In maintaining this belief in objectivity into the 1950s, Cowell fell out of step with the 
cultural relativist current of anthropology as exemplified by Melville Herskovits, in 
which studious examination of cultural context was essential to the understanding of any 
and all aspects of a given artifact. It was this latter philosophy that would become most 
important to the new field of Ethnomusicology. I discuss this current at the end of the 
next chapter, as a contrast to the concept of music and difference laid out by Cowell’s 
devoted student Harrison. As will be seen, Harrison’s construction of a “Round World” 
of non-difference was far more inventive, idiosyncratic, internally coherent, and limited 
than was Cowell’s “whole world of music.” 
 
  
 
Chapter IV: Lou Harrison and the “Whole Round World of Music” 
 
Prelude: The Question of the Double Concerto 
When I first encountered Lou Harrison’s Double Concerto for Violin, Cello, and 
Javanese Gamelan it represented a challenge to much I had learned thus far in gamelan 
rehearsal and generally as an ethnomusicologist. Having read Clifford Geertz, John 
Blacking, and other prominent theorists of culture, I had gathered that it was best to talk 
about non-Western musics with culture-specific terminology—such as irama and laras 
for Central Javanese gamelan. These were not translations of Western concepts; they 
referred to aspects of Javanese music that had no direct equivalents in Western music. 
Similarly, I understood that the kepatihan (cipher notation) we used was not merely an 
alternative way of expressing something that could also be expressed with staff notation. 
Javanese music was something utterly different from Western music.  
 Through further reading in anthropological culture theory I would learn more about 
the theoretical underpinnings to such choices of wording. I realized that I was both 
cultivating respect for other cultures and accumulating a body of concepts by which we 
could conceive of Javanese music from within. There was a history to this approach to 
the study of non-Western music that was intertwined with gamelan’s very presence in the 
academy. Playing gamelan was not simply making music; it was a lesson in cultural 
relativism. 
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With this learned, Harrison’s Double Concerto presented a conundrum. It was a piece 
that seemed to belong not to one culture but to two, or perhaps to deny the difference 
between them. It employed two sets of notation, one in kepatihan for the gamelan (the 
“orchestra” of Harrison’s concerto) and one in staff notation for the soloists on violin and 
cello. Rehearsal required the calling-out of two sets of instructions: “Soloists, start at 
rehearsal 1!” and then, “gamelan, start at gong leading to irama II!” Strangely, these parts 
came together elegantly, consonantly, and yet remained distinct. We seemed to be 
playing two different works, produced by unrelated intelligences, which somehow fit 
together perfectly.  
How was this possible? As an ethnomusicologist, did I not understand music to be the 
product of a single culture? Wasn’t the music of any particular culture only meaningful in 
relationship to other meaningful practices of that culture? How then had Harrison created 
a piece in which two groups of musicians performed their own irreconcilably different 
musical practices, and yet played together as if they were doing more-or-less the same 
thing, as if their musics had all along been meant for an encounter with each other? Had 
Harrison discovered that, after all, these different musics, which we thought were each 
connected to utterly different systems of significance, were actually only different on 
their surface? Were we just looking at differences of translation after all? On the other 
hand, could this piece really be considered Javanese at all, or was it just another case of 
the Western imagination of the exotic? Was it merely another fantasy?  
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Introduction 
This whole round living world of music—the Human Music—rouses and delights 
me, it stirs me to a “transethnic,” a planetary music. 
Lou Harrison, Music Primer 
 
In much of what follows in this chapter, I will temporarily leave cultural relativism aside, 
and consider Harrison’s own theories of culture. It will be seen that according to 
Harrison’s worldview, the Concerto for Violin, Cello, and Javanese Gamelan makes 
perfect sense because it is simply a demonstration of what he saw as the truly shared 
features of Western and Javanese musics. I will describe how Harrison’s vision of a 
round, connected world of similitudes permitted him to compose in his manner, and I will 
call his compositional method of uniting cultural practices from distant world regions 
“elision.” Harrison saw himself as at a certain point having awakened to “reality,” and so 
I call the view of the world that he constructed his “reality.” I do not imply that this 
constructed “reality” was a fantasy. It is the object of this chapter to scrutinize his 
“reality,” to understand the principles which gave it coherence and the evidence by which 
it staked its claim to validity, and to suggest how Harrison’s compositions can be 
understood as clear and meaningful when taken as a part of this “reality.”   
By what analytical process, or by what process of rationalization, did Harrison 
envision “a Whole Round World of Music” with such clarity, and as a composer how did 
he have the courage to compose that world? I will begin with a brief account of how 
Harrison came to his “reality,” which it seems he held from around 1960 until the end of 
his life. Harrison had experienced a nervous breakdown in New York in the late 1940s, 
and then entered a period of discovery of new principles, culminating in a new cohesive 
worldview starting in 1960. The next two sections will be analyses of what I see as the 
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two primary intellectual tendencies by which Harrison constructed and maintained this 
worldview. First is a grand dualistic scheme by which all world phenomena could be 
understood as in opposition. Second are the ordering schemes by which various musical 
and non-musical ideas the world over could be classified.  
I then examine how both aspects of this “reality” gave rational basis to some very 
idiosyncratic views and a very eccentric style of relating to the world that was by turns 
courageous, defiant, passionate, arrogant, and gracious. In other words, I examine how a 
particular rational process led Harrison to be a non-conformist. In the final section I 
return to a discussion of cultural relativism as it has guided the field of ethnomusicology 
and studies of Javanese music in particular, showing how particular aspects of Harrison’s 
universalism are troubled in light of those findings. Ultimately I am not interested in 
championing either theory of difference, but rather in bringing them into a dialogue that 
exposes the limitations in each. 
As I have read Harrison’s writings after 1960 and considered his compositions in 
light of them, I have become increasingly convinced that his statements are connected by 
a consistent logic. Harrison seems to have successfully cultivated a personal ethos that in 
both its consistency and in its expressivity is highly visible and subject to critique. 
Despite the tremendous variety of materials that Harrison brought to bear in writing 
music, there is a sizable portion of his body of works that display musical and ideological 
consistency and integration, and to an extent are analyzable as a body of mutually 
illuminating documents. Throughout his life Harrison’s knowledge of Asian musics 
became ever more extensive and nuanced, and yet to a great extent his encounters with 
Asian musics served to continually reinforce his worldview, and to increasingly supply 
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confirmation of its foundation upon certain precepts. As such, Harrison’s writings and 
compositions from the last forty to fifty years of his life can to a remarkable extent be 
viewed as variations upon a single theme, which it will be my aim in the following 
sections to analyze. Nevertheless, the analysis that follows should not be read as a 
totalizing “reality” about Lou Harrison.176 
 
The Dawning of a New Reality: Black Mountain College and the influence of Harry 
Partch 
In this section I discuss some of the conditions leading into Harrison’s construction of 
a new “reality.” These include an emotional breakdown in New York in 1947 and a move 
to the rural setting of Black Mountain College in the North Carolina mountains. I discuss 
how Harrison was influenced by books he read while at Black Mountain College, 
foremost among them Harry Partch’s Genesis of a Music. From this work and others 
Harrison drew principles about how music could be understood according to trans-
cultural concepts, ultimately leading to the possibility of understanding musics from 
various distant world regions as alike. 
Peter Garland has described the 1940s as “the peak of Harrison’s involvement with 
modern music. After studies with Schoenberg, the young composer made the then, and 
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still now, ‘obligatory’ move to New York City.”177 Leta Miller has described Harrison’s 
1943 move to New York as 
difficult financially and socially almost from the start, and the noise level was 
overwhelming. On July 9, 1943, Lou wrote to his mother: “I do not like New 
York at all and I am afraid that I will not be able to write a note in the midst of 
this noise and confusion.”178 
 
 Even as his success in New York grew, Harrison suffered from professional 
insecurity and low self esteem. He was also having trouble finding a satisfactory 
compositional voice. As he described in a publication about Carl Ruggles, Charles Ives, 
and Edgard Varèse at the time, he had eclectic musical interests that included the use of 
serial techniques: “Let it be said without ado that the writer is incorrigibly fond of those 
American composers who have variously been called ‘primitives, naives, and 
iconoclasts.’ He is equally addicted to the contemporary Austrian school of 12-tone 
composition…. On rare occasions he is interested in folk music (these are quite rare) and 
more frequently in cultivated Oriental musics as they are available on recordings and a 
few concert performances.”179 Harrison maintained and developed some of these interests 
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throughout his life, but eventually moved away from many of them, including the use of 
12-tone technique in his own compositions.180 
When New York life finally proved untenable, Harrison’s friend John Cage 
encouraged him to seek a change of scenery and a teaching position at the experimental 
school Black Mountain College in rural North Carolina. In his application for a teaching 
position, Harrison sent a curriculum vitae that listed, as would be expected, major 
episodes of his musical training: his studies with Henry Cowell in 1935 and with Arnold 
Schoenberg in 1942. Near the end, in a section headed “Miscellaneous,” was a more 
unusual item: “in 1947 LOST MIND.”181  
As Harrison recalled in later years, the move to Black Mountain was a turning point, 
for him both emotionally and intellectually: 
Black Mountain was very stimulating, much too stimulating in some ways. But I 
formed habits and interests there that have persisted. For example, I can’t live in 
the city anymore. I loathe it. And, uh, I’ve become completely rural minded in 
that sense. And Black Mountain helped in that, and a closeness with nature which 
I had recontacted again after all those… lo, those many years, ten years in 
Manhattan. You know, that’s not…. Well, even dogs leave Manhattan.182 
 
In the decade after he left New York, Harrison’s most fervent intellectual shift was 
the gradual rejection of equal temperament, the division of the octave into twelve equal 
tones that was by then basic to the conventional tonal idiom and to the serialism he had 
practiced in New York. He rather came to embrace just intonation, an approach to tuning 
that permitted various strategies of bringing intervals into precise simple ratios. Other 
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new interests followed: though he had always been interested in non-Western musics, in 
the 1960s he traveled in Asia, and beginning in 1975 he became an avid student of 
Javanese gamelan, spending much of his last twenty-eight years composing for the 
ensemble. Harrison met his life partner Bill Colvig in 1967, and with Colvig built 
instruments, most notably gamelans tuned in just intonation (the Double Concerto that I 
have already described was composed for the set of instruments residing at Mills 
College).  
By about 1960, the teaming, dissonant world of Harrison’s New York years had 
reorganized into something quieter and more melodic: “I have an advantage that many 
people have not had, having to reconstruct a life—the rubble and initial vision of 
realizing that what you had assumed was reality was no longer, that your assumptions 
about reality were different” (italics mine).183 I will hereafter employ this term of 
Harrison’s, this “reality,” which developed with remarkable coherence in the ten years 
following Harrison’s breakdown. He used it to refer to the world as it really was; I use it 
to refer to the world as he constructed it. 
Harrison acquired a copy of Partch’s Genesis of a Music (1949) shortly after his 
breakdown.184 He was most distinctly influenced by Partch’s detailed explanation of just 
intonation and the historical development of the science of tuning in the West (and to a 
lesser extent in China), stretching back to Zarlino and to Ptolemy and further still to 
Pythagoras. Partch told the history of tuning as a story of both development and decline. 
On the one hand, the science of tuning had become ever more advanced through the 
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centuries—in other words, ever more sophisticated solutions were developed to handle 
the difficulties that tuning in pure intervals presented—while, on the other hand, in 
general practice what he viewed as the one correct practice, just intonation, had 
ultimately been drowned out by the most dismal, that of equal temperament. Partch found 
that in his own time the dominance of equal temperament had become so complete that 
few musicians even realized that there could be an alternative, that dividing the octave 
into twelve equal semitones was not in fact simply what tuning was. 
Partch argued that the consonance of a musical interval was a factor of the simplicity 
of the numerical ratio that represented it. The unison 1/1 would be the most consonant 
interval, the octave 2/1 would be the next most consonant, the fifth 3/2 and the fourth 4/3 
would follow, and then the major and minor thirds of 5/4 and 6/5. Actually, Partch only 
used numerical ratios as interval terminology, doing away with terms such as “fifth,” 
“fourth,” and “major and minor thirds,” as well as names for pitches such as C, E and G. 
He regarded the latter symbols as arbitrary, reflective of the sloppy mindset of equal 
temperament, which with such compromised intervals as its “fifth” of 433/289 (an 
approximation), rather than a pure 3/2, had only an arbitrary claim to the quality of 
“consonance.” To Partch it was an “anomaly that we, a mechanically talented modern 
people, should insist on accuracy to the millionth part of an inch in certain precision 
instruments, while we nonchalantly accept at least a seventh of an equal ‘semitone’ as an 
‘inconsequential’ error in music and dismiss mathematical computations as having 
‘nothing to do with music’.”185 
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Partch believed that small-number ratios and “consonance,” a musical quality 
detectable by the “human ear,” were indistinguishable. This amounted to a logical 
collapse of the difference between the objective mathematical properties of sounds and 
their subjective apprehension. He rejected arguments that what was arithmetically pure 
and what people found pleasing might be separate separate, taking the enjoyment by 
some people of impure intervals not as evidence that there might be other viable 
approaches to tuning, but rather of the general state of deafness and irrationality in which 
the majority of humanity existed.186 In this his thinking was self-confirming and non-
contradictable. A “good” ear was one that recognized the beauty of “correct” pure 
intervals and the ugliness of impure ones. The theoretical “correctness” of pure intervals 
was meanwhile confirmed by their enjoyment by a person with a “good” ear.  
For Partch then, composing music became a revitalization of the atrophied organ of 
“the ear” and a perfect reconciliation of intuition and reason. By contrast, the majority of 
the world’s musicians, from whatever tradition they came, had not revitalized their ears, 
had not aligned their reason and intuition, and were ignorant of the truth of just 
intonation. For Partch, there was little benefit to studying the ways musicians actually 
made music, as the investigation would be like an a tour of the world under the shroud of 
an endless night: 
Not until we reach the musical equinox do we find the comparatively measurable, 
the dominant day of precise aural quantities which can be noted in fairly precise 
aural reactions—ratios, consonances, dissonances. In the dominance of night is a 
more ineffable value, in which the seen and the heard are out of perspective, 
distorted by untold ages of prejudice, elusive and illusory, and consequently of 
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less ultimate concern than those qualities that can be discerned through the 
intuitive faculties. (GOM, 6) 
 
Culture, then, in taking part in the shaping of tuning practices, was nothing more than 
prejudice. Culture was not at the very essence of tuning, but rather was like dust, clinging 
to and obscuring pure reason. Properly, intonation would be no more a matter of 
convention than was gravity. If culture was generally a force of delusion and corruption, 
Western culture was particularly bad, because it had become completely enslaved to the 
false ideal of twelve-tone equal temperament. In his devotion to these ideas, Partch was 
both a fundamentalist and an iconoclast: his radical vision, founded on unmovable 
principles, set him in fervent opposition to the musical status quo and emboldened him to 
spread the “truth” by unconventional composing, instrument construction, and the writing 
of his treatise.  
Aside from his interest in just intonation, there was another aspect of Partch’s 
thinking that was echoed in Harrison’s post-1960 thinking. This was his view of many of 
the World’s musical cultures throughout history being essentially the same. According to 
Partch, the “important ancient and near-ancient cultures—the Chinese, Greek, Arabian, 
[and] Indian” had music of the same essential emotional quality, which was “tactile” and 
“corporeal,” as opposed to the “abstract,” “disembodied” quality of most contemporary 
music. The ancient Chinese had roughly the same musical values as did the ancient 
Greeks 17 centuries later (“corporeal”), and again the Japanese of the 14th-century AD. In 
the 1600s, Japanese Kabuki was formed as a revival of the original ideals of Noh, and 
this occurred about the same time as the Tuscan or Florentine reestablishment of the 
Greek ideals. These correspondences were “no mere coincidence,” but rather were proof 
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of the essential unity of human behavior when responding to like developments. Like 
developments yielded further like developments (GOM, 13). 
Harrison’s dualistic division of the world’s musics from 1960 onward was not based 
on precisely the same principles as Partch’s, but nevertheless was likely influenced by 
Partch. The latter, holding that musics alike in one way tended to be alike in many ways, 
developed a history of the world’s musics as divided into these two broad categories of 
“abstract” and “corporeal.” The result of this strict division of the world’s musics into 
two camps was that those on each respective side were drawn into close association. 
“Corporealness” became the dominant characteristic of all music on its side of the fence, 
the side Partch liked and regarded as natural. While he appreciated that all these 
corporeal musics had differences, he viewed those differences as mere surface variations. 
In their assembled unity, the world’s corporeal musics came to exemplify a forgotten 
human truth that Partch would deploy in a fierce polemic against abstract music, which 
included all of the popular and high prestige music of his time.  
The idea that there were trans-cultural principles by which the musics from various 
civilizations could be understood to be the “same” was not new to Harrison. He had 
already been exposed to Cowell’s ideas on musical difference, which I have discussed in 
the previous chapter. Those views would have been corroborated in another text that 
Harrison studied while at Black Mountain: Fox Strangways’s Music of Hindostan 
(1914).187 Strangways’s inquiry took as its point of departure the idea that there were 
inevitable processes by which music developed, and that these could be observed to have 
occurred to different extents in different civilizations. He argued that the study of North 
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Indian classical music opened a window upon European music of the past, the former 
simply not having undergone certain of the processes of development that had occurred 
in the West. India’s was a melodic art uninflected by any concept of harmony, 
representing a stage of the history of musical development that the West had long left 
behind. Since it had no concept of harmony, contemporary North Indian music could be 
understood as persisting in the same state as that of ancient Greece: “here [in India] is the 
living language of which in those we have only dead examples” (p. v). 
Whereas Partch had reduced different musical traditions to exemplars of the qualities 
of “corporeal” and “abstract,” Strangways reduced them to “melodic” and “harmonic.”188 
This meant that if both ancient Greek music and modern Indian music appeared to both 
be “melodic,” they could be presumed to be roughly the same in other respects as well. 
The particular characteristics by which civilizations were categorized were observable, 
repeatable developmental processes with their own inevitable logic: “[in Indian music] is 
melody absolutely untouched by harmony, which has developed through many centuries 
tendencies which have the force of laws; and the examination of these enables us to some 
extent to separate the respective contributions of melody and harmony to the final effect 
in our own music” (p. v). 
It is worth noting that, despite these similarities between Strangways, Partch, and 
later Harrison, there were also some key differences. Strangways’s evolutionist thinking, 
typical of contemporary anthropology in 1914 (Boas’s historically significant challenge 
to evolutionist ideas in The Mind of Primitive Man had been published only in 1911) and 
reiterated by Cowell, was not reiterated by Partch or Harrison, though remnants of it can 
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be found in their references to “cultivated” civilizations and “primitive” peoples. To 
Strangways, any music, wherever and whenever it was made, belonged somewhere along 
a line of development from the most primitive forms to the most advanced (those were 
Western Europe’s). Similarities among historically and geographically disconnected 
musical traditions could be established by determining their equivalent position within 
this single great line of development. These views were widely held among academics in 
the early twentieth century (and as such did not need to be stated in detail in Music of 
Hindostan), and Strangways conveyed them without particular cultural arrogance. If 
European music was more advanced in an evolutionary sense, that was not to say it was 
in every respect superior: as a “melodic” (pre-harmonic) art, North Indian music was 
characterized by a much more sophisticated treatment of melody than was European 
music, and Strangways greatly admired many other aspects of the Indian way of life as he 
understood it. In contrast, Partch, while seeing a general advancement in the 
sophistication of tuning technologies, did not believe in more general cultural 
advancement, but was rather inclined to see history as a story of continuous degeneration. 
As we shall see, Harrison also became inclined toward this pastoralist “pessimism.” 
 
Harrison’s “Reality” Part 1: Similitudes through Dualism 
The knowledge of madness (i.e., that we are Mad), & the Vision of Reason (imagination 
in the light of the former)—the one is Humor, the other is Art. These are the essentials.  
--Lou Harrison, Music Primer  
 
By about 1960, and from then onwards, Harrison’s writings exhibited a dualistic style 
of thinking similar to that of Partch. He developed a totalizing perspective on the 
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“reasoned” and “absurd” aspects of the “reality” in which he lived and was outspoken 
about each. Various forms of pre-19th-century Western music and Asian musics, in which 
Harrison became intensely interested during this period, came to exemplify for him the 
aspects of culture that he regarded as beautiful and sensible. Harrison understood these in 
antithesis with Western culture, which had degenerated into a state of noisy, mechanized 
irrationality. As with Partch’s “reality,” Harrison’s was organized into a grand symmetry, 
in which everything that he held to be good and bad were configured in opposing chains. 
He did not state the existence of these chains; rather what I am describing are the 
tendencies of thinking that can seem to have lain in the background of Harrison’s 
piecemeal statements.  
As with Partch, Harrison would come to understand his world as a system of 
antitheses. Where Partch’s two broad categories had been “corporeal” and “abstract,” 
Harrison’s pairs of antitheses included 
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• Reasoned  Absurd 
• Country  City  
• Quiet   Noisy 
• Ancient  Modern 
• Natural  Artificial 
• Hand-made  Machine-made 
• Just-tuned  Equal-tempered 
• Mind   Gut 
• Small-scale  Corporate 
• Personal  Standardized 
 
Table 2: Harrison’s Chains of Antitheses 
 
Again, while Harrison never put forward this dualistic structuring of “reality” in an 
explicit way, it remained in the background of his thinking and structured his reasoning 
from behind. He noted, for instance, that to “learn to tune & recognize intervals you had 
best go to a country, quiet place.”189 He did not state explicitly the reason that the country 
was the setting conducive to the perception of pure intervals, but the reasoning can be 
reassembled. Harrison found evidence for it in pastoral Ancient Greece, which he saw as 
indeed a quiet, country setting where rational inquiry was valued and just intonation was 
studied. The New York that Harrison had experienced in the 1940s represented the 
antithesis: loud, irrational, and completely taken over by equal temperament. Ancient 
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Greece and modern New York were, in Harrison’s mind, not particular places with 
cultures specific to themselves (as would be the cultural relativist view that I will discuss 
later in this chapter). Rather Ancient Greece possessed timeless attributes in accord with 
nature, which had merely been lost or obscured in modern New York. 
Not only were the qualities possessed by Greece and New York not the two 
particularities of isolated cultures, and not only were those places representative of the 
antithetical properties that arched over all of existence; what’s more, each set of qualities 
went together, they were each other’s preconditions. Anywhere in the world, Quiet, 
characteristic of the Country, could be deduced as a condition critical in the apprehension 
of just intonation, and the practice just intonation would be the natural consequent of 
being in the Country, and so forth. Furthermore, each concept attributed to one side 
yielded an opposing link on the other, so that any series of deductions in this process had 
symmetrical effects. As Harrison had observed, New York was thoroughly taken over 
with equal temperament and the various styles of composition based on it. Thus the 
concept of the City arose in opposition to the Country, as the place where pure intervals 
were not to be found, the place characterized by noisiness. Noisiness could be assumed 
not to be conducive to just intonation, but rather to various forms of cacophony, 
epitomized by equal temperament.  
Harrison’s “trans-ethnic” style, his manner of combining idioms and instruments 
from different parts of the world, was the fruit of this style of thinking. Through their 
mutual antithesis to the absurd, various musical materials from different distant times and 
places could be understood to be the same. This meant that if Javanese gamelan and 
ancient Greek music were both not the same as music of modern urbanity, with its equal 
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temperament and dissonance, its noise and machines, then within the logic of the grand 
binary scheme they would necessarily be understandable as the same. The generation of 
such similitudes was a compositional act in which great distance and difference were 
elided, and the grounds for the sort of harmonious combinations of the Double Concerto 
were generated.  
Harrison was well aware of and freely admitted to Partch’s influence in the 
development of his “reality,” in which all good things came together in perfect accord. In 
the final stanza of Harrison’s 1973 poem, “Lines 11 and 3 On Harry Partch,” he 
described having learned from Partch that beauty’s singular laws were encoded with 
numbers, giving form to nature and to the human body. Beauty was beauty, whether in 
songs or sunlight: 
He joins together our brains and ears and flesh! 
He is of body sweet and slim, 
And as he talks and teaches (fully absorbed) 
He slightly chants his sentences. 
He grasps and holds us in a sweet reminder 
That yes it is our flesh that knows 
All these lovely ratios, as we know also 
Blooms and loves and tunes and sunlight.190 
 
Harrison recollected that his reading of Partch while at Black Mountain was an 
experience of awakening: 
I began to tune up the things that Harry Partch had written about in the book. 
That’s all. And I suddenly discovered that what they tell you, isn’t true. You 
know, it was just one more disillusionment. And since my breakdown, anyway, I 
had been sort of been systematically going back through history to find out where 
we went wrong [as a civilization], or what could be preserved…. And the 
sensuous, or the sensual actuality of intonation is true. There’s just no getting 
around it. And once you experience it and know what it consists in, and of, and 
about it, and obtain some structural visualization of the whole material, the 
                                                 
190
 Harrison, “Lines 11 and 3 On Harry Partch,” 1973, in LHR, 64. 
 
 195 
continuum of tuning and ratios, then you can’t go back, and your whole musical 
life changes.191 
 
Harrison also recalled that at that time he had tuned the Indian scales transcribed in 
Strangway’s book according to principles of just intonation detailed in Partch’s book. He 
had read Virgil’s Eclogues and concluded that the countryside, and not the city, was 
where such tunings would emerge naturally. He found that idyllic quality at Black 
Mountain, and later he would find it again when he settled in Aptos, California. Pastoral 
settings would become important locations for the proper perception of Harrison’s 
reality:  
To learn to tune & recognize intervals you had best go to a country, quiet place 
for a while. When your ears have recovered their powers & are usable again, 
begin to tune the simplest ratios on some suitable instrument…. The poet Herrick 
has said, “So melt me with thy sweet numbers.” These are the numbers. (MP, 5)  
 
Harrison admitted freely that the development of his interests in just intonation, non-
Western musics, and country life was in reaction to what he saw as the factors leading to 
his breakdown in New York. Critically, he did not simply see this change in his interests 
as a realignment of his activities to become more fitting with his private, personal 
inclinations, but rather as a realignment to conform to absolute truths, transcendent of 
himself and of his own culture. It was an awakening to the “reality” of a beautifully 
ordered cosmos and to the absurdity of the actual world in which he lived, which did not 
conform to its principles. Harrison’s universalist vision was in this sense a projection of 
his own experiences of joy and disappointment onto the entire world; the function of the 
chains of antithesis was the rationalization of his personal likes and dislikes.  
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The chains of antitheses curled outward, permitting broad historical generalizations 
and allowing him to tie together things which might not otherwise be thought to be 
related. For instance in the following statement he correlated the historical rise of the 
burning of heretics and equal temperament: “In Christian times Europe insisted that 
everyone had to believe the same religion and in the same way; indeed, burned or killed 
persons not so behaving; and finally music was to have only one intonation, either ditone 
diatonic, or in recent years, equal temperament.”192 Harrison continued this formulation, 
in which the dogmatism behind the Christian killing of heretics was found to be 
historically linked with the dogmatism of total standardization of tuning practices, with 
the antithetic example of the culture of the Greeks, who, Harrison explained, had 
preceded the Christians with a culture of tolerance, intellectual inquiry, and knowledge of 
just intonation.  
On one occasion, Harrison described Roman culture as another antithesis to the 
Greeks’: “Gutty they were, the Romans, very ‘ingroup,’ and musically mindless.”193 The 
“gut versus the mind” was a theme that Harrison reiterated: to compose from one’s gut 
was to compose for sensual gratification and without thought. Composing with thought 
implied the use of just intonation and careful formal planning. Harrison’s student Robert 
Hughes has used this terminology in describing Harrison’s own compositional process: 
Lou seldom starts out with a gut, sensual idea. Rather, he begins with the 
scaffolding, which is usually some kind of logically rational preconceived 
formula that turns loose, as he manipulates the materials into wonderfully 
sensuous, forward-flowing music.194 
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The mind, then, was a universal that transcended culture. In the following, Harrison 
spoke of a unity of reason and aesthetic listening in a manner that was reminiscent of 
Partch. He preached that once the mind and the ear had been connected, it would be seen 
that the beautiful in music transcended culture, represented by the gut:  
It seems to me that to connect our ears with our minds is necessary to musicality, 
and that very few of us have made that connection. It little matters, finally, 
whether our ears are joined to our guts (as the Chinese might say), for, while that 
connection assures our common group “belongings,” and while that enables us to 
function in whatever ways our several ethnics permit to us, and while it makes us 
practitioners of our various arts, it nowise makes us musicians—or, more 
broadly—artists. I refer, in the latter honorific to the concept of an artist as a 
“fixer” and transmitter of ideas—as one who “sets” or firmly and truly orders 
ideas and then transmits them. That certainly requires the mind; and, to us, it 
requires a connecting of the ears with the mind.195 
 
As noted, Harrison did not associate machines with reason, but with the noisy 
absurdity of modern life. Their use in any instance could be understood to demolish 
beautiful values and mental clarity. Following this line of thinking (arising from the 
dualistic schema at the background of all his thoughts) Harrison could state: 
“Predominant practice today is for dancers to use disks and/or tapes while teaching 
classes, and for accompanying concerts….This is Bad Practice—for it trains in lifeless 
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(un-inter-responding) rhythm, and it increases the popular belief that Machines are 
Holy.”196 Machines were the noisy, lifeless forms of the City’s landscape, and it logically 
followed that lifelessness and madness would inevitably come from using them. 
Harrison appreciated Asian musics in part because he found in them an alternative 
from modern, industrialist absurdity and equal temperament. This sense of the difference 
of Asian musics from that which disturbed him came about as much through the 
reasoning by antitheses as through empirically based discovery. Through a combination 
of first-hand study and idealistic projection, Harrison came to regard Asian musics as 
correlated to the pastoral, quiet, just values of the cosmos. “Musical satisfaction,” he 
remarked, “now lies in the Orient, no longer in the Occident.” Harrison’s attitude toward 
Asian musics can be characterized as pastoralist, for he saw in Asia forms of beauty that 
had once been present in the West but now were spoiled.  
Harrison was, at the same time, optimistic that the West was spirited along a path 
toward the rediscovery of the knowledge present in the East and in its own past. In this 
field, success would come by virtue of the West’s own tradition of experimentation and 
inquisitiveness, the same spirit of invention that he considered to have originally 
demolished the West’s own birthright (e.g. “instruments that are simple in construction 
and permit a wide range of artistic use” and similar vocal techniques). “The occidental 
nineteenth century much admired engineers, and with delight accepted instruments from 
them which were fully committed to the false tuning of equal temperament, and which 
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absolutely preclude lyric graces or any necessary subtleties of intonation or expression. 
Engineers will not undo their work, so that artists must.”197  
This was how Harrison saw his task as an artist: as an archeologist and a builder, who 
would restore that which had been demolished. The artist’s role was to excavate the 
rubble hidden under the city streets, researching the art of the pre-industrialized West and 
the contemporary East and reassembling the shards. Though backwards-looking, this 
vision was radical. If reason and beauty were features of the past, they belonged to such a 
thoroughly distant past that their reinvigoration represented a challenge to current 
conventionality and to that which was currently of high status. The history of the West 
was not, as was often ethnocentrically supposed, a history of progress. On the contrary: 
Our studies of the history of intonation give us a new view of music’s progress. 
Instead of the standard European vision of a long, gradual development leading—
with no outside influence—up to contemporary European usages; we discover 
instead—and on the basis of the richness and diversity of virtual materials—an 
extraordinary “bulge of expansion” in two major periods, and regression in other 
times, including our own. The reason for such a new view is, of course, that we 
are considering the musical materials, not just aesthetical fashions.198 
 
(Note that in giving weight to the examination of “musical materials” over past “aesthetic 
fashions” Harrison’s tone here is reminiscent of his teacher Cowell’s.)  
Harrison explained that the two major periods of richness were that of the Classic 
World, ending with a thinning of richness as the “Christians emphasized subscription 
over investigation,” and then that of Classic Islam. The history of the West was, largely, a 
story of decline, and with this he remarked upon the achievements of various non-
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Western cultures, which, now in distinction from the absurdity that dominated in the 
West, could be grouped together among those sites of true cultural advancement: 
I think that those of us with “Western” backgrounds have for some time now held 
a supplementary notion that India and China and Indonesia were “lateral,” 
sidewise and “static” areas flanking “real,” “marching” history. Thus at least 
conjecturally granting their true existence outside the “back-to-forwards” 
movement of the Judeo-Christian-Moslem dramatic pattern. A decision to reckon 
value on the basis of virtual material usage quickly realigns our historic images. 
(p. 65) 
 
The sort of dualism I am identifying as characteristic of Harrison’s thinking by the 
1960s was in evidence earlier as well, though not in as developed a form. It can be seen 
in a letter Harrison wrote to Cowell prior to his breakdown in the late 1940s in New 
York. On Cowell’s advice, Harrison had visited a therapist. Frustratingly, the therapist 
told him that his music was “ivory tower,” not “connected to the forward-moving 
masses,” and would benefit from psychoanalysis. Harrison wrote with bitter humor that 
the therapist was a sort of person differentiable from himself and Cowell: in his arrogance 
and scientism, his ideas were only a few links away from those behind the creation of the 
atomic bomb: 
He has never heard a note of my music either so how can he say boo about it… 
well he did anyway. If he is typical, I must say that there are increasingly two 
kinds of minds today and I am party to the definitely old-fashioned school of 
thought, I will certainly not condone anything in a line of thinking that would lead 
by any diabolical chain of immoralities to such a thing as that horrible atomic 
bomb. I think science is going to either wreck us or we will get some sense into 
our heads.199 (my italics) 
 
Then Harrison’s stridency cooled, and he mused: “picture of young neurotic defending 
his neurosis to the end.”  
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The logic of loose association found in this remark—whereby through certain vague 
resemblances, primarily through antithesis with himself and Cowell, the therapist could 
be regarded as, if not the same as, then very close to the engineer of an atomic bomb—is 
the same as that which he would later more thoroughly develop into a coherent and 
comfortable reality. Here, as later, Harrison linked together things that he found 
distressing—a psychologist’s arrogance and that which led to the atomic bomb—so as to 
more assuredly reject them. Yet, if this habit offered assurance, it might have at the same 
time created additional stress by heaping negative significances onto concerns that would 
have been less troubling if considered in isolation. Dualism, as such, might have not only 
been the way out of Harrison’s emotional problems, but also a contributing factor to his 
original breakdown. 
An even earlier indication of such dualistic loose association is found in a letter 
Harrison wrote to Olive Cowell in 1937, written soon after the imprisonment of Henry. 
Harrison confessed the agony over his mentor’s imprisonment, and conjectured upon a 
division between two sorts of people, “good” and “evil”: 
The day before I left I read of Henry’s sentence, and I want to tell you how it 
agonizes me. This seems not such an unjust world as totally justiceless…. I 
cannot say how this whole thing has affected me, the strength of ignorance and 
predjudice and the prevailing lack of balanced perception in the great mass was 
never so wholly apparent to me before. It seems that all one can do to be good in 
this world is to follow one’s own precepts…. If you take any but your own ideas, 
corruption has begun in that very process. What irritates me more than all else is 
the compromise. Those who haven’t sufficient strength of perception to carry an 
idea thru to its most ridiculous conclusion, and who will go “so far” and then say 
“but after all,” those are the ones who are the forces of evil as I see it. 
Caution, moderation; these are the words that make the thotways [sic] of the 
uncreative. These are the words that corrupt and confuse the creative world, and I 
imagine that there never will be found any understanding or balance between the 
productive and the unproductive types. And the tradgedy [sic] of it all is that the 
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good, productive, penetrative, and holiest life seems by this arrangement to be 
unhappy at best, almost inevitably.200 
 
Though Harrison indicated in the letter that he did not know the precise nature of 
Henry’s crime, it is likely that he knew it was a homosexual offense, and it is possible 
that his anger was not only an expression of loyalty but also an expression of his own 
sense of victimization by a homophobic society. It is possible that his dismissal of 
intolerance in the “great mass” as a force of evil might have empowered him to expel the 
force of popular opinion from himself.201 Yet, here at the age of twenty Harrison did not 
explicitly identify the mass’s evil “thotways” with homophobia, or more generally with 
intolerance, but rather with an unwillingness to follow an idea to its “most ridiculous 
conclusion.” He was, in other words, declaring that rationalism to the point of 
“ridiculousness” was good and creative.  
This may seem to be an odd notion to champion, but it was indeed the style of 
thinking that characterized Harrison’s later reality. And although the harshness and 
woundedness of the letter to Olive Cowell would not remain characteristic, there was a 
pronounced negative side to his universalist sentiments of later years. All points in 
Harrison’s Round World of Music were linked only through mutual antithesis to the 
forces of absurdity. Great distances of time and space, such as that dividing ancient 
Greece and Indonesia, were elided into a cozy, non-differentiated proximity (rather than 
severed by jagged ideological conflict), but only through dichotomization with the 
overwhelming forces. The trans-cultural nature of the good gave rise to the perception of 
corruption, for indeed the perceptible world did not conform to Harrison’s ideals. 
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 For Harrison’s account of being gay in San Francisco during these years, see his interview with 
Winston Leyland, Aptos 1973, reprinted in LHR, 70-84. 
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Meanwhile the presence of corruption was a necessary element against which to define 
the good things and bring them into a seeming solidarity.  
The belief that reasoned musicianship transcended culture permitted Harrison’s 
intercultural manner of composing. Harrison combined materials of distant origins, with a 
degree of indifference to those origins justified by the belief that at root the materials 
were the same. He assembled a composition that exploited those apparent similitudes, 
while allowing the different origins of the materials to remain apparent. Such elision of 
culturally distant musical voices can be seen, for instance, in the titles of the movements 
of the Concerto for Violin, Cello, and Javanese Gamelan (1982). First are the titles of the 
outer movements, “Ladrang Epikuros” and “Gending Hephaestus.” Ladrang and gending 
are both formal structures of Central Javanese karawitan (the gamelan repertory), while 
Epikuros and Haphaestus are the names of a Greek philosopher and a metal-working god, 
that latter perhaps chosen as an appropriate object of homage for hammer-wielding 
gamelan musicians or perhaps as an allusion to the apocryphal story of Pythagoras’s 
discovery of the physics of tuning on blacksmith’s hammers. 
Elisions are apparent in the meter of these two movements, which in its feeling 
hovers ambiguously between Western meter and Javanese karawitan (the music played 
on gamelan). Indeed, the scores Harrison wrote for use by the soloists and the gamelan 
orchestra are not the same: the former conveys the logic of Western meter through staff 
notation, and the latter conveys the logic of karawitan through its conventional cipher 
notation. 
 
 204 
 
Ex. 11: Excerpt from Gending Epikuros, Violin Staff Notation  
 
Ex. 12: The same excerpt, Kepatihan Notation 
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While this sort of elision was powerful as a compositional technique, as a manner of 
representing the world “out there” it could be highly problematic. Many of Harrison’s 
statements were shrouded in a peculiar haze: was he describing the world as it was or was 
he “composing a world” (a phrase I borrow from the title of Miller and Lieberman’s 
book)? As noted, the process of elision (in part through mutual antithesis) could take on a 
life of its own and produce similitudes for which there was no empirical support. Some of 
these Harrison did not directly verbalize, but nevertheless they can be found implied 
among other assertions which were logically founded upon them. I have not, for instance, 
found Harrison to have written in the most direct manner that traditional Indonesian 
music employed just intonation. He implied it, for instance, in the above statement that 
“musical satisfaction now lies in the Orient”: Harrison reasoned that the composer must 
turn to the Orient because of the destruction wrought in the Occident by engineers who 
were “committed to the false tuning of equal temperament.” To suggest that we must 
return to the Orient because of the false tuning of the Occident amounted to an attribution 
of just tuning to the Orient without making the statement in the most explicit terms.  
Harrison also implicitly attributed just intonation to Javanese music in a note 
introducing his 1961 Concerto in Slendro, by describing his “slendro”202 with a series of 
numerical ratios, and remarking that this “slendro” was in “correct ‘just intonation’.” He 
did not explain in what sense the tuning was “correct.”203 Was it correct in the sense of 
“authentically Javanese,” or was it correct in a more absolute sense, with the implication 
that it might be even more correct than slendro found in Java? The meaning of this 
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statement will become clearer in the discussion of Harrison’s modes in the next section. 
What is important here is that at moments Harrison’s “reality” seems to be transcendent 
of the earthly reality: it was not a sticking point that his representations of other cultures 
be in fact accurate, as what he was ultimately seeking to represent was something higher 
and more reasoned than the pettier reality of the actual world. 
The correlation between Javanese gamelan and just intonation does make sense 
within Harrison’s dualistic model of similitudes and antitheses, in which just intonation 
and gamelan were both not products of industrialized modernity, and their similarity was 
established through their mututal antithesis to that modernity (corresponding to equal 
temperament). Stated differently, Javanese music, clearly not belonging to the Western 
tradition of art music or of popular music, could be classified in the alternative category 
of ancient (natural) musics. Therefore it belonged to just intonation and just intonation 
belonged to it. To articulate this process of reasoning probably would not have seemed 
sensible to Harrison, nor would it have felt quite right to state the ultimate conclusion in 
the boldest terms, as there was no direct evidence for it, but the governing dualism 
permitted statements that ultimately confirmed it.204 As noted, the dualism also inspired 
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 Harrison’s sort of dualism is quite like E.T.A. Hoffmann’s as described by Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea 
of Absolute Music, trans. Roger Lustig (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989): 43. Hoffmann’s 
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the physical tuning of gamelans in just intonation and the creative combination of 
Western and Javanese instruments into various consonances in his compositions. 
Late in life Harrison expressed some uncertainty that all tuning practices world-wide 
could really be understood in terms of simple ratios. This was no radical dismantling of 
the reality. Yet it was a subversion: Though Harrison’s meaning is not perfectly clear to 
me, it seems that in a keynote address to the Microtonal Society in 2001 he suggested that 
the idea that just intonation (or was he in fact rather referring to Pythagorean tuning?) 
could explain all the world’s intonations was the same sort of falsehood as the belief in 
the equal-tempered scale. Such would be a refutation of a core tenet of his earlier 
universalism (It is clear from this address that Harrison had not entirely abandoned his 
world view, only that he was admitting a “fracturing” in it): 
I am sure that each of us has a view of “what went wrong” to surround us almost 
everywhere with the dull industrial gray of a global monoculture in twelve-tone 
equal temperament. My own view is fractured. I have the feeling that many over 
the years have hoped that somehow, if a person went far enough in cycling 
fifths—actually true 3:2s—she would find that this simplest tuning pattern of all 
would “transubstantiate” into all the other intervals. Pretending that such is 
possible seems to me one way of entering that wish-fulfillment dream world 
which now pervades music everywhere that “the West” has settled in. The West 
is, of course, Northwest Asia, which is Europe and its satellite cultures. The other 
part seems to me economic. Imagine being able to “mechanofacture”—for there is 
little “manu” in it—rank upon rank of theoretically different instruments, tuned all 
the same, and interchangeable everywhere on the planet. What a supercorporation 
the whole thing implies. And, indeed, to my mind that is what it is.205 
 
Despite the “fracturing,” this quotation exemplified the language that Harrison had 
been employing for decades. He had by that time spent much of a lifetime combating the 
“dull global monoculture in twelve-tone equal temperament,” against industrial 
                                                                                                                                                 
of this unarticulated, dichotomously structured “background” to the point that those correlations and those 
antitheses that were left unstated were nevertheless communicated, intrinsic as they were to the whole. 
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modernity of the 19th and 20th centuries, as he understood it. His battle strategy was to 
construct an appealing universality of everything else: of that which came before (the 
pre-19th-century West), of that which existed outside (Asian cultures), and of that which 
was in rebellion (certain 19th- and 20th-century artists, mostly his own modernist 
colleagues). He had advocated locally made instruments and against “supercorporations” 
for decades. It is unclear whether at this late point he continued to understand his own 
principles as necessarily underlying such hand-made objects, different as they were from 
the standardized, machine-built objects of industrialized modernity. 
For the alert reader, the sorts of broad generalizations about the “East” necessary to 
carry out this strategy will be suggestive of the colonialist thinking described in Edward 
Said’s Orientalism. It is worth saying, however, that Harrison’s manner of thinking was 
in one respect different from that described by Said. This is not because Harrison held the 
East in high regard (which would not in itself set him apart), but more importantly 
because Harrison’s statements were not attempts at constructing clear boundaries 
between a Western “us” and an Eastern “them,” but rather in dismantling such 
boundaries. Even while he deployed his own generalizations, Harrison described a reality 
in which the “us” (the group with which Harrison positively self-identified) was 
configured as opposed to the mainstream of Western culture but not opposed to the East. 
Harrison’s mainstream “them” was absurd, omnipresent and dangerously close; his “us” 
included a community of rebellious artists in the U.S. and peoples on the far end of the 
globe.  
In that sense Harrison’s dualism rejected rather than affirmed the sense of a 
differentiable East and West. His effort at decentering the West, and indeed dissolving it 
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as a concept, is exemplified in his terminology (already witnessed in the statement to the 
Microtonal Society quoted above) by which he turned Europe into “Northwest Asia” and 
America into a “satellite culture” of Europe or on other occasions into “Usonia.”206 
Harrison often placed “the West” in quotes, indicating that, rationally speaking, there was 
no such place. Note how much Harrison’s view is like that of the Orientalists, described 
by Said below, in terms of its dualistic building of opposing chains, and yet how his 
divisions of its “us” and “them” fall along different lines from theirs: 
One of [the historical/cultural circumstances out of which Orientalism emerged] is 
the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality 
is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, 
each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative 
interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of 
“ours” and theirs,” with the former always encroaching upon the latter (even to 
the point of making “theirs exclusively a function of “ours”)…. “Our values were 
(let us say) liberal, humane, correct; they were supported by the tradition of 
belles-lettres, informed scholarship, rational inquiry; as Europeans (and white 
men) “we” shared in them every time their virtues were extolled. Nevertheless the 
human partnerships formed by reiterated cultural values excluded as much as they 
included. For every idea about “our” art spoken for by Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, 
Newman, Carlyle, Renan, Gobineau, or Comte, another link the chain binding 
“us” together was formed while another outsider was banished.207 
 
As will be seen further in the next section, division and ordering were replete in 
Harrison’s schema, and yet they had nothing to do with creating divisions based on 
language or race, but rather had the reverse effect of unifying diverse cultural 
products under a set of trans-ethnic categories. It cannot be denied, however, that 
Harrison’s strategies required him to construct an Orient that suited his own “reality,” 
and in that respect he exemplified the mentality described by Said. 
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The “Reality” Part 2: The Construction of Similitudes through the Hierarchical 
Ordering of Trans-National Musical Concepts 
 
Documented in Harrison’s writings is a “reality” that, besides uniting worldwide 
practices in a dualistic scheme of the “reasoned” versus the “absurd,” also united them in 
a plethora of ordering schemes. These orderings were hierarchical:208 their assemblage 
and classification of world-music concepts were done from the top down, proceeding 
from large abstract concepts.209 The concepts, for the most part, were trans-cultural: the 
exemplars of “pentatonic,” “opera,” and even “Baroque” could be found anywhere in the 
world. Harrison’s biggest compendium of such orderings was the Music Primer, which I 
will discuss below. 
These orderings schemes functioned in part as aids for the composer. For instance, in 
the Music Primer Harrison laid out a classification of melodies as “Base, Middle, & 
Full,” each designating an increasing degree of completeness of a precomposed melody 
and a decreasing responsibility on the part of the performer to add ornamentation (MP, 
11). Elsewhere, toward a transnational ordering of contrapuntal methods, Harrison 
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proposed “Formal” versus “Informal” as the uppermost categories, with subcategories of 
“Imitative” versus “Non-Imitative,” and further subcategories of “Diatonic” and 
“Chromatic,” and so forth on down (MP, 12). He attested that each of these kinds of 
counterpoint “abounds in world musics.” Harrison suggested further that “Differentiated” 
and “Non-differentiated” were useful concepts in the ordering of contrapuntal styles: 
“Some Bach Chorale Preludes & Balinese Gamelan works have voices widely 
Differentiated in style—a rapid, figurative voice counterpoints a slow & vocal chorale, 
etc., while Palestrinian voices all move in a very similar way & are Non-differentiated” 
(MP, 13). 
 
Ex. 13: Chart from Music Primer 
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The ordering scheme in which Bach Chorale Preludes were equated with Balinese 
Gamelan can be taken as exemplary of Harrison’s manner of making practices from 
opposite ends of the globe representatives of larger trans-cultural concepts (in this case 
“Differentiated Counterpoint”). Harrison’s ordering schemes were based not on cultural 
evolutionist theory, but on an alternative vision of the relationships of the world’s musics 
in which culture and nation were in fact relatively unimportant, and cultural 
“advancement” was meaningless.210 As compositional tools, aside from their explicit 
function of systematically enumerating possible compositional techniques, Harrison’s 
hierarchies allowed the discovery of new similitudes among the world’s musics. Whereas 
dualism had permitted the discovery of similitudes through mutual antithesis, ordering 
permitted their discovery through typology.  
Though some of the transnational musical types yielded by these hierarchies were not 
uniquely Harrison’s—he grouped many scales from around the world under the familiar 
category of “pentatonic”211—in other cases the association of elements under Harrison’s 
transnational concepts was inventive. He once remarked upon how certain Korean pieces 
belonged to the category of “Baroque”: “Sujechun (and a few other works—Chn Peh Hyi 
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Mun, and Hae Ryong among them)” employed an antiphonal use of contrasting 
instrumental groups and could thus be categorized with the orchestral groups of the 
Concerto Grosso form. “Actually, Sujechum is a Baroque work, aesthetically, and a very 
great one—a splendid expression in Korea of that last true aesthetic of mankind (which 
was world-wide).”212 
Even Harrison’s pentatonic classifications were eccentric. He adopted the Javanese 
words “slendro” and “pelog” as pentatonic categories referring, not specifically to modes 
from Indonesia, but rather generally to anhemitonic and hemitonic modes respectively 
(modes without and with half-step intervals).213 In the Primer Harrison represented 
various “slendro” and “pelog” modes through the ratios of just intonation. More than 
simply borrowing the terms “slendro” and “pelog” for his system, Harrison implied that 
the Javanese theory behind the terminology was the same as his own: 
Crossing the Pacific on a freighter I began a little list of pentatonic modes, some 
of them already known to me and some of them noted as possibilities for future 
investigation. I suddenly realized that European music theory lacks any usable 
classification or naming system for penta-modes—an astonishing lack, I think. 
During the same trip I also composed a little Violin Concerto for a friend. This I 
wrote in “anhemitonic pentatonic,” modes (only two of them), and, since 
Indonesians use the term “Slendro” to mean “anhemitonic pentatonics,” and, that 
term being shorter and lovelier, I called the piece “Concerto in Slendro.” (MP, 26-
27 
 
For Harrison, it was clear that the Javanese concept of “slendro” was the same as his 
own concept of anhemitonic pentatonics, and, seeing his own concept as of trans-cultural 
applicability, he saw no reason not to likewise use the term “slendro” as a trans-cultural 
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descriptor. Though the reasonableness of this was obvious to Harrison, the critics of 
Concerto in Slendro (1960) did not understand: 
Well—the “Western” critics wrote that my piece was composed in “Exotic 
Indonesian Modes.” Since the two modes concerned are the simplest and most 
widespread modes on the planet, two things were clear: 1) Some critics are deaf. 
2) “Westerners” do not regard it as really possible (or if possible, then fair) for 
other than Europeans to invent or already to have invented good clear theory &/or 
terminology about anything except maybe about religion. (Europeans have never 
invented a major religion.) (MP, 27) 
  
In Harrison’s ordering, all pentatonic scales were represented as varieties of one of 
four categories: “Prime Pentatonic,” “Slendro,” “Pelog,” and “Mixed.” All were 
expressed via numerical ratios; for instance, one version of the “Prime Pentatonic” was 
written 6/5 10/9 9/8 6/5 10/9, each ratio designating a consecutive interval (he also 
provided the ratios between each of the ascending notes and the fundamental, in this case 
1/1 6/5 4/3 3/2 9/5 2/1).214 Harrison called this manner of representing modes via just 
intonation “the only sure demonstration” (MP, 27). His meaning in this statement, as with 
others of its kind, is unclear. Was it that through these simple ratios one was sure of 
getting the most accurate representation of the pentatonics of various cultures, or that one 
was sure of getting a cornucopia of “correct” pentatonics, rather than what might 
characterize actual practice? I believe that Harrison was vague because the point 
remained ambiguous in his own mind, as either a matter of “reality” as it was or (and) as 
he composed it.  
In the realm of Harrison’s compositions, this ambiguity was simultaneously important 
and irrelevant. It was important because in a work like the Double Concerto instruments 
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of different cultural origins were apparently made to truly play a single pentatonic scale 
together in tune, the sort of thing that would be possible if the world’s musicians were in 
fact conforming to Harrison’s pentatonic ordering scheme. It was irrelevant because in 
Harrison’s compositions he himself created both the theory and the music itself, and so 
his ideas on the similarity among different musics, though cloudy in their relation to the 
world’s various musical practices, became a cloudless representation of the fact. The 
Double Concerto premiered on the Mills College gamelan, which Harrison and Colvig 
themselves created and tuned in pure intervals. This, in a sense, settled the issue of 
whether gamelans are tuned with pure intervals, for indeed at Mills College there was 
one.  
Harrison did not specify whether this catalogue of modes, which he said “constitute 
every human’s most important tonal inheritance” (MP, 27), had been discovered via 
observation (field work) and then organized inductively into categories or if they had 
been developed by mathematical deduction and then attributed to various cultures after 
the fact. I suspect it was a combination of the two, with more of the latter than the former. 
What is certain is that Harrison was not interested in the theories behind intonational 
practices other than his own. It would have been out of character for him to have called 
non-Western understandings of intonation “irrational,” but he nevertheless did voice his 
indifference on the subject. In front of a mixed assembly of Asian and Western musicians 
at the 1961 Tokyo East-West Conference, he announced his disinterest in local, 
“magical” understandings of intonation: 
Now the Westerner will tell you that the notes are C, D and E. The Indian says, 
“the cry of the peacock and the trumpet of the elephant” (or some such): the 
Chinese indicates the “tones of the Emperor and his Prime Minister”—or 
whatever. All alike are magical names, they give no information. But when 
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Ptolemy said, for Syntonon Diatonon, 10/9-9/8-16/15-9/8-10/9-9/8-7/15 [sic], he 
gave an analog of the true events—and so we may tune this tuning precisely as he 
did then in Alexandria, as it sounded through the beautiful museum there.215 
 
As seen, similarly with Harrison’s dualistic reality, in which two things that might 
seem to be separated by a great chasm of difference could be collapsed together via a 
mutual antithesis, Harrison’s ordered reality connected dissimilar concepts by placing 
them in a common category. This led to some highly original forms of argument. In one 
case, Harrison put this logic to a pragmatic end in a plea for preservation and expansion 
of the Chinese opera in the U.S.. On a large, elaborately calligraphied sheet of paper, he 
called for greater financial support for the suffering art form. Chinese opera was one of 
two of the world’s operatic traditions, and as such to allow the art, presently struggling, to 
die because of financial troubles in the richest nation in the world would be worse than 
criminal: it would be “nonsense.”  Integral to Harrison’s argument was the art form’s 
status as Opera, a category that transcended nationality. Harrison reasoned that Opera had 
two sub-categories, “Chinese” and “Western,” and since both were practiced in the U.S. 
both could legitimately be called American. American Opera in all its forms must be 
supported.216 
A few ordering schemes not already described include nine ways of varying a motive; 
two ways of handling intervallic content (“Strict Style” and “Free Style”); three varieties 
of rhythmic modes (Hindu, Islamic, and European medieval); a catalogue of forms 
(especially dance forms); four motivations for composition (voluntary, suggested, 
requested, and commissioned); and three ways of using the Fibonacci sequence. Chinese 
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opera was the world’s most “complete musical theatre,” because it fulfilled every sort of 
text-musical relationship: “Plain speech, unaccompanied. Plain speech accompanied. 
Rhythmitized speech unaccompanied. Rhythmitized speech accompanied. Song 
unaccompanied, etc., up to & including Chorus accompanied” (MP, 27) 
Harrison’s organizational impulse at one point led him to propose a world center for 
world music. At the 1961 East-West Conference in Tokyo, he drafted a description (not 
published in the proceedings) of a rather large building that would house musicians from 
all the world’s traditions, particularly the “civilized” ones. The problem to be addressed 
was that these groups were, at the present moment, metaphorically divided into “four 
large music rooms,” meaning that, “Although the musicians from the Sino-Japanese, the 
European, the Hindu, and the Islamic rooms are indeed on speaking terms, still, each 
knows only a bit about the knowledge and the traditions of the others.” Harrison’s 
institute would break up these cultural divisions, and instead would reorganize the 
civilized world’s musical knowledge into “1) a Mode Room, 2) a Library (for books, 
printed music, and sound-recordings), 3) a Workshop—for theory, techniques, and the 
entire instrumentality--, 4) a print shop-for the spreading of the knowledge of the 
institute, and by those knowledges to help the less evolved musical cultures towards their 
natural flowering, if they would want that.”217  
Later, Harrison described his idea for the mode room in greater detail. It would be a 
place where one could study “all the various musical modes that mankind has made in the 
course of history” in an ordered way, as if all peoples in world history had been 
collaborating in a single great project of mode construction. The mode room would be 
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“the most important thing musically” he would ever do, and would function in the 
following way: 
What I had in mind was a set of drawers. For example, you could pull a drawer 
and there would be Ptolemy’s intense diatonic. Then you would have bars, or 
tuning forks, for an octave. Somewhere in the room there should be a harp or a 
large instrument which you could tune up over many octaves to really study its 
characteristics and be able to compose on it. Then there should be a big book 
which should tell you when the mode was first written down, or where it was first 
discovered, or what its history in diffusion among people was.218 
 
There were varying degrees of clarity as to the derivation and intent of these 
orderings. Was Harrison prescribing the rigors whereby a good composition and a good 
compositional career might be fashioned? Was he logically determining the already set 
rules by which Nature governed the world of music, or at least would if human 
irrationality didn’t intervene? Was he representing practices that were plainly observable 
in the real world, facts gathered through fieldwork? Generally he kept such distinctions in 
a haze. Indeed Harrison’s thinking maintained little differentiation between the 
prescription of correct action, the deduction of rational truths, and the empirical 
observation of an “out there” reality. These orderings were presented both as fruitful 
approaches for the composer to get a methodical hold of his resources and also as logical 
orderings of the world of music, representations of a musical reality that was “out there,” 
ultimately as demonstration of the rationality that governed that reality and made music 
into a bond among humans. 
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Rational Eccentricity 
“Music is emotional mathematics. As a matter of fact, it is rational intervals that grip you 
and emotionally stir you, not the surds of equal temperament, which are from deafness.” 
      --Lou Harrison, from interview with RK 
As he had sworn to Olive Cowell when he was twenty, Harrison had indeed 
unwaveringly followed his “own precepts,” carrying many “thru to its most ridiculous 
conclusion.” His inventive understandings of the world of music, besides lending a 
particular illumination to various things musical and providing the similitudes that 
permitted his method of musical composition, also severed him from established modes 
of thought and granted him creative freedom. It enabled a wholesale rebuke of 
conventionality that maintained such absurd values as, for instance, that of technological 
advancement. Harrison had rationally and thoroughly remodeled “reality,” and in doing 
so had turned the concept of “advancement” on its head. He had also made nonsense out 
of such an idea as the superiority of European classical music, having shown that the 
high-status music of the concert hall was mostly absurd, and that anyway there really was 
no such place as “Europe,” only Northwest Asia.  
Standardization, mass production, and equal temperament, while themselves 
components of an ideology of hyper-organization, had no position within Harrison’s 
system and were understood as features of the absurdity that saturated and dominated the 
modern world. For all of its regulation, modern society and city life in particular became 
merely a jumble of irrational numbers, or “surds”: “From the Latin, ‘Surd’=’Deaf’” (MP, 
7). This label of “Surd,” as a designation of absurdity in both the field of mathematics (an 
irrational number) and of perception (deafness) became the most searing criticism in 
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Harrison’s vocabulary. It signified not only how maddened mainstream culture was but 
also how insignificant. 
The Music Primer is both Harrison’s richest compilation of orderings and a testament 
to his eccentricity in its fullest flower (it presents most of the ordering schemes I have 
described so far). Harrison’s anticonventionalism is apparent in its very production. The 
calligraphied text has no table of contents, no introduction, and all together little apparent 
organization (even the treatises of other bohemian composers such as Partch and Cowell 
were conventional in their layout and tone). The lack of organization is perhaps 
surprising given Harrison’s love of ordering, and given the many orderings that the 
Primer sets forth, yet it seems that, having established the ordered coherence of so many 
musical concepts, the Primer itself was free to express a delight in disorder. Rather than 
offering a succession of linearly developing ideas, the Primer offered a series of 
seemingly unconnected (though in Harrison’s “reality” deeply connected) “Items,” the 
flowerings of his “wild civility.”219 Harrison declined to exclude ideas that might be seen 
as ideas irrelevant to a compositional treatise, and he declined to divide types of 
knowledge into conventional categories. The Primer is rather an assortment of vaguely 
relating compositional methods, observations about transnational music practices, and 
gracious reflections on life and art.  
Among the Primer’s items are an observation that children studying fractions in 
school ought to be helped to tune them (page 5); that composers ought to write a version 
of every vocal work in the international language of Esperanto (page 22); brief but 
detailed instructions for the owner of a copy of the Music Primer on how to color in the 
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boxes that precede each item—including suggestions on the possible order of colors and 
the choice of paints (pages 38-39); an observation that “’Modern life’ is high-decibel 
chaos, in smog” (page 44); and a list of 19th-century geniuses that included many social 
renegades who created their ideas and materials from scratch, but no composers: “Morris, 
Blake, Zamenhof, Whitman & maybe Dolmetsch—Darwin too, & Thoreau” (page 41).220 
In one glowingly gracious reflection Harrison, rather than describing the qualities of 
beautiful music, marveled at the blessing that there was music at all:  
The miracle is not that so much music exists, nor that so much of it is beautiful—
but, rather, that it exists at all. Most music is produced by some fluke of nature—
harpsichord jacks just barely pluck & then repass the string, bows just barely pull 
the strings & then proceed, the plucked string may balk or buzz, even vocal 
chords grow hoarse & raw. Reeds may or may not vibrate, flutes may wheeze or 
refuse, lips lapse infirm! Thank heavens that anything works when it does—& the 
musicians too! (MP, 19-20) 
 
In another passage, which I can only imagine to be partially tongue-in-cheek, Harrison 
gave an idiosyncratic explanation of twelve-tone technique. First, he declared that 
twelve-tone was a method of composing with “but a single neume (or melodicle).”221 
Melodicles were one of Harrison’s early terminological inventions, similar to the concept 
of neums that he may have received from Cowell. One used melodicles as fragments that 
build melody through their transposition, retrograde, inversion, and so forth. This 
statement suggests that at the time he wrote the Primer, Harrison had elided his old 
concept of “melodicle” with “neume” and “twelve-tone row.” 
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Then, with mischief perhaps, Harrison made a more startling assertion about 
serialism: 
Mr. Schoenberg’s excellent ear early informed him that there is no tonality in 
equal temperament (only the octave is a good interval). Being a European, & 
sharing in Europe’s heavy investment in equal temperament, it did not seriously 
occur to him simply to retune. He invented instead a way of putting some order 
into an essentially chaotic affair by arranging an order of succession through the 
unrelated pitches (while systematically avoiding the only related ones—the 
octaves). Thus, he substituted an order of succession for a hierarchy of 
relationships. If one is going to have to cope with twelve tones in equal 
temperament then his method is one very good way of doing so. (MP, 15)  
 
This account of the motivation for the twelve-tone technique was clearly quite unlike 
Schoenberg’s own conception and different from that likely held by any twelve-tone 
composer. Harrison creatively departed from the traditional, insider (he had himself been 
an insider once) conception of serialism, offering instead a reworking of the idea within 
his own “reality.” He employed his own terminology, so that the tone row became a 
“melodicle,” and the complex motivations for serialism’s invention became a simple 
combination of dissatisfaction with tonality under equal temperament and a typically 
European failure of vision. This statement serves as demonstration of how distorting and 
inventive were Harrison’s configurations of others’ practices. I believe that Harrison felt 
sincere admiration for Schönberg, that he intended nothing back-handed about the above 
description of his former-teacher’s technique. As we have seen, he could be similarly 
respectful and yet uncompromising in his representations of Asian musics. 
 
Another “Reality” from Cultural Relativism 
Contrasting with Harrison’s way of viewing the world’s musics, in which all were 
understandable according to certain trans-cultural concepts, is another paradigm that has 
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emerged in cultural thinking in the twentieth century and been of great importance for the 
field of ethnomusicology. I will call that paradigm cultural relativism and will define it 
here in such a way as to serve my present purpose. This is not the cultural relativism that 
I discussed in the previous chapter on Cowell, which was actually shaped by positivist 
and evolutionist ideas. Cultural relativism as I define it here has been more influential in 
ethnomusicology since the field’s formal creation in the mid-1950s and as will be seen it 
continues to be evidenced in ethnomusicological publications.  
Corresponding to the “cultural” and “relativism” parts of its name, there are two 
principal aspects to this cultural relativism that are only fully coherent when considered 
together. First is the concept of “a culture” as a group with members and usually a 
location. Culture in this sense is both integrated, meaning that its various forms of 
expression are understood as part of a larger unity, and bounded, meaning that its 
members’ forms of expression differ from those living outside of the cultural area. 
Roughly, this cultural relativism regards people within the cultural area as the same as 
one another and differentiable from those outside of it.  
Second is the notion that for members of the cultural group the meaning of cultural 
practices is constituted exclusively in relation to other practices of the same culture, and 
that cultural practices have no meaning beyond this internal constitution. This aspect 
carries implications for both research methodology and values. In terms of methodology, 
the researcher is challenged with drawing the operative concepts for the interpretation of 
meaning of a given practice or product (such as music) from within the culture itself, 
rather than from any external source. In terms of values, the “goodness” or “badness” of 
any cultural practice or product is to be understood according to modes of evaluation 
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native to the culture itself. This aspect of cultural relativism has been especially 
controversial, as it relates to ethical values (is Nazism to be understood as valid within 
the context of German culture?) At the same time, the relativity of aesthetic values to 
culture has been largely accepted among ethnomusicologists (at least in print). It is this 
latter sense of the relative nature of values that has been most significant for 
ethnomusicology. 
The development of various versions of cultural relativism and its centricity in 
modern anthropological thought is often attributed to Franz Boas and his students, 
including Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Melville Herskovitz. Herskovitz was one 
of the first to give formal articulation to cultural relativism.222 Writing in the first decades 
after World War II, he championed the principle at a moment when it was both becoming 
highly influential in the field of anthropology (and in the new discipline of 
ethnomusicology) and was coming under attack as morally permissive in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust. In this climate Herskovitz attempted to make clear what cultural relativism 
was and was not. To him it was methodological: Anthropologists were to be aware of 
their own cultural biases in conducting field work. It was not moral: Cultural relativism 
did not command the tolerance of any action as “good” if it only conformed to the 
definition of “good” within its cultural context. 
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Similarly to Harrison’s brand of universalism, Herskovits’s cultural relativism 
opposed evolutionist hierarchy, and was intended to deepen capacities of tolerance. There 
the similarities ended. With the methodology of cultural relativism, the anthropologist 
was to be aware that he/she too belonged to a culture, and therefore would inevitably 
bring his/her own cultural biases into the understanding of other cultures. Above all, the 
anthropologist would have to be extremely cautious in the declaration of universals, 
which Herskovits argued often turned out to actually be absolutes—not ideas and 
preferences everywhere held, but rather the projections of the Western researcher. In fact, 
according to Herskovits, it was not only ideas and values but even sensory perceptions of 
reality that were influenced by culture, and therefore even a simple empirical observation 
by the researcher might not match that made by his research subjects. Culture went so far 
as to affect seemingly fundamental experiences of taste, color, pain, and time. While the 
search for universals was key to the Herskovits’s anthropological project, he held that 
more often than not the pronouncement of universals was ethnocentric.  
From the cultural relativist perspective, Chinese opera has everything to do with 
Chinese culture, and Western opera has everything to do with Western culture. While the 
two may become unified for convenience by the term “opera,” they cannot be 
meaningfully understood as of a common type. There is no transcultural 
musical/theatrical category of activity to which they both belong. Neither is there a 
transcendent, non-culturally defined field of musical values by which they can both be 
appreciated. In considering foreign objects and practices, it is culture that must be 
prioritized, not “universal” concepts that, in fact being of Western origin, function to 
conceal the fundamental differences among cultures. 
 226 
Once, when pressed in an interview to give a definition of world music, Harrison 
responded, “well, music is music, no matter where you find it.”223 Perhaps the most 
radical conceptual revision arrived at by cultural relativism in Ethnomusicology has been 
the antithesis of Harrison’s view. It has been argued that when studying non-Western 
musics the very concept of “music” must be considered an external imposition on 
disparate practices that can only be properly defined from within their individual cultural 
contexts. In other words, not only are particular musical aesthetics culturally contingent, 
but the very thing we call music is a concept contingent to, invented by, Western culture, 
and its recognition in the practices of other parts of the world is at best a case of mistaken 
identity. Judith Becker, for instance, has argued that the organization of both musical 
time and melody in Javanese music are best understood in relation to other Javanese 
organization principles, such as those of the calendrical system, and not according to 
conventional understandings of “tune” that the Western researcher is likely to bring to the 
field. She herself arrived at this insight only after years of careful and focused study of 
gamelan “in its own culture”: 
Only after several years of performance of Javanese gamelan music, and research 
into gamelan music, did I begin to suspect that the underlying assumptions of this 
music, the way this music is conceptualized, have little in common with the 
concepts underlying the music I grew up with. I had always assumed that “music 
was music,” anywhere in the world, that musicians were musicians all over the 
world, and that in spite of surface differences in tone, texture, rhythm, meter, 
melodic contour, etc., all music derived from common sources, that musicians all 
over the world used the same kinds of mental processes to produce their melodies. 
I now feel quite sure that this is not the case, that there is not an abstract “universe 
of music” which becomes manifest in different ways in different cultures, and the 
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term music is a rather sloppy cover term applied to acoustic phenomena which are 
the result of any number of different mental processes and conceptualizations.224  
 
In ethnomusicology, the introduction of cultural-relativist knowledge has often 
functioned in critique of concepts held to be universal. Becker’s challenge to the 
universal concept of music is one example. Another, of much significance here, is Mark 
Perlman’s critique of the notion that just intonation is a natural tuning system and that it 
guides the tuning of gamelans in Java. Perlman presented his argument in an article titled 
“American Gamelan in the Garden of Eden.” By this title I understand him to mean that 
in the hands of certain modernist composers, foremost among them Lou Harrison, 
gamelan had been woven into a Western pastoral mythology that had nothing whatsoever 
to do with its role in Java.225  
Harrison had given us gamelans in just intonation, by constructing them, composing 
for them, and making statements suggesting, though never in the most direct terms, that 
just intonation is a proper characteristic of gamelan. In response, Perlman, who has 
interviewed musicians and gamelan makers in Central Java, asks us to examine the 
principle of just intonation alongside another intonational principle, the Javanese embat. 
He tells us that it is embat that properly accounts for Javanese tuning, and not the 
Western, supposedly trans-cultural principle of just intonation. Whereas just intonation 
proposes a single intonational ideal based on numeric ratios, embat proposes valuing the 
unique intervallic contour possessed by each set of instruments. Any given gamelan’s 
embat is particular and irreproducible. While embat is certainly not the same as equal 
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temperament, neither does it function as the antithesis of equal temperament in the way 
that Harrison viewed just intonation.  
Perlman’s contrasting of just intonation with the individuality-oriented embat makes 
the former comes to seem rigid (as rigid as the equal temperament Harrison rebels 
against). One might conclude that, whereas just intonation is founded on a single 
principle (the use of the simplest ratios intervals possible), the aesthetic underlying 
Javanese embat is without principles, similar to personality.226 Personality is unique to 
each individual, and that uniqueness is one of the positive things about personality. It can 
be said that some personalities are more pleasant than others, and yet there could never be 
a single principle that defines the goodness or badness of personalities, nor a formula 
from which good personalities could be derived, for such would run counter to 
personality’s very essence as unique. In Java, then, each gamelan could be said to have a 
personality, the uniqueness of which is valued and which cannot be understood or derived 
through any formulaic method, including that of just intonation.227  
Cultural relativism, as I have described it, is important to Perlman’s articulation of the 
case. In relativizing Harrison’s values on intonation by contrasting them with embat, his 
stated purpose is not to refute just intonation but to show how in each case the “discourse 
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of intonation can be shown to embody the preoccupations of the culture that produced it.” 
Discourses, Perlman explains, “reflect wider themes of each society.” Perlman argues 
that, though Harrison might seem to some to be a dissident of Western culture, he was 
actually “clinging tenaciously to ideas deeply embedded in Western music history (read: 
as opposed to values evident on the culture’s surface)” 228 and was merely projecting 
those ideas onto Javanese gamelan.  
Perlman’s primary aim is to show how the “juxtaposition of elements from two 
radically different music-cultures throws the deepest presuppositions of each into bold 
relief.” He does not argue that composers such as Harrison are wrong to create gamelans 
in just intonation, only that we must understand that they are doing something that is 
“Western” and not “Javanese”:   
As a student of traditional Javanese gamelan music (karawitan), I find this 
[association of just intonation with the gamelan] an odd superposition of musical 
concerns. Music in Java has nothing to do with just intonation—not in its interval 
usage, not in its theory, not in its intellectual context. By impressing just intervals 
into their gamelan, American composers, consciously or not, have infused a 
Western soul into a Javanese substance.229 
 
Leaving aside the question of whether just intonation is in any sense appropriate for 
gamelan, I would like to turn to another absolute held by Harrison that could be similarly 
relativized. That is Harrison’s belief in “quiet” as an absolute good, and “noise” as an 
absolute bad, which led him into what Leta Miller has termed a “battle against noise 
pollution.”230 The questions of what sorts of noises are desirable and what are not, what 
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decibel levels are desirable, in what locations, and to what extent one person ought to put 
up with the noise of another person, are of quite broad societal concern compared with 
the issue of which system of intonation is the best. With noises generated by machinery 
and amplified music defining the modern soundscape, the notion of there being such a 
thing as “noise pollution” has become widespread in the U.S.. Can “peace and quiet” be 
regarded as a universal good? Do our aural environments need protection from noise in 
the same sense that a river needs protection from man-made pollutants? Do we have a 
right to peace and quiet, or conversely a right to be noisy? 
I do not really seek to answer these complicated questions, only to suggest how 
research informed by cultural relativism may be used in critique of Harrison’s views. His 
notion of Quiet as an absolute good can be understood as of a piece with his belief that 
the pleasantness or unpleasantness of musical experiences was dependent purely upon the 
sound itself, not upon the person listening. Subjectivity was not important to the 
apprehension of beauty: once everyone had “linked their minds and their ears,” all would 
perceive beauty, intrinsic to sounds themselves, in the same way. Beauty was a feature of 
sound, and “the ear” was merely a tool of that intrinsic beauty’s perception. Such an 
idealized human ear in its natural and healthy state would be attuned to receive pleasure 
only from rational sounds.  
Just as cultural knowledge and individual personality were not factors in the 
determination of good intonation, neither were they factors in the determination of good 
volume. The following, from an interview in 1994 with Miller, is Harrison’s description 
of the displeasure that he and Colvig experienced when attending a loud concert: 
I concluded that people who live in cities now are deaf. We’re country boys; we 
don’t need that. The anxiety aroused by that amount of sound was such that I 
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could no longer have the kinetic response. I could see that there were humans on 
the stage, and they were doing things, but my body did not respond. The ear was 
cut in two. Such loud-tech nonsense represents the contemporary way of 
impressing one with the establishment. All the corporate power is there. I don’t 
need it.231 
 
Harrison needed to make little distinction between his private, momentary experience at 
the event (“anxiety,” no “kinetic response,” “my body did not respond”), his enduring 
personal preferences (“We’re country boys; we don’t need that”; “I don’t need it”), and 
external realities (“people who live in cities are deaf” and “loud-tech nonsense” 
represents “corporate power”), as the three had no effective difference within Harrison’s 
internally logical “reality.” The most interesting utterance in the above quotation is “The 
ear was cut in two,” for in its very grammar, the addition of the direct article “the,” it 
conflates the personal and the universal. Taken it in the context of Harrison’s reality, we 
may understand that there was no logical distinction between his ear and “the” universal 
ear, and as such his momentary experience and that of everyone (or at least everyone with 
a sensible ear; remember that “deafness” and “absurdity” were the same to Harrison) was 
logically the same.232 
Given Harrison’s love of Javanese gamelan and his view of Quiet as an absolute 
good, it is perhaps ironic that anthropologists and ethnomusicologists working in Java 
have found a cultivated aesthetic of “noisiness,” and indeed interpreted that aesthetic as 
important to gamelan. They have described a Javanese love of noise that, far from having 
been introduced with modernization or corporatization, is actually an aspect of traditional 
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culture. They have observed that the Javanese have long tolerated and even valued a level 
of noisiness and busyness that exceeds that of normal Western social boundaries, that 
Javanese communities, whether in cities or villages, have a tradition of cultivated 
noisiness.233  
This Javanese concept of ramé, or, in a word, lively noise, presents a challenge to the 
idea that the extent of tolerance for and enjoyment of noise and loudness is universal. 
Sarah Weiss describes ramé as a value evident in both the most modern and traditional 
forms of Javanese expression: 
The cacophony of the Javanese world can be overwhelming to some, yet it is 
highly valued by most Javanese people. The aural atmosphere of the preparation 
for any kind of celebratory event should be ramé, or bustling and lively (in 
Javanese). Multiple sound sources are integral to the creation of the keraméan 
(keramaian, Indonesian) of the moment, including the combined airing of heavily 
amplified radio or cassette music—often from several sources—impromptu 
speeches, the sounds of hawkers, the increasingly organized sounds of multiple 
groups of musicians as they prepare to perform. Traditional Javanese gamelan 
music, or karawitan, is itself aurally ramé in the sense that there are many musical 
events happening simultaneously in the texture of the music. The listener’s ear is 
not drawn primarily to one predominant melody and then to the 
accompaniment.234 
 
Based on his observations while doing fieldwork in Java, R. Anderson Sutton has argued 
that in the playing of digital and analogue recordings it is not just desirable volume that is 
culturally relative, but also desirable distortion. He describes how, whereas as a 
Westerner he had once assumed the absence of distortion was an absolute value for 
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recordings, in fact in Java he came to see that both the ability to perceive distortion and 
the valuing of it were culturally determined: 
But is “distortion” a culturally relative notion? To some extent, I believe it is. 
Without having conducted controlled experiments myself, I am unable to present 
statistical evidence in support of my belief. However, on a number of occasions 
Javanese friends commented to me on the “good” (apik, bagus) or “clean” (resik) 
quality of cassette recordings that I judged to be somewhat distorted—although 
less so than many other recording I heard in Java. The threshold of distortion 
perception—and certainly the threshold of distortion tolerance—would seem, then 
to be variable in human experience, conditioned by various environmental and 
cultural factors. Even if one accepts the notion of such variability, however, it is 
clear that the degree to which high volume settings alter sound quality in Java is 
unquestionably noticed by most Javanese listeners, and yet it does not appear to 
bother most listeners.235 
 
As seen in the above quotation by Weiss, ramé has been used to give a larger cultural 
frame to the extreme polyphonic floridness of Central Javanese gamelan: gamelan is one 
phenomenon of noisiness among others, including hawkers, impromptu speeches, and, 
most significantly here, “heavily amplified” music. Sutton associates gamelan aesthetics 
with the “busy” patterns of batik cloths, and again with heavily amplified music, often 
from multiple sources.236 The music of Central Javanese gamelan is, from within this 
frame, not an expression of Harrison’s quiet, regular, pastoral values, but rather of the 
noisy, teaming chaos (so it can seem to a visitor) characteristic of a Javanese marketplace 
or festival. From this angle, it would seem that gamelan in Java is performed with the 
same spirit as the blasting of recorded music for an entire neighborhood. 
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Conclusions 
As a theory of culture, cultural relativism ought to be able to account for a cultural 
phenomenon such as Harrison’s Double Concerto. Yet, cultural relativism’s view of 
meaning as constituted within the integrated and bounded context of “a culture” makes 
conceiving of the piece quite difficult. First, there is the problem of Harrison’s being 
influenced by ideas from “outside” of his culture, most obviously in his use of Javanese 
gamelan. Cross-cultural influence as such is difficult to account for coming from the 
cultural-relativist viewpoint that I have described. Second, Harrison seems to have 
worked vigorously to sever himself from many of the practices of his own culture, such 
as its dominant preference for equal temperament. The idea that a member of a culture 
might not exhibit the tendencies of the culture is also difficult to conceive of from the 
cultural-relativist perspective, sometimes forcing an interpretation of the individual’s 
ideas as either idiosyncratic or, as Perlman argues, as actually exemplary of those of their 
culture on a more “deeply embedded” level than is obvious.  
Though in this chapter I have focused my critique upon Harrison’s reality, I hope also 
to have at least suggested that his Double Concerto presents something of a challenge to 
cultural relativism. As a theory of difference, cultural relativism has its own limitations 
based on its way of organizing difference and non-difference. Whereas Harrison had 
severed musics into two types depending on their positive or negative relationship to 
certain absolute values, cultural relativism divides all cultures from one another, and 
views any given music as in some way integrated into the whole of a single culture (or 
else is left with regarding it as idiosyncratic). This is one reason I find Harrison’s hybrid 
compositions such as the Double Concerto to be so interesting, and for me it is an aspect 
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of their beauty. Not only do they present a challenge to myopic ethnocentrism by 
introducing non-Western idioms into concert music settings; pieces like the Double 
Concerto also challenge our supposedly more objective cultural relativism. 
It is also worth observing the extent to which Harrison’s universalism and cultural 
relativism have had the same goals. Both combat ethnocentrism, though by quite different 
means. Harrison’s universalism diminished the significance of ethnic difference: It 
demonstrated that ethnocentrism was a mistake because the ethnic differences that it 
supposed were in fact mere surface variations, ripples upon an ocean of unity. Meanwhile 
cultural relativism has combated ethnocentrism by amplifying the importance of 
difference, insisting that values are culturally contingent and thereby removing the 
grounds for passing absolute judgment on the practices of others. (Nor, argues Renteln, 
does cultural relativism imply all cultures’ values to be “equally valid,” for to claim so 
would necessitate that there be a scale for assessing value that lies outside of culture.) 
From Harrison’s view, cross-cultural respect was established through recognition of 
similitude, the fundamental positive regularities that connect all humans. Meanwhile, for 
cultural relativism respect may come through recognition of previously unrecognized 
terms by which people of different cultures make their claims to dignity. Finally, as 
Harrison’s reality enabled examination, critique, and even a personal break from values 
he felt to be oppressive, so has cultural relativism been often employed in challenges to 
hegemony.  
It must finally be restated that, though I have argued that Harrison created his own 
“reality,” I do not think he was living a fantasy. Harrison’s reality was no more a fantasy 
than the next person’s. It was a good-faith attempt at coming to terms with a complex 
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world, of which he had an unusual broad knowledge. Rather than holding Harrison’s 
worldview up to impossible standards of objectivity, it may be best to assess it in terms of 
its effects. What can be said here is that, as Harrison’s reality was not backed by 
significant institutional power, the force it did have was counter-cultural. On a personal 
level for him it was liberating and productive. It was exceptional not in its deviation from 
objective truth, but in the extent to which it carried through on its own terms of 
coherence, seamlessly coordinating every aspect of Harrison’s knowledge, whether 
musical, ethical, scientific, or political. Harrison’s enormous body of creative works was 
the “reality’s” outpourings, which communicated it and became material evidence for it. 
It is thanks to this legacy, Harrison’s poems, calligraphied treatises, aluminum gamelans, 
and his compositions, that we can so clearly hear his world of integrated and perfected 
reason and intuition, his “Whole Round World,” as if through his own ears. 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter V: Conclusions: Reflections upon Modernism as a Peculiar Style of 
Concern with Difference 
Throughout this dissertation I have used certain terms that were also used by these 
composers, though sometimes not in precisely the same ways. One is modernist. All of 
the composers I have studied identified at one point or another, in one way or another, 
with this label. All of them, for instance, published in the journal Modern Music. They 
might not have agreed, however, with my definition of the term and might have resented 
my choice to label them with it. I have used modernism in reference to what I have found 
to be the sparse but distinctive ideological features that unite these composers and 
distinguish them from other discourse communities. My use of the term has arisen from 
the specific materials I have studied, and as such may not correspond precisely to other 
modernisms, defined by other scholars in light of other materials.  
In particular, my understanding of modernism differs from those that prioritize style 
as definitional to the movement, counting as modernists, for instance, only those 
composers who worked in a dissonant idiom. All three of the composers of this study 
worked with intense dissonance only at times, and in particular Harrison—whose 
medium from about 1960 onward tended to be consonant and backward-looking to the 
euphoniousness of past centuries—has been championed as having “moved beyond” 
modernism into postmodernism or into some other, broader worldview. I have prioritized 
ideology in my definition of modernism, and the result has been a quite broad net that 
captures both dissonant and non-dissonant styles indifferently, and even captures the 
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outward-looking and backward-looking Harrison. The advantage of this approach is that 
it has allowed me to observe ideological agreement between composers who conceived of 
themselves—and continue to be conceived of by commentators—as bitterly opposed. 
Accounts of modernist ideology often list among its attributes scientism and progress-
orientation. For instance, noting that serialism came to dominate in institutions of 
composition following the Second World War, Born and Hesmondhalgh contrast the 
rising ideological flavor of this modernist movement with the one that preceded it: “The 
earlier modernist (or proto-postmodernist) experiments with representations of others—
whether exotic, nationalistic, or populist—gave way to an increasingly abstract, 
scientistic, and rationalist formalism based still on the near or total negation of 
tonality.”237 Born argues that postwar high modernism asserted musical autonomy in the 
deliberate exclusion of the representation of non-Western music, and denied that it was 
limited by ethnicity. “The lineage that became institutionally and ideologically dominant 
in musical modernism—serialism and its aftermath—and which is defined as an absolute 
and autonomous aesthetic development, won out over the eclecticism of other early 
modernist experiments, including the various forms of aesthetic reference to other 
musics” (p. 18). 
As a study of Cowell and Harrison, my project is an examination of the 
experimentalist tradition that Born/Hesmondhalgh and others have defined in distinction 
from the serialist/”high modernist” vein of modernist composition.238 Without wishing to 
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deny the many important distinctions between, for instance, a Harrison and a Boulez, I 
have found that, in certain regards, these experimentalists were not as different from the 
high modernists of Born/Hesmondhalgh’s description as it might seem. In particular, the 
rationalism and scientism with which those authors characterize high modernism 
characterize Cowell and Harrison as well (we have seen that Harrison’s views on science 
were highly idiosyncratic, but he nevertheless claimed that a science-based certainty 
underlay his endeavors). Musical autonomy, as we have seen, was a key concept in 
McPhee’s representation of “the absolute music of Bali.” And while these composers can 
justifiably be called “eclectic” (and perhaps, in Cowell’s case, “relativist”), they held 
their interests in ethnic differences to a great extent in hopes of developing a relationship 
with musical materials that would be transcendent of ethnicity (in other words, in search 
of a truer, less ethnocentric musical autonomy).  
Intellectual individualism was a tendency of these composers. This does not imply 
isolationism. As we have seen, McPhee, Cowell, and Harrison, though driven to develop 
highly personalized forms of expression, did not work in vacuums. Far from it; 
individualism was a collective value (though, it would seem, it gave rise to the modernist 
myth of isolation that some composers cultivated and has been cultivated on their 
behalf—notably Ives239). By intellectual individualism, I mean the drive to see the world 
                                                                                                                                                 
they were utterly dissimilar. Cowell’s experiementalism was a rationalistic endeavor intended to uncover 
through experimental processes scientifically verifiable truths of music that would yield material 
advancements in musical technology. Cage’s experimentalism was meanwhile conceived as a cultivation of 
equanimious consciousness in relation to musical results, in the manner in which a scientist was charged 
with developing equanimious receptivity to the results of experimentation. In brief, Cowell was interested 
in the products of experiment, while Cage was interested in its processes. While the two attitudes were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (and perhaps were not exclusionary in the minds of all experimental 
composers), for the present purposes, only the experimentalism of the Cowell school is significant. 
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afresh, distinct from all other visions, and to develop a unique aesthetic and moral 
position towards the world. The composers of this study expressed their unique visions 
through writings and compositions. They were influenced by colleagues and sometimes 
gave credit, but each of the modernist composers I have studied was ultimately 
determined to find an utterly distinctive angle upon art, and to develop for himself a voice 
never heard before. (Colin McPhee was impressed with the less individualistic method of 
composition among the Balinese, perhaps out of discontent with the individualism 
required of him in the modernist milieu). 
This modernist individualism has placed a special demand upon me as researcher. As 
I noted in the Introduction, I have had to devote very careful study to each individual’s 
conception of difference, because each was a new creation. Perhaps I have needed to 
employ a more microscopic lens than I would have were I critiquing the writings of 
academics, for whereas academics tend find reward in innovating within well established 
paradigms, these artists claimed their fame through developing idiosyncratic, even 
eccentric personal visions. Harrison in particular went to lengths to reinvent his entire 
“reality,” to an extent that probably would have been untenable had he been an academic.  
All three composers brought their modernist compositional imperative to create 
products of radical originality into their cultural thinking, and the result was that, though 
each devoted himself to very careful study, at times he may have felt legitimized in 
crafting styles of knowledge that were “creative,” but, by academic standards, 
“problematic.” This tension can be seen in the treatises of Harrison and Cowell, devoted 
equally to the task of giving guidance to young composers and to representing the “truth 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ives with his innovations precedes his famous European contemporaries, Schönberg and Stravinsky” 
(“American Composers IX: Charles Ives,” Modern Music 10, no. 1 [November-December 1932]: 29). 
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of music.” A dual function of prescription and representation—in guiding others in 
regards to what was “good” of music on the one hand, and what was “true” of music on 
the other—would not have been likely to motivate anthropological treatises, which are 
conventionally only dedicated to the task of (cultural) representation.240 If these 
composers’ representations of the differences “out there” in the world of music are 
problematic, this fact may be understood as an outcome of the peculiar dual purpose that 
they served.  
All three composers shared a view that there was a “nature” of music: that music was 
not simply a blanket term applied to things invented, performed, and lived with and 
through, but was indeed something “out there” with inherent properties, which it was the 
task of the composer (at least one of any worth) to understand in an innovative way. (All 
three of these composers also allowed for relativism in their own ways.) Cowell based his 
musical truth upon the overtone series and a variety of other systematic manipulations 
and expansions upon the science with which he was familiar. Harrison’s musical truth 
included an interest in just intonation. McPhee used his studies in Bali to discover the 
immanent features of music (emotional expression was not one). In this way, it became 
possible for these three composers to not only make evaluations of the musics of others in 
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terms of whether they were “good” or “bad,” but further to arrive at evaluations of their 
“truth” or “falsehood.”  
Cowell at one point reflected upon this trend of composers becoming increasingly 
interested in allowing their compositional decisions to be guided by notions of what 
music “really was”: “There is an ever-widening interest among musicians and music-
lovers concerning the nature of what is being played, as well as how it is being played” 
(NOM, I: 1). And further, “the study [of harmony] is generally unsatisfactory. [It] has not 
been made into a scientific and reasonable exposition of the subject of harmony. It is a 
leftover from the time when the aim was not to know facts about harmony, but to know 
the conventions of ‘good taste’ as recommended by famous and skilled musicians” 
(NOM, I: 7). 
For each of these composers—in very different and dramatic ways—their inquiries 
into the absolute nature of music were part of a struggle for personal, musical freedom. 
This means that all of these developed theories of the “true” nature of music, were, 
explicitly or not, strategic moves in a battle with other approaches to music-making 
(often dominant and uncompromising approaches). Harrison, for instance, in arguing for 
just intonation and against equal temperament, was claiming the freedom to compose as 
he liked, not simply because he like it, but because it was, after all, “right.” Cowell was 
similar, with his grounding of tone clusters and complex polyrhythms in a single 
scientific system, and his denigration of conventional harmony instruction as haphazard: 
“The conventional study of harmony is neither a science, giving impartial facts 
concerning chords and their connection, nor is it a technique which can be followed in 
order to reach a style in which any composer would wish to write music at the present 
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time” (NOM, I: 10). Conventional harmony instruction had arrogantly represented itself 
as scientific, and it was therefore incumbent upon Cowell to develop a “true” harmonic 
science in order to debunk it and free the student from its many “do nots.” The science of 
non-conventionalism was, it seems, the only weapon for battling the science of 
conventionalism. 
Resentment was a consistent motivating force for these modernists, and adversarial 
concerns gave shape to their ideas through-and-through. All three composers displayed 
marked resentment towards specific dominating musical ideas and styles, and with every 
breath and tone they committed to representing non-Western musical ideas and styles it 
was simultaneously their objective to represent, define, and repute those former ideas and 
styles, which were, in a burdensome sense, “theirs.” Although the object of each 
composer’s resentment was inevitably constructed, those objects were certainly no more 
a fantasy than were the foreign musics that these composers constructed in antithesis to 
them and in confirmation of the validity of their own projects. 
There has perhaps not been anything wholly radical about this dissertation, but in a 
few respects I hope it will offer new analytical perspectives to historical musicology and 
ethnomusicology. I hope to have provided a suggestion of possible ways to extend upon 
the way musicologists examine composers who have composed “interculturally” and 
represented non-Western musics.241 I have striven in this project to avoid either of two 
extremes: on the one hand to uncritically accept these composers’ representations of non-
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Western music, on the other to dismiss their representations as mere exoticism, as a mere 
manipulation of Orientalist tropes rather than as significant engagements with their 
objects worthy of thoughtful consideration. As I discussed in the chapter on McPhee, the 
tendency of some scholarship to move toward one of these extremes or the other—
finding the virtue of authenticity in one composer and vice of exoticism in another—has 
sometimes arisen from external stylistic and ideological issues, which run independently 
from the question of authenticity itself. This said, it is certainly the case that some 
composers have given a great deal of care to their cultural representations, while others 
have approached the matter with frivolity and ethnocentrism, and that scholars have had 
an understandable desire to bring each of these treatments to their readership’s attention. 
This project has focused on three composers who, like many other modernists, could 
not be accused of having simply invented exoticist fantasies. Each devoted careful study 
to their chosen non-Western topics, and each was supremely committed to fidelity, as he 
imagined it might be achieved. The question I have ultimately hoped to have addressed is 
not whether the representations of each composer were true or false, but by what means 
they staked their claim to truth. I have not critiqued these composers’ representations by 
rejecting them in favor of another truth about “the Orient,” or any particular culture.  
I hope that what I have presented may be of interest to ethnomusicologists who are 
giving thought to the epistemological concerns of their field. Like many 
ethnomusicologists, I take the position that the analytical methods for arriving at “pure” 
and “unproblematic” cultural representation do not now exist, and are not likely to exist 
in the foreseeable future. In particular, although I have introduced knowledge developed 
within ethnomusicology’s long-dominant cultural relativist epistemology as a contrast 
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with certain aspects of the knowledges of McPhee, Cowell, and in particular Harrison (I 
also have aimed to suggest that there are continuities between all three and current 
ethnomusicology), I have not done so with the intention of replacing the latter with the 
former. This dissertation presents fragments of ethnomusicology’s ideological heritage 
from the mouths of these composers, and suggests ways in which ethnomusicology can 
become increasingly critical of its own limited modes of understanding difference. 
As I have noted, I began this project with the hope of developing a method of 
analyzing hybrid compositions. In the end I have analyzed the terms by which each 
composer constructed a world in which hybrids could exist. We can know that these were 
not fantasy worlds: in McPhee’s Tabuh-tabuhan, Cowell’s United Quartet, and 
Harrison’s Double Concerto we can hear the “reality” of each. 
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